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Abstract 
 
NGOs now have a history spanning almost three decades in Nepal, with origins that 
are rooted in both party politics and international pressures for liberalisation 
beginning in the mid-1980s. Tens of thousands of national and international NGOs 
work on a range of issues encompassing development, human rights, democracy and, 
most recently, peacebuilding, the vast majority funded and supported by Western 
donors. As NGOs were rising to prominence as a potential force for social change in 
the early 1990s, the Left was also beginning to organise, and denounced NGOs as 
agents of imperialism. The Maoists came to prominence by fighting a revolutionary 
war to improve life for the poor peasant majority, but after a decade-long People’s 
War, the Maoists became incorporated into the parliamentary system. While the 1990 
revolution met formal, popular political demands for democracy, consolidated with 
the overthrow of the monarchy as a result of the 2006 revolution, there has been little 
economic progress for the mass of the population. The Maoists’ subsequent decision 
to join mainstream politics meant that any potential for fundamental economic 
redistribution was postponed, and bourgeois democracy re-stabilised. This 
stabilisation relied on the interplay of two phenomena: an anti-Maoist alliance 
consisting of the international community, business federations, the domestic ruling 
elite and NGOs, and a fundamental ambiguity at the heart of the Maoists’ political 
theory. At a number of crucial moments in the struggle, the Maoists’ conviction that 
Nepal was not economically prepared for social transformation led to moments of 
hesitation and confusion, which were successfully exploited by the state and its 
supporters. The interventions of NGOs in particular played a decisive role in 
resolving these moments of upheaval in ways that protected elite interests and 
facilitated the incorporation of the Maoists into conventional, mainstream politics. 
This process in turn has had a profound impact on the Maoists’ politics and 
organisation. Key priorities and approaches adopted by NGOs have been internalised 
and reproduced by the Maoists, including the foregrounding of ethnic politics over 
class politics, which has the potential to polarise Nepali society along ethnic lines. It 
is argued that such approaches were latent in the Maoists’ theory of revolution but 
were crystallised through the agency of NGOs.  
 10 
Preface 
 
The interaction between the NGO industry and the emergence and evolution of the 
left parties in Nepal is an understudied subject. Yet the nature of this relationship is 
crucial to understanding development and politics—and indeed the politics of 
development—in Nepal, particularly over the last two decades. My engagement with 
Nepal began in November 2001 when I was working for an international NGO called 
International Alert and visited Kathmandu for the first time. It was only months after 
the palace massacre in June, and coincided with the escalation of the war between the 
Maoists and the army. I had joined International Alert the previous year, and was 
developing work on the role of women in peacebuilding. Over the next several years I 
spent much time in Kathmandu and had the opportunity to travel throughout the 
country. These experiences led me to better understand the workings of the broader 
aid industry, and my own role as a well-paid NGO representative in this industry. And 
like many others before and after me, I began to ask uncomfortable questions. What 
did it mean to ‘build peace’ working for an international NGO funded by major 
Western powers? What was the wider role of ‘peacebuilding’ in the vast and 
influential aid industry? Like most capital cities in the developing world, such an 
industry thrives in Kathmandu. I realised that if I claimed to know anything about 
Nepal, I needed to begin to understand not only the nature of this industry, its purpose 
and impact, and its supporters and detractors, but also the nature of poverty and 
inequality, the historical roots of underdevelopment in Nepal and what institutions 
and initiatives were in place to address it. Analysing the role of NGOs was the 
obvious starting point, since I was working for one, and since NGOs are often the 
primary mechanisms through which aid is delivered. But when the war escalated and 
began to influence national politics, one also had to attempt to understand the aims of 
Maoist movement, claiming as it was to be addressing poverty and inequality. As I 
began to learn about the role of NGOs, both on a theoretical level and from my own 
experiences, I developed the view that there was a need to fundamentally reassess this 
role from the perspective of social justice. I soon discovered that I was not alone in 
wanting to develop a more critical and theoretical analysis of NGOs. The need for 
such a reassessment does not imply a blanket rejection of NGOs but a rethinking of 
the terms of their engagement with the aid industry and donor governments in general 
and with left parties in particular. But as I investigated the relationship between NGOs 
and the left parties in Nepal, I also began to understand what made the parties so 
susceptible to being influenced—and in many senses and to varying degrees ‘co-
opted’—by NGOs and NGO ideology; this had to do with a combination of the theory 
and strategy of the Maoist parties. Witnessing the general strike of 2010 was a pivotal 
moment, and to my mind clearly reflected the parallel agendas—at times co-operating 
and at times conflicting—of NGOs and the Left. I attempt here to grasp the nature of 
NGOs as a category, in all its contradictions, begin to offer insights into the essence 
of NGOs, question the respective approaches of NGOs and the left parties to social 
change in Nepal and draw contingent conclusions.  
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I. NGOs and the Left in Nepal 
 
On 1 May 2010 the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) organised 
the biggest May Day rally ever seen in Kathmandu. Hundreds of 
thousands of people participated, with tens of thousands coming from 
outside the capital. Across the country, it was estimated that over a 
million people participated in demonstrations. The mood was jubilant, 
and yet defiant. The rally was followed by a general strike. For five full 
days, there were mass demonstrations, mass meetings in the streets, all 
transport was shut down and shops were closed. The level of 
organisation, discipline, co-operation and creativity shown by the Maoist 
rank and file was remarkable. The immediate demand put forward by the 
Maoist leadership was that Madhav Kumar Nepal, the prime minister at 
the time, resign in order to make way for a national unity government led 
by the Maoists. Those on strike also put forward several other demands: 
that Nepal adopt a ‘people’s constitution’, that national sovereignty be 
upheld, that there be civilian supremacy over the army and that the peace 
process—started in November 2006 with the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) between the Maoists and the 
government—be concluded. The Maoist leadership claimed that the strike 
would continue until these demands were met. But on the sixth day, 
NGOs, businesses, chambers of commerce, journalists, lawyers and 
others held a rally in the centre of Kathmandu, with several thousand 
people in attendance. NGOs in particular, as part of broader ‘civil 
society’, played a crucial role in organising the rally, arguing that it was 
a ‘non-political’ intervention that represented the interests of ‘the people’. 
Their demand was that the Maoists withdraw their strike within 48 hours 
on the grounds that it was disrupting the peaceful functioning of the city 
and was detrimental to the peace process. The ultimatum they gave the 
Maoists was that they would come back out onto the streets in even 
greater numbers. They did not have to wait long. Not only did the Maoists 
withdraw the strike that very evening, Chairman Prachanda publicly 
apologised four days later, calling for national consensus. Much of the 
Maoist rank and file were seething.1  
 
There is an apparent contradiction at the heart of the global NGO phenomenon.2 
Despite a dramatic increase in the levels of funding to NGOs since the 1980s (Lewis 
and Kanji 2009: 2; Riddell 2008: 48; Salamon 1994), technological advances and 
                                                
1 For ease of reference, throughout this work the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) or UCPN 
(Maoist) will generally be referred to as the Maoists. The faction that split from the party in June 2012 
and formed a new party called the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) will be referred to as the CPN 
(Maoist) or the Baidya faction, named after its most prominent leader, Mohan Baidya. CPN will refer 
to the original Communist Party of Nepal formed in 1949, prior to any splits. A history of the 
communist movement in Nepal is detailed in Chapter 2. 
2 The term ‘NGO’ as used in this research refers to non-governmental organisations that operate mainly 
at national and international levels and that work with government donor agencies as their partners 
and/or funders. A more precise definition of the term—and the problems involved in defining the 
term—is found in the methodology section later in this chapter. 
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greater global awareness of uneven development, there appears to have been only 
limited reduction in global poverty and inequality, either within or between countries 
(Wagle 2010; Milanovic 2007; Kiely 2005; Wade 2004).3 While individual NGOs 
have made progress towards exposing injustice and delivering services, the NGO 
sector as a whole has been unable to address the scale and significance of uneven 
development at a global level. This is not to suggest that NGOs are to blame for the 
ills of the world, but if NGOs are a major component of the global aid industry—and 
have increasingly been held up as agents of social change by the World Bank and 
other global institutions—then this raises questions about the impact and effectiveness 
of NGOs and the political and economic paradigm within which they operate. The 
apparent contradiction, in other words, can be explained by examining the role of 
NGOs under neoliberalism and, in particular, their relationships to the neoliberal state. 
Viewed from the perspective that these relationships constrain any serious 
contestation of capitalism and that NGOs must function within neoliberal rationality 
(Fernando 2011: 238), it becomes clear that NGOs are not—nor can be under their 
current manifestations—the main agents in a radical social transformation that is 
arguably necessary to address poverty and inequality. Indeed, they may become 
‘instruments of state power’ (Fernando 2011: 241) that increase rather than decrease 
the vulnerability of populations. Perhaps more significantly, it is arguable that NGOs 
wittingly or unwittingly help to maintain the status quo (Veltmeyer and Petras 2005: 
121-22), not only by propagating neoliberal ideas along with states, but compete with 
other oppositional forces that do actually attempt to threaten or at least challenge the 
neoliberal order, such as those on the organised left.  
 
1.1. Conceptualising NGOs in Nepal 
Five theses constitute the focus of this research. First, while NGOs claim to challenge 
the neoliberal state, they do not challenge the structure of the capitalist system; as 
such, they are contradictory phenomena. They find themselves in contradictory 
positions because in attempting to challenge the very problems that neoliberalism 
gives rise to, NGOs contest but also collaborate with the neoliberal state. As Fernando 
(2011: 237) observes, ‘the political economy of NGOs is perfectly compatible with 
                                                
3 The UNDP’s Human Development Report 2013 is more optimistic, and argues that as global 
economic power is shifting towards the Global South, where the middle classes are growing rapidly in 
size, income and expectations, extreme poverty has fallen from 43.1 per cent in 1990 to 22.4 per cent in 
2008 (UNDP 2013). 
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capitalism’. The approaches that NGOs take to social change have often led to 
contradictory consequences in the real world (Kamat 2002). These include, for 
example, development NGOs implementing microcredit programmes that add another 
layer of uncertainty to the lives of the poorest by drawing them into the market; 
human rights NGOs calling for impunity abroad but ignoring human rights violations 
and systemic corruption at home; conflict resolution NGOs working on initiatives for 
peace but within socio-economic parameters that fail to challenge the causes of 
conflict; or democracy NGOs arguing for Western military interventions that 
undermine democratic processes both at home and abroad. In the case of Nepal, 
NGOs have positioned themselves alongside government donors and 
intergovernmental agencies as leaders in the fight against poverty, and channelled 
large amounts of funding to that end. But it is arguable that poverty alleviation efforts 
have largely failed (Panday 2009); Nepal continues to be one of the poorest countries 
in the world. At least in that sense, NGOs in Nepal are similar to most NGOs 
elsewhere in the world: in approaching the question of social change from the 
perspective of providing charity for those in need, they recognise flaws in the manner 
in which society is organised; at the same time, as partners and recipients of donor 
funding, they have become ‘disciplined according to the logic of capitalist modernity’ 
(Fernando 2011: 234). This logic has limited their ability challenge the ideas and 
activities of neoliberal donors and the international financial institutions (IFIs), and 
instead they have become both advocates and service-providers for these institutions. 
The role of the state and its position in the global economy—particularly when it 
comes to funding and promoting NGOs—features heavily in this analysis because it is 
a constitutive factor in the approach NGOs take to social change. 
 
Second, NGOs cannot be understood in any meaningful sense without referring to the 
donors that fund them. These donors are often Western governments, or foundations, 
institutes and international NGOs associated with Western governments; they also 
often form the sole source of funding for national NGOs. This has significant 
consequences if one considers not only the kind of power and influence donors wield 
in developing country societies but their historical and contemporary imperialist role 
in a global context (Manji and O’Coill 2002; Petras 1999) and, by extension, the 
imperialist ideas they promote. If NGOs and government donors collaborate, and 
funding often means the very survival of NGOs, tending to dictate NGO agendas, 
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then NGOs can hardly be said to be non-governmental (Hallward 2007: 179). In 
Nepal, a number of governmental donors pre-dated the rise of NGOs, and out of the 
tens of thousands of NGOs that exist in Nepal today, only a handful operate without 
funding from donors (Dhakal 2000: 92). Dhakal (2007: 71) estimates that up to 95 per 
cent of Nepali NGOs are funded by donors and international NGOs (INGOs). This 
funding relationship, imposed on but also accepted by NGOs themselves, is 
problematic for reasons that have been well documented and analysed: accountability 
rests with donors and not with beneficiaries, since donors hold the purse strings 
(Hearn 2007; Kamat 2003a; Petras 1999; Hulme and Edwards 1997). The role of 
donor funding and hence the role of NGOs cannot be separated from wider political 
questions, and in particular the contradictions within neoliberalism that allow 
technical approaches to poverty to substitute for fundamental political change.  
 
Third, material and ideological factors not only prevent NGOs from challenging the 
capitalist system, but under certain circumstances, these factors make NGO 
approaches counterproductive to fundamental change. The material and ideological 
roles of NGOs manifest themselves in myriad ways. NGOs exist, at least in part, as 
responses to the effects of neoliberalism, but are also promoted by neoliberalism and 
in particular the neoliberal state: states transfer both funding and ideas to NGOs 
(Fernando 2011; Harvey 2005; Kamat 2002). Donor funding is not merely a series of 
financial transactions that flow from developed to developing or from government to 
non-government; funding creates what Gramsci refers to as the ‘material structure of 
ideology’ consisting of institutions and organisations whose task it is to influence 
common sense (Morton 2007: 130). NGOs are part of this material structure, based on 
an ideological framework that vacillates between preserving the status quo and 
managing social change within certain limits. Gramsci (2011b: 52) emphasises the 
importance of analysing ‘how the ideological structure of a ruling class is actually 
organised: that is, the material organisation meant to preserve, defend, and develop 
the theoretical or ideological “front”’. In the case of Nepal, NGOs have also been 
major players in building an alliance of anti-Maoist forces, whose project has been to 
bring an end to the People’s War without providing an alternative project for social 
transformation. The result has been a strengthening of elite power and a weakening of 
the struggle for equality, human rights and social change. It is true that NGOs in 
Nepal have been responsible for channelling human and financial resources into the 
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country and drawing international attention to specific problems—whether human 
rights violations during the war that were committed by both the Maoists and the 
army, corruption amongst the political elite or the scale and depth of poverty and 
underdevelopment. They have also been responsible for untold numbers of 
development, human rights, peacebuilding and democracy projects, mainly since 
1990, which have had varying degrees of impact (Tamang 2011; Heaton Shrestha and 
Adhikari 2011; Shah 2008a; Chand 1991). But they have not only been unable to 
address (even by their own standards) the problems they identify in relation to 
underdevelopment, human rights violations, conflict, the democratic deficit and so on, 
they have also been unable to provide answers to the causes of these problems. 
Mediated by donors, the NGO approach is not one of a total view of the world but one 
that is fragmented, disconnected and partial.  
 
Fourth, NGOs have been prominent players in civil society and have come to be 
conceptualised as interchangeable with civil society. This is partly because NGOs 
have exercised a kind of hegemony in wider society, given donor support for NGOs. 
That civil society can be reduced to NGOs is misleading in one sense, in that civil 
society as a concept is clearly much more than NGOs, but is not an inaccurate 
description of reality: because NGOs are promoted by donors within civil society, and 
civil society itself is promoted as a ‘virtuous’ space that keeps checks and balances on 
the state, NGO ideas have come to dominate civil society. The notion of civil society 
as promoted by donors, however, is a sanitised version of civil society that neglects 
the fact that it has always been a space of conflict and contestation of ideas, and that 
these ideas play themselves out in social relations. As Fernando (2011: 239) observes, 
‘NGOism has become an even more important tool for disciplining and managing 
potentially counterhegemonic modes of production’. In Nepal, NGOs have also been 
equated with Nepali civil society in both theory and in the popular imagination. This 
is primarily because of their dual role, at times defending the status quo, at other times 
working with sections of the Left that aim to challenge the status quo. During the 
Maoists’ People’s War, the NGO sector had an antagonistic relationship with the 
Maoists, while during the height of the democracy movement in 2006, they sided with 
the movement. Understanding this dual role and the ways in which it is manipulated 
by the state, and negotiated by NGOs themselves, is necessary for understanding 
NGOs in Nepal. Many of the poorest people rely on NGOs for basic services; for the 
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middle classes NGOs are seen as necessary (and a potential source of employment), 
leading either to an unquestioning approval or a reluctant acceptance of their role. 
There is broad acceptance of NGOs in society, despite their contradictions. Yet the 
Maoists were also able to emerge as a political force, one that appeared to question 
the NGO approach to social change, and seemed for a moment to challenge its limits.  
 
Fifth, while NGOs have flourished under neoliberalism, paradoxically, the left parties 
themselves have contributed to the resurgence, maintenance and success of NGOs and 
NGO ideology. This is due in part to the decline of the organised left on a global scale 
since the 1970s, further undermined by the dissolution of the Soviet Union two 
decades later. In Nepal, while the Maoists managed to present a serious challenge to 
mainstream politics, in the contest for influence they ultimately failed to counter the 
gradualist approach of the NGOs. The result has been that NGOs, which now form a 
multi-million dollar industry—and which have become a distinct part of Nepali 
culture and society—have outweighed the influence of the left parties. Most recently, 
NGOs have helped shape not only the Maoists’ strategy and tactics but also their 
overall political trajectory. In indirectly promoting specifically capitalist 
development, NGO approaches and ideology appear to be in direct opposition to the 
Left. But despite their very different origins and dynamics, over a period of time the 
NGO sector and the Left in Nepal have both come to work according to a gradualist 
framework, adopting the view that social development will be the outcome of decades 
or even centuries of gradual change. While the Maoists at times recognised the 
problems associated with the role of NGOs, and adopted an arguably uncompromising 
anti-NGO position for much the war, in the post-2006 context they have been 
unwilling and unable, in different ways, to challenge the influence of NGOs. The 
dynamics of this convergence are complex; on the one hand they involve an intricate 
mix of pragmatism and theoretical ambiguity on the part of the Maoists, and on the 
other, deep contradictions and an enormous strategic effort—which is at least partly 
conscious—on the part of NGOs and their donors. The outcome of this 
accommodation has been to facilitate the Maoists’ drift from a revolutionary strategy 
to an acceptance of the official political process as the only credible and realistic path 
to change. The Maoists’ path has not been enacted solely through an accumulation of 
experience with establishment institutions. It is not simply the case that the Maoists 
have shifted from radical idealism to political realism through a series of defeats or 
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through the sobering influence of moderate political forces, though the proliferation of 
NGOs in Nepali society has had a deep impact on the Maoists’ line of development. 
The Maoists’ theoretical framework has disarmed them, and perhaps even 
predisposed them, in the right circumstances, to work according to the logic of NGOs.  
 
1.1.1. Explaining NGOs and the Left in Nepal 
The description of the general strike and its aftermath at the outset of the thesis aptly 
illustrates the complex and contradictory relationship between the Maoists and NGOs. 
Using the rhetoric of ‘peace’, NGOs presented themselves as having an apolitical 
response to the war, and were promoted by the mainstream as neutral actors. In reality 
this position was as ideological as the Maoists’ position: the Maoists’ ability to 
mobilise large numbers in favour of the strike threatened the interests of the 
government and its allies—businesses, the media and NGOs—and they were 
compelled to organise a response. Instead of exploiting the class polarisation that the 
general strike had created, within a few days the Maoist leadership admitted defeat, 
thoroughly confusing the Maoist rank and file. On the one hand, the Maoists 
underestimated the role of NGOs. If NGOs are ultimately grounded in capitalist 
relations and the imperialist interests that currently exist in Nepal, as this work 
attempts to demonstrate, then NGOs have the potential to be an essentially counter-
revolutionary force, whose significance the Maoists neglected. The pressures applied 
to the Maoists, particularly on entering mainstream politics, not only by bourgeois 
politicians and donors but also by NGOs—to be realistic about the possibilities for 
change, to relegate the fight for justice to abstract notions of human rights and to 
accept the framework of the market, amongst others—have resulted in the loss of a 
revolutionary perspective as the dominant perspective within the party.4 This is 
important because the Maoists had spent almost two decades stoking a revolutionary 
process in Nepal that had questioned obscene levels of poverty, vast inequality, and 
the prospects for fundamental change within the existing bourgeois democratic 
framework. Poverty and inequality are also of central concern to NGOs. The Maoists, 
however, at least initially, realised the need to go further: they raised the level of 
political consciousness of the population (Shneiderman 2010), and this increased 
                                                
4 This loss of a revolutionary perspective was the basis for significant ideological differences within the 
leadership, and which led to the official split in the party in June 2012 and the formation of the 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), led by Mohan Baidya.  
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consciousness had been a major factor in the Maoists’ success in facilitating the 
overthrow of the monarchy and marginalising the right, whose ideas related to 
monarchy, class and caste have dominated Nepal for centuries (Mikesell 1999; Shaha 
1990). On the other hand, the Maoists overestimated the power of NGOs. Once in 
government, they moved from an analysis considering both the subjective and 
objective conditions for revolution, to one that considered only the objective 
conditions: it would be impossible for the Maoists to reject the efforts of the NGO 
industry given the level of Nepal’s development. During the early 1990s, in contrast, 
the Maoists had consciously planned a series of interventions based on an overall 
strategy to change the course of history; this included launching a war and building a 
movement. The objective conditions for revolution remained the same, however; it 
was the Maoists who had changed their strategy. The withdrawal of the general strike 
exemplified this capitulation towards the agendas of NGOs.  
 
Through an examination of Nepal’s contemporary political history and the role of 
NGOs in shaping this history, this research traces the origins of the NGO sector in the 
struggle for democracy by the political parties, outlines the nature of the communist 
movement in Nepal and describes the relationship between NGOs and the left-wing 
political parties, drawing conclusions that point to flaws with their respective—and 
unexpectedly similar—approaches to social change. In a country where the NGO 
sector has become a veritable industry, and yet where the revolutionary aims of the 
Maoists have had clear resonance amongst large sections of the population, measuring 
the respective approaches of NGOs and the Left, and examining the relationship 
between them, facilitates an understanding of which approaches have been effective 
and why. Of the many criticisms hailed against NGOs, they have also been accused of 
weakening the revolutionary left (Fernando 2011; Kamat 2002; Chintan 2000; Petras 
1999) by diverting potential support for revolution towards an accommodation with 
the neoliberal order. It is this complicated relationship between NGOs and neoliberal 
states—inherently co-operative but antagonistic at times of social instability—that 
structures the relationship between NGOs and the Left.  
 
1.1.2. The logic of capital 
The extent to which Nepal is neoliberal—measured by the extent to which Nepal has 
embarked on neoliberal reforms and the modalities, degree and depth of its integration 
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into the global economy—is relevant for this analysis because it has an impact on the 
validity of the Maoists’ analysis of Nepal as semi-feudal, which in turn has 
implications on what kind social change is possible in Nepal. Despite their obvious 
differences, the Maoists and the NGOs share a theory of social change that postpones 
social transformation to the distant future. The Maoists’ theoretical analyses are 
complex and evolving, but one central theme has been that despite the problems 
generated by the history of capitalist evolution in developing countries, socialism is 
impossible in countries with a low technological and economic base, and therefore 
capitalist development in the short-term is not only possible, but also necessary and 
desirable. NGOs clearly share the assumption that there is a problem with purely free 
market models of development—their very existence is witness to this. Nevertheless, 
if at times only in a negative sense, NGOs accept the framework of the market as the 
only practical terrain on which to pursue development (Pearce 2000: 20). NGOs have 
campaigned for limited changes at the legal or constitutional level, while at other 
times have joined mass popular campaigns for change. In general, however, the NGO 
approach to social change has involved internalising market logic and operating on 
the basis that capitalist economic growth will, with some tweaking at the margins, 
eventually bring about greater equality and prosperity for the majority. The Maoists’ 
vacillating policy towards NGOs, and the convergence between them, is at least partly 
the result of a theoretical framework that also envisions equality and prosperity only 
at some unspecified point in the future.  
 
A political economy analysis supports the argument that NGOs have been a key part 
of Nepal’s liberalisation process since the mid-1980s. Material and ideological factors 
have facilitated NGOs to push an anti-communist policy that can be traced back even 
prior to the Cold War. These policies are reflected in the work, discourse and ideology 
of NGOs in Nepal and their relationships to political parties. An analysis of the 
geopolitics of the region is also necessary because the history of NGOs is Nepal is 
bound up with Nepal’s geopolitical position between China to the north and India on 
its southern border, and geopolitical factors have influenced both the level and type of 
assistance Nepal has obtained. While geopolitics may seem unrelated to an analysis of 
NGOs and the Left, it is integral to the role and history of NGOs, and foreign 
assistance more generally, in the country. Cold War politics made Nepal an attractive 
place for global and regional powers and, since the 1950s, the US, Britain, Japan, 
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Russia, China and India, amongst others, have spent billions of dollars on Nepal’s 
development efforts, while at the same time boosting trade links and ensuring that 
Nepal’s borders, markets and macroeconomic policies are increasingly liberalised. 
The attention paid to Nepal by global and regional powers, however, was also due to 
the establishment of the Communist Party of Nepal in 1949, and the rapid growth and 
popularity of left-wing ideas.  
 
Such international interest has influenced the Left in complex ways, and is not 
unconnected to the transformation that has been taking place on the Left in Nepal 
since the early 1990s, primarily the rightward shift of the Communist Party of Nepal 
(Unified Marxist Leninist) or UML, which has occurred alongside its efforts to 
strengthen its links to the NGO sector. The UML embraced NGOs as a way of 
bolstering its credibility as a left-wing party, building a base in the rural areas and 
directing money into the party. Many UML leaders believed the party would be able 
to withstand donor pressures, but the UML is now virtually indistinguishable from its 
former nemesis, the Nepali Congress.5 Clearly this process is not only the product of 
relations between the parties and the NGOs, but these links have played a crucial role 
in the UML’s transformation. This research considers the degree to which the Maoists 
are undergoing this same process, a process that began towards the end of the war but 
accelerated following their entry into the mainstream. There is compelling evidence 
that the Maoists have been co-opted by NGOs, but it is also the Maoists’ theoretical 
framework—despite ten years of armed struggle, the support of millions and a 
relatively firm anti-NGO policy—that has prevented them from challenging the 
reformism of NGOs. There are both subjective and objective factors at play here: it is 
both the case that the objective situation—Nepal’s geopolitical position, its 
relationship to India and the US, its terrain and level of underdevelopment and so 
on—that convinces at least some Maoists that NGOs are a necessary evil; but the 
Maoists’ analysis of the political economy of Nepal, their focus on development as a 
nationalist project, and their acceptance that the degree of economic development 
determines the level of consciousness of the Nepali working class, also makes them 
vulnerable to the influence and ideas of NGOs.  
 
                                                
5 The UML’s shift rightward, analysed in Chapter 4, created the space that allowed the Maoists to 
present themselves as an alternative. 
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1.2. Critiquing NGOs 
A critique of NGOs initially emerged in the mid-1980s, falsifying the idea that NGOs 
had a comparative advantage over states ‘more or less at the very moment that it was 
first promulgated’ (Tvedt 2006: 678). But it was only in the mid-1990s that a critical 
literature consisting of independent academic analyses began to develop (Hearn 2007: 
1096), reflecting the realisation that after decades of development, in which NGOs 
have played a central role, problems of poverty and inequality were persistent. Hearn 
(2007: 1096) distinguishes three main types of critique.6 The first, led by NGOs 
themselves, offer technical or micro solutions to the problems that NGOs encounter, 
mainly in implementation and the realisation of objectives as stated in project 
proposals to donors. The second type primarily comes from within academia, drawing 
on empirical evidence and going further than NGO-led critiques. Finally, the radical 
critiques attempt to understand NGOs in historical and political terms, seeking to 
problematise development failures and offer political explanations for these failures. 
In the process, the radical critiques adopt a more nuanced approach to the study of 
NGOs: on the one hand, NGOs cannot be dismissed as ‘agents of imperialism’ 
because recent history demonstrates that, in alliance with other social forces and 
under polarised political conditions, NGOs have resisted neoliberal policies and their 
effects; on the other hand, the ‘default position’ of NGOs is to stabilise and defend the 
neoliberal order. The boundaries between these different types of critiques are not 
fixed, as many of the academic critiques are NGO-led and many of the radical 
critiques are also based within academia.  
 
1.2.1. NGO-led critiques 
Critics from within the NGO sector engage in what Igoe and Kelsall (2005: 16) 
describe as ‘an internal critical discourse that is conducted by NGO staff themselves, 
aided by researchers closely linked to the NGO industry’. These critiques range from 
offering practical and immediate solutions to project implementation to the need to 
reform global institutions, pressure governments to ensure better governance and 
promote greater accountability amongst NGOs. They draw heavily on field 
experience and the publications of government and UN agencies, multilateral 
                                                
6 These critiques are adapted from Hearn (2007), who argues that the theorisation of NGOs in the 
1980s was embedded in (neo)liberal assumptions, and that it was only in the mid-1990s that the critical 
literature on NGOs began to be theorised outside of neoliberal thinking. 
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institutions and other NGOs. NGOs with more resources and a greater capacity for 
reflection often argue for a more serious consideration of the failures of development. 
An influential book by Oxfam’s Duncan Green (2008: 11-29) calls for ‘active citizens 
and effective states’ to address poverty and inequality, arguing that poverty is not only 
about economic growth but essentially about self-confidence and political 
empowerment, and states upholding international obligations. The weakness of this 
approach, however, is the implicit premise that poverty and powerlessness are brought 
about at the micro-level rather than being systemic, and that what is needed is external 
intervention to build the capacity of the poor to ‘realise their rights’ (Green 2008: 28). 
The notion of being an active citizen potentially implies looking for individual or 
technical solutions to structural problems. But this analysis also avoids moving 
beyond a discourse of rights to confront structural and systemic issues, which are 
responsible for the reproduction of poverty over time (Bush 2007). Green (2008: 5) 
writes that ‘extreme inequality provokes outrage and condemnation, because it 
violates the widely held notion that all people, wherever they are, enjoy certain basic 
rights’. This not only implies that a certain level of inequality is acceptable, but does 
not provide a means to realise human rights. At the same time, it appeals to the moral 
obligations of states to promote the idea of human rights and neglects the fact that 
state incentives for meeting international human rights obligations are often absent, 
but are also impossible to achieve without fundamental structural change. 
 
Fowler (1998: 152) argues for trust-based partnerships between northern and southern 
NGOs that ‘transcend the funding element in relationships’ in the face of growing 
emphasis on the contract-based relationships encouraged by donors. While 
relationships of power between donors and NGOs are acknowledged, this analysis 
appears to rely on the will of NGOs to overcome structures of power and tends to 
ignore powerful constraints on NGO agency. Hilhorst (2003: 5) also presents an 
analysis of NGOs that is ‘founded on an actor orientation’ arguing that because NGOs 
have agency, they can effectively escape hegemonic development discourses. But, as 
Tvedt (2006: 680) argues, donors and political leaders have had an interest in 
promoting an independent image of NGOs because this independence ‘has made them 
useful politically and given the system as a whole added legitimacy’. The issue of 
agency is vital to understanding the potential of NGOs. Wallace et al. (2007: 13) 
argue that as part of the ‘international aid chain’, with donors at the top and 
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beneficiaries at the bottom, relationships with donors are not only about compliance 
but also resistance. Wallace et al. (2007: 5) conclude that this ‘shows that NGOs are 
not simply clones of the aid industry and they can take independent action in 
opposition to the dominant development paradigms’. But while northern NGOs are 
able to negotiate relationships with donors, just as southern NGOs negotiate 
relationships, they are also constrained by donors. While NGOs both influence and 
are influenced by the reality of the political and economic structures in which they 
operate, these structures are ultimately more powerful than NGO agency.  
 
Although many of the NGO-led critiques have produced valuable empirical data and 
ideas for better practice, NGO agency is problematised solely in terms of the 
subjective commitment and compassion of individuals and organisations rather than 
the objective situation in which they operate. The starting point is that while donors 
have compromised the independence of NGOs, they are nevertheless capable of 
withstanding these constraints, particularly in partnership with southern NGOs and 
beneficiaries. NGOs do have agency, but this overly subjective analysis fails to 
examine NGO agency in the context of capitalist relations: the nature of the neoliberal 
state, the political uses of funding and the role of partnership in integrating southern 
NGOs into dominant political and economic structures. More immediately, capitalist 
relations impose material constraints on NGOs that determine their very survival. 
 
1.2.2. Academic critiques 
A whole spectrum of academic critiques delves more deeply into the contrast between 
the scale of poverty and inequality and how NGOs have attempted to address these 
issues. While these critiques also consider technical problems associated with 
implementation, they situate these problems in the context of power relationships 
between northern and southern NGOs and the limitations that funding relationships 
impose on NGO agency. They comprehensively detail the pressures that donors place 
on NGOs, including increased competition for limited funding, expectations to 
‘professionalise’ operations, the need to align strategies with official aid policies, 
show visible and quantifiable results, and ‘scale up’ activities. Indeed, many academic 
critics of NGOs have warned against this new paradigm of managerialism, and the 
crisis of identity and legitimacy facing NGOs (Pearce 2010: 630). While both donor 
pressures and the limitations of NGOs are taken seriously, many of the critics are 
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ultimately hopeful of the potential of NGOs. Bebbington et al. (2008: 5) note that, 
‘one of the disappointments of NGOs has been their tendency to identify more readily 
with alternative forms of interventions than with more systemic changes, and that 
there are strong grounds for reversing this trend’. Fernando (2011: xi) argues that 
NGOs ‘have played, and will continue to play, a central role in producing new ideas 
and leadership for politically meaningful social transformation’. While this research 
draws on a range of academic critiques, and does not argue for the dismissal of 
NGOs, it does argue that the evidence for this optimism is contested. 
 
Several authors illustrate the connections between neoliberalism and NGOs. Salamon 
(1994: 114) points to one of the most visible links, noting, ‘the conservative 
governments of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher made support for the 
voluntary sector a central part of their strategies to reduce government social 
spending’. Derksen and Verhallen (2008: 221) refer to the global aid chain as having 
been ‘successfully integrated into the neoliberal development paradigm’ and that aid 
is effectively defined by governments ‘subcontracting NGOs to perform services that 
the government itself is unable to undertake, and… on terms wholly defined by the 
state’ (2008: 231). Wallace et al. (2007: 26) also note that the work of NGOs is 
increasingly being defined in neoliberal terms. Lewis and Opoku-Mensah (2006: 665) 
acknowledge that ‘the particular flexibility of NGOs as an institutional form within 
neoliberal policy agendas has ensured that non-governmental actors have remained 
prominent within international development and humanitarian policy’, suggesting that 
NGOs are working with rather than challenging neoliberal policies. Elsewhere, Lewis 
(2001: 31) notes that ‘for neoliberals, NGOs are part of the private sector and provide 
vehicles for increasing market roles and advancing the cause of privatisation’. As 
neoliberalism has transformed the core concepts of alternative development into ideas 
that help sustain the neoliberal project, the goals of abolishing poverty and inequality 
have become sidelined, and NGOs have become useful for the neoliberal project.  
 
Working with and under neoliberal governments has inevitably produced constraints 
on NGOs’ ostensible role in mediating between donors and beneficiaries. Cooley and 
Ron (2002: 6) argue that far from advancing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
NGOs, the ‘marketisation of aid’ has generated dysfunctional outcomes, where 
material incentives determine strategic choices in a highly competitive aid market. 
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Others suggest that the project-based work of NGOs, as dictated by donors, raises 
questions about NGO legitimacy and representation that NGOs are ill-equipped to 
answer (Lister 2003: 176; Van Rooy 2001: 38). Several authors also refer to problems 
with NGO bureaucratisation, accountability and co-option (Lewis and Opoku-Mensah 
2006: 668; Kamat 2003a: 66; Hayden 2002: 56). Framed partly in response to 
inadequate results, Wallace et al. (2007: 25) discuss the new aid mechanisms created 
by the World Bank, IMF and other donors, which oblige NGOs to be watchdogs of 
government yet also reliant on them for funding. But in order to show results, there 
are pressures on NGOs to scale up activities. Edwards and Hulme (1992: 17) argue 
that NGOs concerned with maximising impact and influencing government policy 
must accept, as a starting point, the constraints and difficulties of working with 
government. Yet this analysis places insufficient weight on the role of the state in 
reproducing dominant (neoliberal) ideologies that ultimately militate against the 
ability of NGOs to maximise impact. 
 
The solutions proposed by critics in academia are many and varied. For Wallace et al. 
(2007: 177-78), forging relationships between northern and southern NGOs is key to 
challenging the norms set out by donors. For Derksen and Verhallen (2008: 234), 
devolution of power to local organisations and consultations with beneficiaries are 
crucial to addressing donor pressures. For this they point to changing their own 
organisation as the most effective way of ‘reinventing the system’ of aid, placing the 
need for change on individual NGOs. Van Rooy (2001: 40) is more sanguine about 
the role of NGOs, suggesting that northern NGOs should build on their strengths by 
confining themselves to working on humanitarian operations and scrutinising the 
worst effects of capitalism. A number of these analyses suggest the need to draw on 
both theory and practice to overcome constraints to implementation. Lewis and 
Opoku-Mensah (2006: 674) conclude that the controversy surrounding NGOs is due 
to the ‘lack of a sound research foundation on the topic of NGOs’ and suggest that 
any further research should have stronger connections with social science theory and 
be located ‘more firmly within the structural context in which NGO activities take 
place’. Wallace et al. (2007: 3) also note that ‘research on NGOs rarely engages 
seriously with the relationship between theory, policy and practice’. According to 
Hearn (2007: 1096) the main weakness of many of the academic critiques is that they 
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remain under-theorised, and fail to adequately contextualise the contradictory roles of 
NGOs in ultimately reinforcing capitalist relations.  
 
1.2.3. Radical critiques 
Many of the radical critiques are drawn from the Marxist tradition, attempting to ask 
key questions about ‘who is the social change for and what are its structural 
impediments’ (Pearce 2010: 631), in order to move beyond technical and non-political 
assumptions. A number of radical critics argue that NGOs have not been able to 
address the effects of neoliberalism because they have both adopted and been shaped 
by it. For Harvey (2003: 78), NGOs have played an important role in the 
dissemination of neoliberal ideas. The notion of individual liberty, for example, was 
an important prerequisite for the resurgence of NGOs, which were in many cases 
established for the purpose of helping to reinforce ideas about individual rights. 
Harvey notes that ‘the rise of advocacy groups and NGOs has, like rights discourses 
more generally, accompanied the neoliberal turn and increased spectacularly since 
1980 or so’ (2003: 78). In his study of politics in Haiti, Hallward (2007: 181) argues 
that while NGOs are apparently preoccupied with civic virtue and impartiality they 
now ‘provide the main institutional and ideological mechanism for the reproduction 
of Haiti’s ruling class’. In Thailand, where the NGOs backed a coup overthrowing the 
democratically elected Thai Rak Thai government, Ungpakorn (2009) writes that 
NGOs have disgraced themselves by siding with conservative royalists and 
‘remaining silent in the face of the general attack on democracy’. Kamat (2004: 155) 
has conducted some of the most comprehensive theoretical research on NGOs. In her 
research on community-based organisations (CBOs) and select NGOs in India, she 
argues that ‘the policy debate on NGOs exemplifies the conflict between liberalism 
and socialism’. By focusing on a sociological framework of state versus civil society, 
where NGOs are equated with civil society and mediate the excesses of the state, 
mainstream debates conceal the ways in which NGOs are integrated into capitalist 
relations. Kamat concludes that the theoretical explanation for this shift by the 
international community, away from the state and towards civil society, is the 
reconstitution of the meaning of public and private in an effort to privatise the public 
sphere, including at local levels, according to the interests of the neoliberal state. 
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These critiques also suggest a neo-colonial role for at least some NGOs. Researching 
urbanisation and the growth of urban slums, Davis (2007: 76) describes NGOs as the 
true beneficiaries of development, where ‘the actual power relations in this new NGO 
universe resemble nothing so much as traditional clientelism’. Wallace (2004) shows 
how northern NGOs ultimately end up competing with southern NGOs—the very 
people they aim to help—for limited donor funds. But these trends are less theorised. 
Hearn (2007: 1101) applies comprador theory, first used to theorise the nature of 
imperialism in the 1920s, to understand the role of select NGOs in Ghana, Uganda 
and South Africa. She argues that there were several factors that contributed to the 
Africanisation of the NGO sector but that it was ‘both a conscious and a structural 
process’, including increased direct funding to southern NGOs—particularly when a 
heavy foreign presence became politically unsustainable—and the proliferation of 
indigenous NGOs, led by the African petit bourgeoisie relying on foreign funding as a 
safety net in the midst of deteriorating economic conditions. Manji and O’Coill (2002: 
574) maintain that the work of NGOs from the 1980s was not unlike the philanthropic 
zeal of their missionary predecessors, only ‘this time with a vocabulary consistent 
with the new age of modernity’. They argue that Europeans were playing a ‘civilising’ 
or ‘developing’ role in Africa. These analyses focus on the financial and political 
dependence of NGOs and the material and ideological roles of national NGOs in 
perpetuating Western imperialism, as a basis for understanding the role of NGOs in 
global political economy terms.  
 
The worldwide growth of mass-based resistance to neoliberal trends at the end of the 
1990s presented a considerable challenge to neoliberal ideas, and radical critics have 
also turned their attention to the impact of NGOs on social movements. These 
movements had their roots neither in the NGO sector nor solely in left parties, though 
they were influenced and shaped by the politics of both. Roy (2004) describes the 
mechanism through which resistance is depoliticised: ‘The capital available to NGOs 
plays the same role in alternative politics as the speculative capital that flows in and 
out of the economies of poor countries. It begins to dictate the agenda. It turns 
confrontation into negotiation. It depoliticises resistance’. Harvey (2003: 189) 
describes how ‘a burgeoning movement of non-governmental organisations (some 
sponsored by governments) sought to control these social movements and orient them 
towards particular channels, some of which were revolutionary but others of which 
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were about accommodation to the neoliberal regime of power’. Davis (2007: 76) 
argues that ‘NGOs have proven brilliant at co-opting local leadership as well as 
hegemonising the social space traditionally occupied by the left’, while Kaldor (2003: 
86-88) suggests that NGOs are the tamed transformation of the social movements of 
the 1970s and 1980s when they came to be seen as mechanisms for implementing the 
ideological formula of markets and elections in the 1990s. These radical critiques 
theorise NGOs in the context of historical power relations and the political and 
economic system in which they are embedded. They consider the structural forces that 
shape the class nature and role of NGOs, and they highlight the contradictions 
between the objectives and outcomes of NGOs by considering the material realities of 
intended beneficiaries together with the stated intentions of NGOs. Although 
relatively few of the radical critiques consider the implications of the relationship 
between NGOs and neoliberalism for movements and the Left, they nevertheless offer 
the most concrete basis for understanding the role of NGOs and answering the 
theoretical questions posed for the purposes of this research. 
 
1.3. NGOs and the development illusion in Nepal 
The pursuit of development in the traditional sense—large-scale infrastructure or 
social programmes funded by foreign donors—only began in Nepal after the fall of 
the Rana dictatorship in 1951.7 In the early 1950s, the literacy rate was 2 per cent, 
there were no motorable roads outside Kathmandu (Brown 1996: 63) and the vast 
majority of the population was engaged in subsistence farming, with few agricultural 
markets (Mihaly 1965: 9). Such was the context in which donors were to construct the 
aid industry in Nepal. The end of the Rana era and the marginal easing of political 
suppression created at least the potential for development, and even though the 
panchayat system—established with the royal coup of 1960—had preserved the stark 
socio-economic inequality of the Rana period, successive panchayat governments had 
to prove that monarchical rule was an improvement for the mass of the population.8 
Development had to figure in government plans.  
 
                                                
7 The events that led up to the 1950-51 revolution, and the establishment and workings of the 
panchayat system that replaced it, are described in more detail in Chapter 2. 
8 In the foreword to Devendra Raj Panday’s provocatively titled book Nepal’s Failed Development, 
Harka Gurung puts it bluntly: ‘That development failed during the three decades of the panchayat 
regime is obvious from its basic ideology of maintaining the status quo even if the country got further 
pauperised’ (2009: vii). 
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1.3.1. The foreign aid landscape 
King Mahendra ascended the throne after King Tribhuvan’s death in 1955 and 
immediately began to develop and centralise state institutions. The National Planning 
Commission (NPC) was set up in 1955, and in 1956 Nepal negotiated an aid 
agreement with China for US$126 million, much to the dismay of India (Mihaly 
1965: 67). That same year, Nepal embarked on the implementation of its First Five-
Year Plan, combining targets for the economy with projected expenditure on 
development and guidelines for the private sector’s contribution to meeting these 
targets (Whelpton 2005: 125). Eugene Bramer Mihaly (1965: 75), an American aid 
advisor who wrote a key text on foreign aid to Nepal in the 1960s, observes that the 
spirit of the plan was difficult to challenge; it stipulated that ‘development must be 
rooted in the real wants and aspirations of the people’, that it must benefit the entire 
population and that it must have widespread support based on a sense of justice. On 
financing this development, the plan made it clear that Nepal would have to rely 
heavily on foreign aid, but cautioned that aid must not compromise Nepal’s 
independence and national self-interest (1965: 76). Mihaly argues that his optimism 
was misplaced, since the infrastructure to raise domestic revenues—mainly through 
increased taxation—was lacking. Not only did Nepal have to rely heavily on foreign 
aid, but this aid would compromise Nepal’s independence and national interests, since 
it was being used as a foreign policy tool.  
 
Describing the role of foreign aid in the 1950s and 60s, Joshi and Rose (1966: 472) 
wrote that among Asian states there was perhaps none whose economic development 
programme was more dependent on foreign assistance than Nepal’s. During the first 
two decades of assistance, foreign aid mainly took the form of grants. It was only 
after 1970 that the proportion of loans started to increase (Mihaly 1965: liii-lvi). From 
the late 1980s Nepal became even more reliant on external loans, leading to greater 
debt, which ultimately led to ‘more stringent aid conditions to correct structural 
imbalances caused by the debt itself’ (Khadka 1997: 1056). Khadka argues that this 
could be interpreted as direct interference in Nepal’s internal affairs because the 
conditions attached to the aid were that recipients would have to adopt free market 
economic policies, correct macroeconomic imbalances, deregulate the economy and 
implement decentralisation policies (1997: 1059). There was also pressure to privatise 
state-owned industries, cut subsidies and public expenditure and increase the price of 
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electricity and other public services. The Nepali Congress government elected in 1959 
and subsequent royalist governments during the panchayat era had acknowledged that 
foreign aid had complicated Nepal’s efforts to produce a comprehensive economic 
development programme. Successive governments had assumed, correctly, that all aid 
programmes were driven by political considerations (Joshi and Rose 1966: 474). Yet, 
according to Schloss (1983: 1117), offers of assistance were accepted ‘regardless of 
their compatibility with the development plan’ because domestic resources were 
deemed to be lacking and basic data on the economy prevented any detailed ordering 
of development priorities. As planning became more sophisticated, the government 
concluded that it could exploit the competition between donors to its own advantage 
(1983: 1120). Reducing dependence on India was a key priority. As a result, Nepal 
was always seeking to diversify aid sources, but this required skilled political 
maneuvering and often made for a greater lack of co-ordination among donors, 
leaving Nepal with highly inconsistent aid and vulnerable to manipulation and 
pressures to accept aid on the terms of the donors. For example, when Nepal 
requested aid from India to construct the East-West Highway, Nepal suggested that 
the project would only have economic utility if north-south roads were constructed 
first. Recognising that this would enable direct contact between different regions of 
the country without having to cross into India—thus reducing Nepal’s reliance on 
India—Indian officials turned down the project (1983: 1120). It was only when King 
Mahendra secured aid from the USSR, and then China, that India agreed to construct 
a portion of the road (1983: 1123). As ever, Nepal had aspirations to increase its own 
share of the development budget, but this was considered unlikely given the lack of 
substantial sources of indigenous revenue. 
 
1.3.2. Limited development 
Post-1950, important improvements were made in education, infrastructure, malaria 
eradication, infant mortality, communication and basic healthcare, amongst other 
sectors. Whelpton (2005: 137) notes that education expanded rapidly after 1971, with 
more than half a million students in higher secondary and tertiary education 
(compared to under 2,000 in 1950), and 3 million in primary school, with a literacy 
rate that jumped from 5 per cent in 1952 to 40 per cent in 1991. Infant mortality was 
halved, to 10 per cent. Whereas during the Rana period there were few cars in Nepal, 
 31 
by the early 1980s road networks had expanded throughout the country.9 Air travel 
had also increased substantially, with 42 airfields across the country (2005: 138-39). 
Communications within Nepal were improved through an expanded postal service, 
and telephone lines increased from only 25 in 1951 to 63,000 by 1990. Radio 
coverage reached 90 per cent of the population and TV covered 25 of the urban 
population by the late 1980s (2005: 139). Several hydropower projects were also 
completed, and power generation went from 1.1 MW in 1951 to 160 MW in 1990. 
Panday (2009: 44) also notes improvements in industry, which contributed almost 10 
per cent of GDP in 1991, and services, which contributed nearly 40 per cent of total 
national output. Foreign aid contributed significantly to all these advances (Gurung 
1984: 65). Despite progress, however, uneven development remains a challenge. The 
main problem Panday sought to investigate was the source of stagnation and the 
reasons behind the inadequacy of development. 
 
Several factors at least partly explain limited development in Nepal. The first is that 
development was used to reinforce a nationalist project that privileged the Nepali 
language and the culture of high-caste Bahuns above all else. Brown (1996: 63) 
observes that ‘poverty was not alleviated and, instead, development assistance was 
utilised to preserve and entrench the power of the panchayat elites’. Whelpton (2005: 
180) notes that the panchayat was widely seen as a tool that was used to specifically 
further Bahun domination. The panchayat government’s model of state-led 
development was aimed at facilitating national integration along specific class and 
caste lines. It was the hill culture of the Bahuns in particular that the panchayat system 
sought to promote at the expense of the cultures of other ethnic groups. Donors were 
permitted to provide the necessary funds and technical assistance if they were broadly 
consistent with government development plans, but development was a secondary 
project for the panchayat. A good example of how development was used to promote 
hill culture was the 1964 Land Reform Act, where ethnic minorities were prohibited 
from clearing and cultivating tribal land under the kipat system, under which rights to 
land were based on membership of a particular ethnic group (Regmi 1972: 27). Under 
the new regulations, the government instituted a resettlement programme, in which 
                                                
9 Famously, the cars that were operating in Nepal during the Rana period had to be carried over the 
hills from India by porters (Hoftun et al. 1999: 94). The road network had expanded from 276 
kilometres in 1951 to 7,330 kilometres in 1990 (Whelpton 2005: 137).  
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hill people moved to the plains.10 The expansion of the presence of high-caste hill 
people—representing ‘authentic’ Nepalis—was meant to strengthen the legitimacy of 
the hill elite, but the subjugation of ethnic minorities ultimately strengthened 
opposition to panchayat rule. Besides this, only 30,000 hectares of land was collected 
by the government and distributed to the landless (Whelpton 2005: 142) under the 
reformed legislation. 
 
A second reason was Nepal’s dependence on the Indian economy and the resulting 
diversion of manpower from Nepal to India. Many Nepalis, particularly from the hills, 
were recruited into the British Indian Army or migrate to northern India where job 
prospects are often considerably better. Seasonal migration is necessary for many 
agricultural labourers in order to survive, but it has at times weakened the hill 
economy of Nepal by reinforcing economic ties to India (Seddon 2002: 143). Shrestha 
(1990: 82) has argued that the economic contribution of Nepali emigrants to India has 
lost vital human resources to Nepal’s economy. On the other hand, particularly in 
recent years, it has been recognised as an important livelihood strategy that has 
expanded social networks and skills (Thieme and Wyss 2005: 85). The vastly superior 
infrastructure in India also means that east-west travel in the hills can be far simpler 
via India than through Nepal, the open border facilitating communication and easy 
access between the two countries. Indian aid and investment, particularly early road 
projects, were geared towards expanding India’s business interests and fortifying its 
strategic defence capabilities. All of these factors consolidated Nepal’s dependency 
on India. Nepal was reduced to a virtual semi-colony of India, but with none of the 
benefits of infrastructural development that other colonies experienced, and all the 
disadvantages of being subject to the demands of a sub-imperial power.11 Brown 
(1996: 63) argues that ‘resource-poor Nepal would have struggled to develop under 
the very best of external conditions, but it was further handicapped because of its 
integration within the world economy under the most disadvantageous terms’. While 
Indian aid at times converged with the interests of the Nepali elite, it was not provided 
                                                
10 Figures are unreliable but estimates are that the proportion of hill people in the Terai increased from 
5 per cent in the early 1900s to 35-40 per cent by the end of the panchayat era (Brown 1996: 78). 
11 These disadvantages, amongst others, include unequal treaties such as the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty, 
Indian interference in Nepal’s political affairs since independence, and Indian control over the vast 
majority of trade and industry in Nepal. 
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on the basis of the interests of Nepal’s population, and only served to strengthen 
India’s hand in the Nepali economy. 
 
Finally, for both the panchayat regime and for donors, development was instrumental; 
it was driven by the desire to prevent the spread of communist influence in Nepal, not 
necessarily to ensure human advancement. For the two largest donors at the time, the 
US and India, aid was determined by ‘standard, Cold War thinking’ (1996: 64). For 
India, Nepal was considered to be vulnerable to the influence of China’s communist 
revolution, and through which communist ideas could spread to India. For the US, 
economic development for its own sake was not a priority. Brown (1996: 65) argues 
that ‘economic development was seen as the key to political stability and was deemed 
essential to hold back the communist tide’. That US efforts failed to make substantial 
headway in development terms was inconsequential. Brown (1996: 63) cites a fourth 
reason for the lack of development: Nepal’s geography and lack of natural resources. 
While the rugged and uncompromising mountainous terrain made communication and 
infrastructure development difficult, it is arguable that aid could have been directed 
towards overcoming the harsh geography of Nepal, instead of considering it an 
absolute impediment. Limited development did take place under the panchayat but the 
experience of development in Nepal remains uneven and incomplete. 
 
1.3.3. NGOs as the antidote 
There was recognition that the panchayat had largely failed to bring about the kind of 
change required to address the growing developmental crisis in rural Nepal, and the 
NPC recognised rural development as a top priority. The transition to democracy 
brought about two major administrative changes in the regulation of domestic NGOs, 
which had significant political consequences. First, the Social Service National Co-
ordination Council (SSNCC), the original government agency responsible for the 
regulation and co-ordination of NGOs, became the Social Welfare Council (SWC), 
and began to work in a more transparent manner under the Ministry of Women, 
Children and Social Welfare in collaboration with representatives from other 
ministries and government agencies.12 Second, funding regulations changed. Foreign 
funds could now flow directly to NGOs instead of being filtered through government. 
                                                
12 The establishment of the SSNCC under the panchayat is outlined in Chapter 2. 
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That NGOs in Nepal could now directly access funds from donors and INGOs was the 
single biggest factor contributing to their dramatic increase. In September 1990, the 
interim government created a task force to draw up guidelines for the NGO sector, 
encouraging international and national NGOs to focus on improving the lives of the 
most disadvantaged communities in rural Nepal (Seddon 1993: 145). The Eighth 
(1992-1997) and Ninth (1997-2002) Five-Year Plans highlighted the catalytic role of 
NGOs in addressing poverty in Nepal. Policies were adopted to extend the reach of 
NGOs in rural areas, encourage INGOs to work with and develop the capacity of 
national NGOs, develop a national monitoring and evaluation system of NGOs, 
simplify the administration of NGOs and ensure that the work of NGOs 
complimented local government (Dhakal 2000: 88). NGOs were promoted as 
essential development partners. 
 
As with global figures, the exact number of NGOs operating in Nepal is unknown. 
According to statistics from the SWC, in 1989 there were 250 registered NGOs. By 
1992 the figure had more than doubled, to 576; by 1997, there were 5,978 NGOs, an 
increase of 1,030 per cent (Dhakal 2000: 91). Shah (2002: 144) notes that over 11,000 
were registered by 2000. An Asian Development Bank (ADB) report claims that by 
2002 over 13,000 were registered (ADB 2005: 4), and Karki (2004: 7) notes that in 
2004, 16,562 NGOs were registered. In 2006, the SWC calculated the number of 
national NGOs to have grown to almost 20,000. According to recent figures 
calculated by the SWC, the number of officially registered NGOs across the country 
stands at 30,284 (SWC 2011), and thousands more are unregistered. In 2005 ADB 
estimated a total of 60,000 registered and unregistered NGOs in Nepal (ADB 2005: 
4). Some 5,370 NGOs are affiliated to the NGO Federation of Nepal, the national 
umbrella organisation of NGOs. There are 207 INGOs working in Nepal according to 
the SWC; 110 are members of the Association of International NGOs in Nepal. Karki 
(2004: 7) argues that given the geographical and geopolitical context of Nepal—and 
its population size of just over 30 million—these numbers are not insignificant.  
 
There were three major periods in recent Nepali history in which the numbers of 
NGOs grew dramatically: first, following the 1990 people’s movement; second, 
following the escalation of the conflict in 2001; and finally, following the second 
movement for democracy in 2006. The focus of funding in the early 1990s was 
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infrastructure development, and only in the mid-1990s expanded in a more strategic 
manner to include advocacy around human rights and social inclusion. It was also in 
the mid-1990s when much of the discourse around civil society began to appear, 
mainly coming from NGOs with international connections and funding. Funding 
criteria were only broadly related to official development plans drawn up by 
successive Nepali governments, and much of the funding from bilateral donors was 
and still is tied aid, usually to donor exports (Gurugharana 1994: 4). Following the 
escalation of the war in 2001, a number of NGOs working on peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation became more prominent. Although these NGOs could not 
work beyond district headquarters during the war, funding for peacebuilding projects 
was pouring into the country.13 Finally, following the 2006 movement, new 
organisations emerged that were working on constitutional issues, transitional justice 
and security sector reform in addition to peacebuilding, and more INGOs working on 
these issues were also registered. These organisations have had access to funding on 
an even more massive scale than previously. As Miklian et al. (2011: 297) argue, 
‘foreign aid for peacebuilding tends to arrive in large volumes just after conflict’ and, 
according to the OECD, reached levels of US$598 million in 2007 globally. In 2009 
this figure was US$855 million.14 Although direct financial support to NGOs allowed 
far greater room for manoeuvre amongst NGOs, it has been a constant source of 
tension for the government, which has to compete for funding in the post-conflict 
situation (2011: 295) and is often sidelined.  
 
1.3.4. Critiquing NGOs in Nepal 
In Nepal a critique of NGOs emerged in the early 1990s, both from within intellectual 
circles, and from within the NGO sector itself. The critiques undertaken by NGOs, 
however, remained at the level of project evaluations, rather than more in-depth 
structural analyses, and were confined mainly to NGOs that had funds and access to 
donors and where no existential threat was posed. Despite limited criticism from 
                                                
13 Interviews with senior NGO workers from development and peacebuilding NGOs in Humla, Mugu 
and Rukum, and the NGO Federation in Rolpa between 28 February and 18 April 2010. This view is 
confirmed by Seddon and Hussein (2002: 33-34). 
14 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/Nepal%202.pdf (last accessed on 8 September 2013). In 
addition, the UNDP project Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal (SPCBN) donated 
almost US$10 million in funding for NGOs and other partners in 2009. See 
http://web.undp.org/comtoolkit/success-stories/ASIA-Nepal-crisisprev.shtml (last accessed on 8 
September 2013). Dixit (2011: 78) also references the funding that has been ‘lavished on 
peacebuilding, transitional justice and constitution-writing—with little result’ after 2006. 
 36 
within the NGO sector itself, over the years a mainstream perception has been 
created, encouraged by a section of intellectuals and academics, that NGOs are mainly 
only involved in ‘dollar-farming’ (Phuyal 2004: 9) and fall far short of the 
development objectives expected of them. With respect to influencing politics, 
Panday (2009: 20) has argued that within civil society NGOs have ‘yet to demonstrate 
that they can reverse the process of deterioration and depreciation’ of Nepali politics. 
While there is truth in the mainstream criticism that a number of NGO leaders have 
acquired expensive vehicles and built themselves big houses in Kathmandu in the 
name of development or human rights (Chintan 2000: 139), there is less analysis and 
critique of the ideological role of NGOs and their donors, and whether and how this 
has influenced the capacity of the Left to contribute to social transformation. 
 
The question of whether NGOs dominate civil society, leaving limited room for the 
Left to operate, or whether the Left has hegemonised political space in Nepal, is 
important. The Maoists argue that donors, in part through the NGOs they fund and the 
market ideology they promote, have attempted to prevent growing support for the 
communist movement in Nepal. This is only partly correct. In the final analysis, both 
the NGOs and the Left have limited the prospects for fundamental social change. In 
other words, there has been a convergence of approaches that has restricted the 
possibility of moving beyond technical solutions to development. From the 
perspective of donors and NGOs, efforts to prevent the emergence of a strong 
communist movement in Nepal have failed. But in another sense, they succeeded: the 
project of revolutionary transformation has been put on hold since the Maoists entered 
the mainstream. The NGO approach to social change has regained its leading edge in 
this contest, and the Maoists—who for many held the only hope for material 
change—are losing support. The real danger is complete disillusionment and, in the 
process, the re-stabilisation of bourgeois democracy. This contest has not taken the 
form of a clear and conflictual competition. The two forces have influenced each 
other, but NGOs have essentially prevailed. For the Nepali establishment, this has 
been an important moment in the process of consolidating its hegemony. As Gramsci 
(2011a: 137) argued, for any class to dominate—to wield control of political society 
and state institutions—it needs to have established a hegemonic bloc. The contention 
here is that the NGO sector has played an important role in enabling the construction 
of that bloc by helping to neutralise the Left, drawing at least sections of the Left into 
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its orbit. At the same time, analysing the Maoists’ strategy and tactics—in particular 
the failure to explicitly place economic tasks as central and immediate aims of the 
revolution—helps explain their capitulation to NGOs. 
 
1.4. Methodology 
This section describes the relevance of Nepal for the purposes of this research, the 
type of data that was sourced and how data was collected, including the nature of 
interview questions and the context in which interviews took place. It also describes 
the basis for the selection of specific districts, and outlines the limitations of the 
research. In addition, it defines the key concepts used throughout this work, and sets 
the parameters of the research. The relationship between the NGO sector and the Left 
in Nepal is clearly conditioned by historical circumstances specific to Nepal, but 
observations can also be made at a more general level. Drawing on the relevant 
theoretical literature, the research encompasses three registers: first, it evaluates the 
literature on NGOs and civil society at a global level, including NGOs in Nepal; 
second, it considers the history, economy and contemporary politics of Nepal, 
including modes of production debates and the Maoists’ conception of semi-
feudalism; and third, it describes the history of the communist movement in Nepal, 
including the UML’s shift to the right and the strategy and tactics of the Maoists, with 
a particular theoretical focus on the concept of stages and the Maoists’ use of this 
concept as an approach to social change. Information gathered from interviews has 
served to nuance an understanding about the nature of the central relationship under 
examination—that between the NGO sector and the left parties. 
 
1.4.1. The relevance of Nepal 
Nepal is an illuminating case study for understanding the meaning and significance of 
NGOs and the relationship between NGOs and the Left for three main reasons: first, 
the sheer numbers, influx and influence of NGOs in Nepal since the 1990s; second, 
the massive impact of the Left on Nepali society and political culture since the 1950s, 
including the revolutionary process that has recently made a shift to reformist politics; 
and finally, the nature of the Nepali economy, which is partly determined by Nepal’s 
history and geopolitical position, and which has profoundly influenced the left parties 
and the trajectory of politics in general over the last two decades. First, as has been 
discussed, there are tens of thousands of NGOs operating in the country, the vast 
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majority of which were established after the introduction of the multiparty system in 
1990. Since then NGOs have played a pivotal role in Nepal’s development. There are 
local, national and international NGOs working on a range of activities, but the vast 
majority are involved in the fields of development, human rights, peacebuilding and 
democracy, which through these specific approaches are attempting to address the 
overarching issues of poverty and inequality. Nepal is a particularly interesting case 
study in this respect because each of these frameworks—development, human rights, 
peacebuilding and democracy—has exceptional significance in the country. In terms 
of development, Nepal is an extreme case of underdevelopment, ranking 157 out of 
187 countries on the Human Development Index (HDI).15 Development has been 
pursued by the state and international donors since the 1950s (Panday 2009: 43; 
Gurung 1984: 61). In terms of human rights, Nepal had one of the worst human rights 
records in the world for a period during the war, including the largest reported number 
of enforced disappearances in the world (Singh et al. 2005: 2). Nepal has also been 
through ten brutal years of civil war and arguably has one of most vibrant democracy 
movements in the world, dating back to the 1920s and 30s (Brown 1996: 14). Each 
framework has brought forth specific types of NGO projects, and using examples 
from these sectors in particular facilitates the research to make some generalisations 
about the NGO sector as a whole in Nepal and its relationship specifically to the two 
biggest communist parties, the UML and the Maoists.  
 
Second, Nepal has experienced a remarkable revolutionary process led by the Maoists 
that abolished a 240-year-old monarchy and profoundly changed Nepali history and 
society. Several years after the war, Nepal is going through a process of political and 
social change that has affected the most remote and poorest parts of the country. Both 
NGOs and the Left have been major players in the current upheavals, but neither has 
been able to translate political instability into concrete change for the poor majority. 
Nepal therefore provides a context that is ripe for an examination of how NGOs and 
the Left are shaping the direction of that change. The conflict brought with it 
increased funding for national and international NGOs, but also the development of a 
                                                
15 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has published HDI rankings annually since 
1990. The HDI was introduced as an alternative to conventional measures of national development, 
such as level of income and the rate of economic growth, and is a composite of three basic dimensions 
of human development: health, education and income. The figure for Nepal’s HDI is 0.458, lower than 
the average for South Asia, at 0.548. See http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/NPL.html (last 
accessed on 11 March 2013). 
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powerful mass-based movement. Nepal provides a particularly remarkable case of the 
ways in which these forces—the Maoist movement and the NGOs—have interacted, 
produced tensions and raised new ideas about the possibilities for social change.  
 
Finally, Nepal is an important case study because although a large peasantry 
dominates the countryside and Nepal’s financial markets are not as deeply integrated 
into the world system as other economies, neoliberalism has penetrated the economy 
through international donors, including massive economic and social policy reforms 
imposed by the World Bank and IMF, and through India. Since the government of 
Nepal began to adopt neoliberal reforms in the mid-1980s (Sharma 2006) with the 
assistance and encouragement of donors, relatively few concrete results have been 
achieved in terms of poverty alleviation (Wagle 2007). According to World Bank 
figures cited by Sharma (2006: 558), the percentage of the population below the 
poverty line rose from 33 per cent in the mid-1970s to 42 per cent in the mid-1990s, 
and the incidence of poverty was greater in rural areas, where the vast majority of the 
population lives, than urban areas. Combined with the levels of NGO funding and the 
numbers of NGOs, Nepal also provides for a concrete test of whether this funding has 
strengthened neoliberal reforms.  
 
1.4.2. Data collection 
Administratively, Nepal is divided into 75 districts, 14 zones and 5 development 
regions; it also constitutes three main geographical regions running east to west—the 
mountainous north bordering China, the hills that make up the middle of the country, 
and the Terai region, which are the flat plains bordering India.16 The focus of the 
extensive field research was geographical and interview-based; interviews were 
concentrated in seven main districts including Kathmandu, with another eight 
secondary districts, to make fifteen altogether from across the country. Districts were 
chosen on the basis of representation of the following criteria: geographical region, 
development region and level of development. Thus the selection of districts aimed to 
include representation from each of the mountain, hill and plains regions, each of the 
five development regions (eastern, central, western, mid-western and far-western), 
and include the poorest districts and the most developed districts, apart from 
                                                
16 UNDP and other development agencies often categorise levels of development according to these 
geographical distinctions. 
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Kathmandu. The Maoists’ base areas were also chosen in order to understand the 
contrast between areas where the intensity of the war was at its highest, and those 
districts outside the base areas. The final spread of districts included Mugu and 
Humla, which are in the mountainous far-west region and also the poorest districts in 
the country; Ilam and Jhapa, which are the most developed districts outside 
Kathmandu, are in the eastern development region and represent both the Terai plains 
and hills; Rolpa and Rukum, which are the Maoists’ base areas in the remote mid-
western hills, and which ran parallel administrations during the war; and Kathmandu, 
where the majority of interviews with politicians, journalists and NGOs took place. 
Due to logistics, the western development region was not covered, but Rolpa and 
Rukum bordering the western region were reasonable substitutes. Thus four out of 
five development regions were included in the sample of districts. Other districts that 
became part of the field research because they were on the way to the main districts 
included Sarlahi, Parsa, Bara, Morang, Kanchanpur, Kailali, Banke and Surkhet.  
 
Interviews were conducted with NGOs related to development, human rights, 
peacebuilding and democracy, as well as the district branches of the NGO Federation, 
where possible. Interviewees also included the respective leaderships of the UCPN 
and the UML, as well as journalists, district representatives and others who could 
speak about the conduct of and relationship between NGOs and the left parties in the 
district. Interviews were confined to the district headquarters of each district: 
Ghamghadi, Mugu; Simikot, Humla; Ilam, Ilam; Chandraghadi, Jhapa; Libang, Rolpa; 
and Musikot, Rukum. An average of 6 days was spent in each district, excluding 
travel. Other than Humla and Mugu, which required flights from Nepalgunj given 
time constraints, buses and jeeps were used to travel to and from Kathmandu. 
Interviews conducted in Kathmandu were mainly with NGO and civil society leaders, 
senior party figures and journalists. The total number of interviews conducted was 68, 
out of which a selection were used for direct quotations, and several others to 
construct an understanding of the specific situation in different parts of the country, 
particularly the Maoists’ base areas.17 Representation from a selection of NGOs, the 
Maoists and/or the UML was obtained in each district in the sample. Approximately 7 
or 8 interviews were conducted in each of the main districts, apart from Kathmandu, 
                                                
17 A list of interviews is found in Appendix 2. 
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where 25 interviews were conducted. In general, interviews were conducted with one 
interviewee in a relatively private space, usually in an office. A research assistant 
from Kathmandu helped arrange and conduct the interviews in the districts, translate 
the interviews where translation was necessary, and helped provide other logistical 
support in terms of travel and accommodation. Interviews were semi-structured and 
questions focused on the recent history of NGOs in Nepal, the nature of the aid 
industry, the perceived material and ideological roles of NGOs and donors, the 
relationship between the UML and NGOs, including the process of ‘NGOisation’, the 
specific role of NGOs in the peace process, the politics of the Maoists and the extent 
to which they are focused on class or ethnic politics, and the federalism debate. 
Additional questions were also asked, depending on the type of interviewee; for 
example, in the districts outside Kathmandu, interviews began with informal 
discussion on the general problems in the district, the specific concerns and opinions 
of the interviewee and the main activities of the NGO in question.  
 
Figure 1.1: View of Simikot. Bordering China and India, the district of Humla is one of the poorest in 
Nepal. 7 April 2010. Source: The author 
 
The purpose of focusing on geography and not specific NGOs, for example, was to 
understand whether the level of development of particular districts influenced the 
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level and intensity not only of NGO activity but the activities of the left parties. The 
assumption was that NGOs would be working in the poorest districts, but also that the 
Maoists would be relatively more popular. In the base areas, where the Maoists 
dominate, the contention was that there would be fewer NGOs. These contentions 
made for unexpected results, and exposed the complexities of the relations between 
NGOs and the left parties. It was found that fewer NGOs work in the poorest districts 
because travel to remote areas is relatively expensive, time-consuming and physically 
more challenging.18 Pigg (1993: 48) notes that a combination of practical and political 
reasons often determines where development initiatives are focused, contributing to 
uneven reach. Relatively greater numbers of NGOs work in the most developed 
districts and those that are easiest to access. Following the war, NGOs have been able 
to work unhindered in base areas, implementing a wide range of projects. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Airstrip in Mugu. The poorest and most remote district in Nepal, it takes 3 hours to reach 
the district headquarters of Ghamghadi by foot. 20 April 2010. Source: The author 
 
                                                
18 The only way to travel to Mugu, for example, which is probably the most difficult district to access 
in the country, is either directly by flight—usually only running once a week—or by flying to Jumla 
and trekking for three days. 
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Secondary data included World Bank and UN reports on Nepal, the Living Standards 
Surveys of 2004 and 2011 produced by the Central Bureau of Statistics based in 
Kathmandu, and data from the SWC, which provides information on numbers, types 
and functions of NGOs, and geographical scope. Secondary data also included US 
policy documents from the late 1970s onwards on foreign aid strategies and assistance 
to NGOs and INGOs. Other desk-based research included international and Nepali 
journal articles published in English, Internet articles, national newspapers, NGO, 
movement and left publications in Nepal as well as observation of the political forces 
and trends to contextualise NGO interventions and responses by the left parties. The 
academic literature on NGOs is still consistently and rapidly expanding, with more 
concerted attempts to theorise the nature and role of NGOs. 
 
1.4.3. Defining key concepts 
The aims, objectives and approaches of NGOs, and the operational levels and 
circumstances under which they work, has led to such a diversity of NGOs that it has 
become a major challenge to categorise them in any meaningful way.19 The 
dominance of NGOs as civil society actors, particularly in the 1990s, has also led to a 
simplistic and problematic view that equates them with civil society, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. This research does not attempt to build on the valuable work 
undertaken to classify NGOs (Martens 2006; Atack 1999; Vakil 1997; Korten 1987). 
NGOs range from traditional development organisations that have a long history, to 
newer, relatively radical social action networks that are attempting to counter specific 
policies or practices. The UN vaguely defines NGOs as ‘any international 
organisation which is not created by intergovernmental agreement’ (Lindblom 2005: 
38), but the term was coined by the UN with the adoption of the UN Charter in 
1945.20 For Vakil (1997: 2060), NGOs are ‘self-governing, private, not-for-profit 
organisations that are geared to improving the quality of life for disadvantaged 
people’. Although they originate from across the political spectrum, this definition 
                                                
19 The term NGO is further complicated by the term CSO (civil society organisation), which includes 
movements and other organisations that do not fit neatly into national legal definitions of an NGO; but 
much of the literature uses these terms interchangeably. NPO (non-profit organisation) and PVO 
(private voluntary organisation) are used mainly in the US, and CBO (community-based organisation) 
is the term used for the smaller local NGOs that emerged in the South during the national liberation 
struggles of the 1950s and 60s. For more in-depth articles assessing the problems with NGO 
classification see Vakil (1997) and Martens (2002).  
20 Article 71 of the UN Charter governs consultative relations between the UN and NGOs (Martens 
2006: 271; Alger 2002: 93). 
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suggests that the vast majority of NGOs place themselves on the broad left; however, 
by virtue of governmental funding, NGOs maintain close links to the state, and 
therefore to the mainstream. Kaldor (2003: 94) describes NGOs as intermediary 
organisations expressing ‘the blurred boundaries between state and non-state’, in 
contrast to definitions that view NGOs as largely independent of government. 
According to the NGO literature, the main types of NGO are advocacy and 
operational. NGOs focused solely on advocacy tend to test the limits of donor 
constraints and have employed methods of collective action similar to social 
movements, while the focus of operational or service-delivery NGOs are confined to 
the technical aspects of project implementation, although they often use advocacy 
methods to secure project access. Table 1.1 attempts a broad systematisation of 
NGOs, demonstrating that NGOs are not a homogenous category. 
 
Characteristic Diversity 
Location • North 
• North in the South 
• South 
Level of operation • International 
• Regional 
• National 
• Community 
Approach • Welfare activities 
• Service provision 
• Emergency relief 
• Education and training 
• Participation and empowerment 
• Self-sufficiency 
• Advocacy 
• Networking 
Ownership • Non-membership structure 
• Membership structure 
Framework • Development 
• Human rights 
• Peacebuilding  
• Democracy 
• Humanitarian 
• Environment 
Orientation • Works with government 
• Single-issue based 
• Mass movement-oriented 
Funding • Government 
• Foundations 
• Other NGOs 
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• Corporations 
• Private donations 
• Membership 
 Table 1.1: Dimensions of NGO diversity. Source: Adapted from Willis (2005: 98) 
 
NGOs have different ideas, practices, strategies and motivations, and they make 
alliances with organisations and movements that span a range of ideologies. Certain 
NGOs pursue progressive change, while others work to maintain the existing system 
(Morris-Suzuki 2000: 68). For the purposes of this research, following Fernando 
(2011: 234), NGOs ‘can be analysed as a unified institutional category’ because they 
possess a unified character in relation to the state, and this character lacks ‘the 
ideological and material flexibility to manage… crises beyond the neoliberal state’ 
(2011: 235). If, as Fernando (2011: 233) suggests, ‘the role of NGOs in creating and 
sustaining social change is best understood in terms of their relationship with the 
state’, and in particular the neoliberal state, then the approach of NGOs is at the very 
least conditioned—and in some cases determined—by the neoliberal state’s material 
and ideological reinforcement. Both aspects of support, material and ideological, are 
crucial since even where NGOs refuse government funding on principle they have to 
operate within the legal boundaries of the state; they may also take questionable 
political positions, in part for this reason.21 Building on the premise that NGOs are 
defined by the neoliberal state, whether as oppositionists or collaborators, it is argued 
that NGOs adopt a particular approach to social change that is necessarily and 
ultimately accommodating, gradualist and reformist. This can be described as the 
essence of NGOs. This interpretation does not deny NGO agency, but allows for an 
analysis of the complex interactions between agency and structure, and how structure 
and power shape NGO agency (Fernando 2011: 21). These features are exacerbated in 
the context of a growing NGO industry, in which there is fierce competition amongst 
NGOs for funding and contracts (Cooley and Ron 2002: 17), and a growing 
proportion of NGO efforts are diverted to securing the financial means for 
organisational survival. 
 
                                                
21 Amnesty International is a good example of an international NGO that claims to refuse donor 
funding but came out in support of Nato’s occupation of Afghanistan. See 
http://socialistworker.org/2012/08/08/amnesty-for-occupation (last accessed on 10 September 2012). 
Information about Amnesty’s funding sources is difficult to find through its website. 
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Following Harvey (2005: 2), the definition of neoliberalism used for this research is ‘a 
theory of political economic practices… within an institutional framework 
characterised by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade’. The turn 
towards neoliberalism began in the 1970s, seeking ‘to bring all human action into the 
domain of the market’ (2005: 3). Saad Filho and Johnston (2005: 5) further argue that 
‘the most basic feature of neoliberalism is the systematic use of state power to impose 
(financial) market imperatives’ to counter the problems of capital accumulation. This 
has resulted in ‘minority power, plunder of nations and despoilment of the 
environment’ (2000: 5). The imperial powers’ imposition of market imperatives at 
home, and their mobilisation of state resources to advance national interests abroad, 
means that globalisation and imperialism cannot be analysed separately from 
neoliberalism. Far from the state being ‘rolled back’ under neoliberalism, it has been 
reconfigured, and the process of deregulation has in reality meant new forms of 
regulation (Munck 2005: 63). As welfare provision has been cut back and an array of 
social protection policies have been introduced to counter the effects of neoliberalism 
on the most vulnerable, NGOs have become increasingly relevant. Thus an analysis of 
NGOs must include an analysis of the neoliberal state. Moreover, the use of the term 
‘mainstream’ throughout this work relates to neoliberalism in that it refers to 
dominant (i.e. neoliberal), conventional politics. The Maoists’ entry into the 
mainstream, for example, refers to their engagement with dominant politics and 
political parties, and neoliberal economic development. 
 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
This research analyses the complex relationship between NGOs and the left parties in 
Nepal and the particular ways in which NGOs have impacted the Left. It argues that 
the co-option of the left parties by the NGOs is not a straightforward, unidirectional 
process, but that the left parties themselves have been open to being co-opted to 
different degrees and in various ways. The thesis concludes with an analysis of what 
this co-option means for the potential for fundamental social change in Nepal. 
Chapter 1 has examined the concept of the NGO and has outlined the five theses of 
this research. Through a discussion of the range of NGO critiques, it has analysed the 
role of NGOs in the politics of contemporary aid at an international level and argues 
that while NGOs have worked with other social forces to challenge neoliberal policies 
under specific circumstances, in general, the global NGO industry has worked to 
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stabilise the neoliberal order. This chapter has also described the origins and 
significance of NGOs in Nepal, and explained the methodological approach to the 
research, including the relevance of Nepal for researching NGOs and the Left, data 
collection and the definition of key terms. With the exception of Chapter 1, which has 
provided a thematic overview of NGOs in Nepal, the remainder of the thesis follows a 
rough chronology that spans the formation of Nepal as a nation-state in the 18th 
century to present-day politics, and the role of NGOs in key events.  
 
Chapter 2 describes the history of Nepal since its unification by Prithvi Narayan Shah, 
the rise to power of the Rana dynasty and its subsequent fall, arguing that the 1950-51 
revolution can most accurately be described as a ‘revolution from above’ because it 
constituted an agreement between the old Rana regime, the monarchy and the Indian 
government, with limited involvement from the popular classes. While there was a 
brief period of democracy during the 1950s, the monarchy—again with the support of 
India—facilitated the establishment of the panchayat regime following a royal coup in 
1960. The chapter also assesses two simultaneous projects: the establishment of the 
communist movement and the US’s aid operation that was meant to weaken 
communist influence. Finally, the chapter explores the emergence of oppositional 
politics in the 1980s, beginning with the student uprising in 1979, and shows how 
NGOs are rooted in both party politics and international pressure for liberalisation 
beginning in the mid-1980s. Chapter 3 describes Nepal’s adoption of neoliberal 
reforms in the mid-1980s, the 1990 revolution—the first mass uprising in Nepal’s 
history—and the establishment of NGOs, following the introduction of multiparty 
democracy, as part of both civil society and the state. Chapter 4 considers the UML, 
its origins and its ideological shift to the right in more detail. It argues that the UML’s 
strategy was to consolidate itself as a communist party after the end of the Cold War 
by forging relations with the burgeoning NGO sector, but as these links were 
strengthened, the UML became entrenched in promoting mainstream neoliberal 
development. Chapter 5 describes the origins of the UCPN, the context for the 
People’s War and the Maoists’ strategy and tactics. It argues that the 2006 revolution 
was primarily a product of the Maoists’ mobilisation, but that it was the strategic 
unity of the parties in building a mass movement—as opposed to solely fighting a 
guerrilla war—that ultimately led to the overthrow of the monarchy. Finally, it 
describes the Maoists’ policy towards NGOs during and after the war, arguing that the 
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inherent contradictions of the policy were never fully resolved. This made the Maoists 
vulnerable to the influence of NGOs.  
 
Chapter 6 describes the general strike of 2010, which was the last major mass 
mobilisation by the Maoists, and a turning point in the development of the movement. 
The leadership’s conduct during the strike exposed ambiguities at the heart of its 
theory, which at that particular moment led to hesitation and confusion. This lack of 
clarity disarmed the Maoists in the face of an elite counter-offensive, partly co-
ordinated by NGOs, which were calling for a withdrawal of the strike in the interests 
of the peace process—but which was, in fact, a consolidation of the status quo. 
Sections of the middle classes who previously had allied with the Maoists were now 
being drawn into an anti-Maoist alliance, and NGOs played a crucial role in 
delegitimating the Maoists. The Maoists were successfully wrong-footed by the 
NGO-led mobilisation largely because they shared some of the same political 
assumptions and analyses about the nature of Nepali society. The Maoists have since 
incorporated and internalised NGO approaches regarding ‘ethnic inclusion’ into their 
political practice in ways that have facilitated a move away from class-based politics. 
The thesis concludes that while ethnic demands have the potential to threaten upper-
caste rule, they also have the potential for dangerous consequences, where ethnic 
rivalries are placed at the centre of politics and the prospects for renewed class 
struggle and of social change in Nepal are undermined. 
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II. Development, communism and anti-communism 
 
Modern Nepali history features several ideological currents. One of these currents is 
the monarchy, which has had political expression since the establishment of the 
Nepali state in 1768. It has undergone several transformations: from 1846 the Ranas 
took power from the Shah kings and instituted a system whereby absolute power 
became hereditary amongst Rana prime ministers; from 1950, a tentative democracy 
was introduced, only to be overturned in 1960 by King Mahendra, who established 
the panchayat system; and from 1990, when a people’s movement turned Nepal into a 
constitutional monarchy, until 2008 when it was abolished altogether.22 The monarchy 
also espoused a nationalism that facilitated its consolidation for a time, but ultimately 
weakened the institution during the panchayat. Nationalism is not unique to the 
monarchy, however, and nationalist perspectives have been promoted from across the 
political spectrum. This chapter concerns two other major ideological currents: 
communism and the anti-communism of the US in particular. Following a brief 
history of Nepal from unification through to the 1950-51 revolution, this chapter 
describes the origins of the communist movement and the US strategy to counter 
communist influence through the provision of aid following the end of Rana rule. It 
then describes the panchayat regime that ruled Nepal for nearly three decades prior to 
1990, with a focus on the nature of Nepali politics in the 1980s and the emerging 
relationship between NGOs and political parties under the panchayat. It argues that 
from the outset, NGOs were nearly always established along party political lines—
beginning with the first human rights NGOs—and that it is impossible to understand 
the emergence of NGOs in Nepal without understanding their relationship to political 
parties, in particular the communist parties. These links were made at a specific 
political conjuncture—under the repressive panchayat system—that facilitated the 
convergence of interests between the parties and the NGOs. Despite very different 
origins, their relationship became based on shared assumptions about development 
priorities. These were significant questions for NGOs, but were decided by their 
partnership with donors. Both NGOs and the donors that supported them held three 
fundamental assumptions in line with neoliberal thinking: that the state is essentially 
incapable of addressing the needs of the poor and marginalised because it is 
                                                
22 According to Whelpton (2005: 19), the monarchy was also a central institution throughout the 
medieval period, regarded as starting with the establishment of the Nepal Era in 879. 
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bureaucratic, detached and inefficient; that international assistance—and by extension 
NGOs—is indispensable; and that gradual reforms, mediated by the market, constitute 
the most effective development interventions. These were also significant questions 
for the Left, and in various ways, they arrived at similar conclusions. 
 
2.1. Unification, integration and the 1950-51 revolution 
The history of the Nepali nation-state begins in 1768 with the conquest of the 
Kathmandu Valley by Prithvi Narayan Shah, who ruled the small kingdom of Gorkha 
in central Nepal and eventually became Nepal’s first king. Gorkha was one of many 
small principalities, itself dependent on borrowing sums of money from its subjects 
(Regmi 1999: 5) because it was unable to profit from regional trade due to its remote 
location. Prithvi Narayan ascended the throne in 1743 at the age of twenty and was a 
skillful political and military strategist (Whelpton 2005: 35), whose ambitions 
extended far beyond Gorkha. Prior to unification, the region was dominated by an 
assortment of petty kingdoms, the most significant of which were divided into two 
loose confederacies, the baisi [22] states of the Karnali region in the northwest, and 
the chaubisi [24] states of the Gandaki region, southwest of Kathmandu (2005: 23). 
Although the foundations for these statelets were culture and ethnicity, Joshi and Rose 
(1966: 4) argue that there were perhaps more rivalries within rather than between 
them. The formation of the two confederacies was preceded by the disintegration of 
the Khasa Empire in the 15th century, whose rulers adopted the title of Malla, but who 
were not related to the Newar Malla kings of the Kathmandu Valley, whose lineage 
can be traced backed to Ari Malla, a new king who first used the title in the 12th 
century (2005: 21). The Newar Malla kings ruled the Kathmandu Valley between the 
12th and 18th centuries, establishing it as an important political, cultural and economic 
centre. In 1482, on the death of one of the more prominent Malla kings, Yaksha 
Malla, the Kathmandu Valley was divided amongst his three sons, giving rise to the 
kingdoms of Kathmandu, Patan and Bhaktapur. According to Whelpton (2005: 35), 
the threat of a Gorkhali invasion was a factor in the chronic, internecine warfare 
between the kingdoms of the Kathmandu Valley and ultimately facilitated their 
conquest. After the capture of Nuwakot, a strategic town lying between Gorkha and 
the Kathmandu Valley, the Gorkhalis asserted control over the profitable trade route 
between Tibet and Kathmandu; Prithvi Narayan took possession of strategic points in 
the area before finally declaring Kathmandu the capital of Nepal.  
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2.1.1. Gorkhali expansion 
Mahesh Chandra Regmi (1999: 9), who wrote several seminal texts on Nepali 
economic history, argues that ‘it is possible to locate economic actors behind almost 
every step in the process of political unification’. After Prithvi Narayan imposed an 
economic blockade of Kathmandu Valley by obstructing trade routes, indigenous 
Newari merchants welcomed the Gorkhali conquest because the empire had the 
potential to form a centralised political administration that enabled them to diversify 
operations and renew trading links with Tibet. In addition to gaining control over the 
trade routes between India and Tibet, one of the principle objectives of Prithvi 
Narayan’s military campaign was to annex the Terai, the southern plains bordering 
India. Regmi (1999: 15) notes that the annexation of the Terai was ‘one of the most 
valuable among the territorial acquisitions of the Gorkhali government’ in the early 
1770s. Prithvi Narayan continued to expand the Gorkhali Empire as far as Sikkim in 
the east and Himachal Pradesh in the west, until his death in 1775.  
 
The Gorkhalis had also challenged Chinese suzerainty in Tibet between 1788 and 
1792, without success (Joshi and Rose 1966: 3). Several years later, Bhimsen Thapa, 
who had come to power in 1806 and taken the title of mukhtiyar [guardian, prime 
minister], and whose father was a loyal soldier of Prithvi Narayan, provoked a border 
dispute with the British. This led to war between Nepal and the East India Company, 
beginning in 1814, and resulted in the loss of one third of Nepal’s territory (Sever 
1996: 87). Whelpton (2005: 42) notes that ‘the Gorkhalis had the advantage of better 
knowledge of the ground and inflicted several reverses on the East India Company’s 
forces’. Brown (1996: 3) also observes that the British ‘found it difficult to break the 
experienced Gorkha army’, despite the Gorkhalis’ inferior weaponry. The situation 
decisively began to favour the British, however, when they captured Makwanpur, a 
strategic town close to Kathmandu (Sever 1996: 86). The Gorkhalis capitulated and 
negotiated an end to the war in 1816 with the signing of the Sugauli Treaty. 
According to Sever (1996: 87), the signing of the treaty had several advantages for the 
British: territory along the western, southern and eastern borders of Nepal was 
annexed, preventing direct contact with the princely states of Lahore and Sikkim, 
which Nepal had ambitions to conquer; raw materials such as iron, copper and lead 
mines, forests and hemp; and a trade route through Tibet. Although the British later 
returned part of the Terai, the current boundaries of Nepal are more restricted than at 
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the apex of Gorkha imperial expansion (Joshi and Rose 1966: 3). The Sugauli Treaty 
not only put an end to Nepali territorial expansion but also to the economic 
development of the Terai, on which the future economic development of Nepal 
depended (Stiller 1976: 50). The aim of the British was not to absorb Nepal but to 
make it smaller and weaker, allowing it to serve as a reasonable buffer with China 
(Brown 1996: 3). Following the war, the British began recruiting Gorkha soldiers into 
the British army, so impressed were they with the prowess of the Gorkha soldiers 
(1996: 3).23 The British were also granted rights to place a British resident in 
Kathmandu. Nepal had lost the war but retained formal independence. 
 
The Gorkhali Empire established a political system in Nepal that was despotic and 
exacting on the population; the peasantry suffered enslavement, forced labour and 
over-taxation, amongst other burdens (Regmi 1995).24 The land tenure system was 
such that peasants paid taxes and other gifts in kind to either the landlord or the state, 
which ultimately went towards the administration of the territory and military 
endeavours, but the ruling class did not concentrate its efforts on developing the 
economy. The decades following the Anglo-Nepalese war continued to be marked by 
rivalries amongst the various noble families that had rights to land and services 
conferred by the monarchy. Gupta (1964: 7) argues that ‘the prevalence of a powerful 
feudal nobility side by side the hereditary monarchy brought new complications and 
tensions in Nepalese political life’. Bhimsen Thapa emerged as ‘the strongest man of 
the kingdom’ (1964: 8), dominated political life until 1837 by persecuting all his 
opponents—particularly the rival Pande family—and established a system that 
reduced the monarch to a figurehead. Continued infighting, the alienation of sections 
of the nobility and the presence of the British resident Brian Hodgson, who ‘was as 
much interested in breaking Bhimsen’s monopoly over the royal palace as were the 
Pandes and their allies’ (1964: 10), eventually brought about Bhimsen’s downfall; he 
was imprisoned and committed suicide in 1839. Old political disputes immediately 
returned, but none of the families were powerful enough to restore stability, including 
                                                
23 The word ‘Gurkha’ came to be accepted in English, but is a corruption of Gorkha. The Gurkhas 
continue to serve in the British Army today. 
24 Stiller (1976: 289) writes that ‘the cry that went up from village Nepal was a cry of pain and a cry of 
protest against official indifference to the lot of village Nepal’. He argues that ‘the system itself rested 
on the shoulders of the farmers, who were the true producers of the wealth of the nation’ (1976: 290). 
Although villagers complained about rents, taxes and injustice the burden grew progressively heavier, 
and ‘there was little the farmer could do but endure’ (1976: 290). 
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Mathbar Singh Thapa, Bhimsen’s nephew, who succeeded him as prime minister in 
1843. Stability amongst the aristocracy remained elusive until Mathbar was 
treacherously murdered by his nephew two years later, likely with the help of Queen 
Lakshmidevi. The murderer was Jung Bahadur Kunwar, who then proceeded to take 
advantage of the unrest. With the help of his brothers, he orchestrated the slaughter of 
all the leaders of the rival families in what became known as the infamous Kot 
massacre, which took place in the kot [armoury] of the palace in Kathmandu in 1846. 
According to Whelpton (2005: 46), ‘the families and followers of the dead, some 
6,000 in all, were expelled from the country’, leading to a dictatorship that was to last 
more than a century. 
 
2.1.2. The rise of the Rana regime 
The rise to power of Jung Bahadur, who adopted the title of prime minister, was one 
of the most significant events in Nepali history. Jung Bahadur entrenched himself 
firmly in power by crushing all opposition, securing recognition from the British and 
procuring a royal order that usurped all rights of the monarchy. The royal order 
conceded all important state positions to Jang Bahadur and his descendants in 
perpetuity, gave them the power to appoint or dismiss public servants, declare war or 
peace with foreign powers, inflict punishment or death upon subjects and repeal, 
amend or frame laws (Gupta 1964: 12). Jang Bahadur also secured himself the 
position of Maharaja of Kaski and Lamjung in order to raise the social status of his 
family from the Chhetri caste to that of royalty. The family took on the name Rana 
and instituted a policy of intermarriage with the Shah royalty, which according to 
Brown (1996: 5) was crucial because it ‘entwined the fates of the two families’ and 
put them on a par with the Shahs. The custom of intermarriage is still intact today. 
The Ranas also neutralised the monarchy by supervising the upbringing of future 
monarchs and introducing them to a life of debauchery from a young age in the hope 
that they would become uninterested in, or incapable of, interfering in politics (1996: 
5). Finally, the king was projected in the public imagination as the reincarnation of 
Vishnu, a Hindu god, in order to undermine any potential political role. The Rana 
dynasty undoubtedly brought forth a long period of stability in government, but 
intrigue and tension continued to dominate within, costing the political and economic 
development of the country. Joshi and Rose (1966: 39) argue that ‘no peaceful protest 
or dissent was possible, and internal changes within the Rana system could take place 
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only through coups and conspiracies’. Given the state of uncertainty about the future, 
everyone from the top of the regime to petty officers set about amassing as much 
wealth as they could. Consequently, ‘in its later stages, the Rana administration 
became an instrument of systematic loot and oppression’ (Gupta 1964: 16), treating 
the state treasury as the private property of the regime.  
 
State revenues from taxation and the sale of natural resources such as timber were 
spent on a combination of unproductive goods—palaces and imported luxuries—and 
investment in Indian industry (Blaikie et al. 1980: 37), which helped ensured the 
Ranas maintained good relations with the British. The Ranas needed the British as 
allies in order to prevent opposition to Rana rule from being cultivated by exiles in 
India; for the British, the Ranas were useful because they allowed unrestricted import 
of British goods into Nepal and they sided with British imperialism. During the Indian 
Mutiny in 1857, Jang Bahadur himself led a large force into battle to capture 
Lucknow from the rebels (Whelpton 2005: 46). It was during the Rana period that the 
Nepali economy became increasingly integrated into ‘the capitalist-dominated 
economy of India, even if the effects of such integration were modified by the 
interests of a landowning class’ (Blaikie et al. 1980: 37) that saw no advantage in 
capitalist development in Nepal itself. For the Ranas, the development of industry 
would create the conditions for the formation of organisations that could lead to 
increased consciousness amongst workers and demands for a redistribution of 
political and economic power (Lohani 1973: 205). Rather, the Ranas were interested 
in maintaining the system of granting land to themselves and to servants of the regime 
– sharply dividing the regime as a class of landowning elites (and the intermediary 
class below them) and the masses, which consisted mainly of the peasantry (Gupta 
1964: 17). They also attempted to prevent the growth of opposition by forbidding 
education to the masses and punishing those who dared leave in search of education 
and other opportunities (1964: 18).25 From the turn of the 20th century, however, ideas 
about social and political change—taken from the independence movement in India—
began to be adopted by a tiny middle-class opposition in Kathmandu.  
                                                
25 Joshi and Rose (1966: 47) describe how when Deva Shamsher, a Rana prime minister with unusually 
liberal views, attempted to establish elementary schools and charitable organisations when he came to 
power in 1901, he was forced to abdicate at gun point by his younger brothers and then banished to 
Dhankuta district in eastern Nepal. Chandra Shamsher Rana, who led the coup, then took his place as 
Nepal’s fifth Rana prime minister and ruled until 1929.  
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2.1.3. The fall of the Ranas 
There are few legacies that the Ranas are remembered for other than inflicting misery 
on the vast majority of the population. But during their century of rule, Nepal was not 
completely stagnant. Limited economic modernisation took place in the form of 
monetisation, the establishment of official trade and the construction of several 
factories. Chandra Shamsher Rana formally abolished slavery and sati, and 
systematised public administration (Whelpton 2005: 64).26 But with mounting 
dissatisfaction with British rule in India and growing consciousness amongst Nepalis 
about the need for political change, the Ranas could no longer continue to rule as 
before. Exposure to the Indian nationalist movement led many Nepalis to believe that 
the fall of the Rana regime could only be accomplished with the elimination of British 
rule in India, since the British had become a bulwark for Rana power (Brown 1996: 
15; Joshi and Rose 1966: 50). Nepalis began to participate in the satyagraha 
movements of the 1920s and 30s in India and were trained in the methods of mass 
movements (Joshi and Rose 1966: 50).27 In 1936, activists and intellectuals formed 
the underground Praja Parishad [People’s Council], attempting to assassinate top 
Ranas. The plot was exposed by an informer and three leading members were 
executed, but this only increased resentment against the regime (Whelpton 2005: 67). 
The eventual success of the civil disobedience movement in India instilled fear in the 
Ranas, and as Brown (1996: 14) notes, ‘it is difficult to overestimate the impact of the 
movement upon Nepal’s modern political life’. They initiated a series of ostensible 
reforms—including the establishment of a basic education system based on Gandhi’s 
model in 1947 (Joshi and Rose 1966: 53) and the introduction of a new constitution in 
1948—but could not prevent the expansion of anti-Rana political organisations 
(Rawal 2007: 35).28 It was becomingly increasingly clear that the strength of political 
opposition to imperialism in India was intimately bound up with the prospects for a 
resistance movement in Nepal. 
 
There were two other factors that defeated the Ranas. First, the participation of 
Gurkha soldiers in World Wars I and II had exposed them to the outside world, and a 
                                                
26 Known across the Indian subcontinent, sati is the practice in which a recently widowed woman 
immolates herself on the funeral pyre of her husband. 
27 Literally meaning ‘insistence on truth’ satyagraha is the Gandhian principle of non-violent resistance 
as a method to achieve political and social reforms, and was used to oppose British rule from 1919. 
28 Brown (1996: 17) notes that the 1948 constitution was ‘positively revolutionary’ in Nepali terms 
because certain rights such as freedom of speech were enshrined within it for the first time. 
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small but significant number of Gurkhas became fiercely anti-Rana.29 Attempting to 
prevent veterans from spreading modern ideas in the villages, the Ranas requested the 
British not to promote Gurkha recruits beyond the rank of sergeant, and enforced 
caste purification rituals on the Gurkhas when they returned from fighting (Joshi and 
Rose 1966: 52). Many Gurkhas refused to be repatriated to Nepal, preferring instead 
to settle in India; a number of them joined the movement against both British 
imperialism and Rana rule. Second, divisions amongst the Ranas themselves, 
particularly after the death of Jang Bahadur in 1877, hastened the demise of the 
regime. When Chandra Shamsher imposed a categorisation amongst the Rana family, 
which had grown to hundreds of male members who were eligible for the post of 
prime minister, this excluded sections of the Rana elite and created further 
bitterness.30 Various defectors played prominent roles in the 1950-51 revolution 
(Joshi and Rose 1966: 49). The decisive factor, however, was the Quit India 
Movement initiated in 1942 and its impact on Nepali activists and intellectuals. The 
participation of Nepalis in the Indian movement created an anti-Rana movement 
within Nepal, however limited, that could not be ignored by the Ranas. Furthermore, 
as Gupta (1964: 49) argues, the survival of the Ranas ‘had depended on the 
submission of the subjects to medieval methods of oppression. But once the idea of 
defiance entered the public mind, the Rana system collapsed like a house of cards’.31 
The Ranas had not only lost the political support of an imperialist power but the 
domestic public was beginning to disregard their authority. The monarchy itself 
would suffer a similar fate some decades later.  
 
The movement in India also facilitated the creation of the Nepali National Congress in 
1947—later becoming the Nepali Congress when it merged with the Nepal 
                                                
29 Over a hundred thousand Nepalis fought in the First World War for the British, with at least 10,000 
killed and another 14,000 wounded or missing (Whelpton 2005: 64). Hundreds of thousands also 
fought in the Second World War in Africa and Europe, again for the British (Joshi and Rose 1966: 57). 
30 In 1856 Jang Bahadur had instituted a Roll of Succession whereby the eldest male member of the 
family would become prime minister; names were ranked on the roll by seniority, and titles and posts 
in the army and administration were allocated accordingly, although there was a degree of flexibility. 
In 1920, Chandra Shamsher modified the roll: ‘A’ class Ranas were born to mothers of equal caste 
status; ‘B’ class to those of a lower caste than the Ranas and ‘C’ class Ranas were illegitimate sons. 
The latter two classes were eventually struck off the roll altogether (Whelpton 2005: 65). For a detailed 
account of the Roll of Succession see Sever (1996). 
31 Gupta (1964: 50) notes how Mohan Shamsher Rana failed to appreciate the significance of the 
nationalist movements taking place elsewhere in the world, refusing ‘to believe that the newly 
awakened aspirations for democratic rule and national independence could also overtake his country’.  
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Democratic Congress in 1950—and the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) in 1949.32 
The Ranas were surrounded: the post-1947 government in India (the powerful Indian 
National Congress), detested the Ranas because they had supported British 
imperialism; the Nepali monarchy, which had been deposed by the Ranas, also 
wanted the dissolution of the regime; the international community was becoming 
impatient with Nepal’s trade barriers and concerned about potential communist 
influence from China; and various Nepali political parties, with a growing base of 
support, were being founded calling for democratic reforms. Out of the Nepali 
Congress also came the underground Mukti Sena [Liberation Army], which was 
making preparations for abducting King Tribhuvan and instigating a revolt in the 
army by disaffected Ranas. Over 3,000 Indian activists had joined the Mukti Sena and 
it had ‘secured control of a significant portion of Nepal’ (Brown 1996: 20), but only 
had reluctant support from Delhi, which did not want to see a civil war on its northern 
border; for Delhi, the Mukti Sena was not to overthrow the Ranas (1996: 18).33 Indian 
interests lie elsewhere: with Chinese communism so close to India’s border, they 
realised they needed to replace Rana rule but also needed to prevent a revolution. The 
Nepali Congress could not be trusted since they had been willing to work with the 
CPN, which had growing support. Plans for the mutiny were foiled and arrests were 
made, but on 6 November 1950 King Tribhuvan and his entire family—with the 
exception of 4-year-old Gyanendra who was left behind to avoid suspicion—took 
refuge in the Indian Embassy before being flown to Delhi.34 India’s intervention in the 
crisis was pivotal and established a troubling precedent: Indian interests were 
paramount in Nepali political affairs.  
 
What became known as the Delhi Compromise involved the Indian government, the 
Ranas and King Tribhuvan—the Nepali Congress was not involved in the talks until 
the final phase, but ‘was in no position to ignore the talks or to indulge in hard-headed 
                                                
32 The Nepal Democratic Congress was initiated by disaffected ‘C’ class Ranas who were committed to 
overthrowing the Rana regime dominated by ‘A’ class Ranas. Violence was not ruled out in achieving 
their aims (Joshi and Rose 1966: 68-69). 
33 Constituting an assortment of students, ex-soldiers and mercenaries, the rebellion launched by the 
Mukti Sena ‘spread from village to village in the form of loot, arson and stray murder of zamindars 
[landowners] and moneylenders’ (Gupta 1964: 44). The Mukti Sena had fought several battles with the 
Rana army until they were defeated by the state’s superior military strength, the Mukti Sena’s own lack 
of co-ordination and its inability to procure sufficient arms and ammunition (1964: 45). 
34 Watched carefully by the Ranas, who were becoming increasingly suspicious of his possible links 
with the anti-Rana movement, King Tribhuvan was kept a virtual prisoner in his palace and feared for 
his safety (Gupta 1964: 43). He decided to flee. 
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bargaining once invited to the negotiating table’ (1996: 19). A tripartite, power-
sharing coalition government was formed, with the Nepali Congress providing the 
necessary democratic credentials and the Ranas providing a measure of stability. The 
Ranas had to accept the compromise, partly to protect extensive investments in India 
(Rose 1971: 285), and partly to avoid total humiliation. The situation suited the 
Indians because it meant the king was indebted to India for having restored the 
monarchy. The Indians could also extend support to the Mukti Sena in order to put 
pressure on the regime when Indian interests were threatened. For example, when 
Mohan Shamsher Rana—the last Rana prime minister in power—attempted to 
establish diplomatic relations with other countries, the Nehru government extended its 
support to the Mukti Sena (Gupta 1994: 3191). In the domestic context it was King 
Tribhuvan who came out on top, triumphantly returning to Kathmandu on 18 
February. In contrast to the Ranas, who were discredited, and the Nepali Congress, 
which was inexperienced, the monarchy was unencumbered with past failures and 
could not be blamed for Nepal’s chronic poverty and backwardness (Brown 1996: 
21). Although it lacked a power base it had a prestige that could be developed.  
 
The events of 1950-51 effectively brought about the end of Rana rule, but whether it 
constituted a revolution is a matter of debate. Brown (1996: 21) notes that ‘the 
overthrow of the Ranas was not secured by a popular movement. It did not unite the 
Nepali people in the cause of democracy. It was not even a bourgeois revolution’. 
Mikesell (1999: 94) similarly argues that ‘it was neither a revolution in the sense of a 
major rearrangement of the class organisation and control of the society nor the 
creation of democracy’. This is disputed by Gupta (1964: 45), who argues that 
spontaneous demonstrations broke out in Kathmandu that could not be suppressed by 
the Rana police. Sever (1996: 147) also refers to the events of 1950-51 as a 
revolution, noting the rise of popular unrest from the late 1940s. What is certain, 
however, is that it loosened the grip of absolute Rana rule and made the transition to a 
new political set-up more gradual and palatable for the former ruling elite. While it 
failed to mark any fundamental socio-economic change, it did replace the old ruling 
order and opened the space for democratic forms to emerge and consolidate; as such, 
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it could be described as a ‘revolution from above’.35 Nepal slipped from one kind of 
dictatorship to another with relative ease, and India continued to play a central role in 
Nepali affairs, preventing Nepal from extending its relations with other countries or 
pursuing an independent foreign policy.36 An independent Nepal—in terms of foreign 
policy, diplomatic relations, arms procurement, security, and business and trade 
links—was always a problem for Delhi because of Nepal’s strategic location as a 
buffer with China and because of concerns over the spread of communism 
southwards. India supported King Tribhuvan because it had a reliable ally (Gupta 
1994: 3191). Putting in place the Nepali Congress after King Tribhuvan’s death was 
logical because of the Nepali Congress’ political ties with the Indian National 
Congress and because it could be persuaded to adopt economic policies that meant 
increased reliance on India.  
 
2.2. The emergence of the communist movement in Nepal 
The two most significant political events that influenced the development of 
communism in Nepal were the independence movement in India and the Chinese 
revolution of 1949 (Rawal 2007: 30; Tewari 2001: 48; Khadka 1995: 56). While the 
revolutionary upheaval in China was relatively far-removed from the communists in 
Nepal, the Indian experience had a more direct impact. With the growth of 
educational institutions in northern India in the early 20th century, many young Nepali 
students began to study in India, particularly from the 1930s. They quickly became 
influenced by the ideas of the Indian communists, who were operating in a relatively 
open political environment compared to Nepal. Based in Calcutta, Darjeeling, 
Varanasi and elsewhere, they began to participate in various groups and study circles 
that explicitly professed socialist ideas. Varanasi in particular became a focal point for 
Nepali intellectual activities (Tewari 2001: 8). Following the participation of Man 
Mohan Adhikari, Pushpa Lal Shrestha and others in the Biratnagar Jute Mill strike in 
1947, they returned to Nepal as young leaders looking for an opportunity to form an 
organisation that could provide the basis for launching a struggle against the Rana 
                                                
35 Joshi and Rose (1966: vii-viii) also note the renaissance in the sphere of literature, the massive 
expansion of educational facilities and the impact these had on innovation and experimentation 
amongst the new elite following the revolution. At the same time, they do not deny the continuity 
between pre-1951 and post-1960 politics. 
36 According to Gupta (1994: 3192), ‘India had become active in fuelling the movement for the 
restoration of democracy for the second time in 1990’ over suspicions of Nepal developing an 
independent foreign policy, this time with China, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
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regime (Upreti 2009: 15).37 One of the debates amongst communist intellectuals at the 
time was over whether to form a left group within the Nepali Congress or to establish 
a separate communist party. Bhim Rawal (2007: 24), a UML central committee 
member who has written one of the few key texts on the history of the communist 
movement in Nepal, notes that ‘due to prejudice against communists within [the] 
Nepali Congress’, Pushpa Lal and other senior figures decided that a separate party 
should be formed. The CPN was established on 15 September 1949 in Calcutta with 
the advice and financial support of the Communist Party of India (CPI).38 The main 
objective of the party was to participate in the popular movement against the Rana 
dictatorship, together with the Nepali Congress.  
 
In the early days of the anti-Rana movement, joint struggle amongst the newly formed 
political parties was relatively more straightforward because leftists of varying 
ideologies had joined both the Congress and the CPN (2007: 33) and activists across 
the political spectrum were increasingly aware that no democratic government could 
be established in Nepal without a struggle in India. Like the CPN, the origins of the 
Nepali Congress were anti-imperialist. In October 1946 a group of Nepali youth in 
Varanasi had formed the Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Rastriya Congress under the 
leadership of B.P. Koirala; its founding conference was held in January 1947, when 
two other organisations—the Nepali Sangh and the Gorkha Congress—joined it, 
forming the Nepali National Congress. The newly established organisation adopted 
four broad resolutions: helping India to obtain full independence from Britain; 
launching a satyagraha to end Rana rule; demanding the release of Praja Parishad 
leaders who had been in prison for several years; and finally, supporting the cause of 
the Vietnamese people against the French (Gupta 1964: 166). From the outset, the 
                                                
37 The Biratnagar Jute Mill strike was a momentous event in Nepali history because it brought both 
Congress and communist activists together in joint struggle; but it was also the beginning of wider 
resistance to Rana rule. According to Tewari (2001: 70), it began as ‘an economic struggle of the 
working class projected from India’, because the Indian left had helped to initiate it and most 
employees at the mill were Indian. When the Ranas repressed the strike with police violence and mass 
arrests, it had repercussions across Nepal (Chatterji 1967: 39): the strike moved beyond the confines of 
trade unionism and joined the mainstream of the democratic struggle. In 2012, the Maoist-led 
government decided to revive the loss-making Biratnagar Jute Mill and hand it over to private 
companies. See http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=34148 
(last accessed on 23 April 2012). 
38 Pushpa Lal Shrestha, along with Niranjan Govinda Vaidya, Nara Bahadur Karmacharya, Narayan 
Bilash Joshi and Moti Devi, are generally considered to be the founder members of the party (Rawal 
2007: 25; Upreti 2009: 15). Pushpa Lal translated into Nepali the first edition of the Communist 
Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in April 1949 (Karki and Seddon 2003: 6), amidst a rapid 
expansion of Marxist literature in the late 1940s in Kathmandu (Rawal 2007: 34).  
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Nepali National Congress understood that for the anti-Rana movement to advance, it 
would have to form an integral part of the Indian nationalist movement against the 
British (1964: 166). It also sought to make links with other nationalist movements. 
The resolution to launch a satyagraha included demands for civil liberties, and 
reaffirmed the call for the release of all political leaders and the end of the Rana 
regime (Tewari 2001: 73). When it took place in April 1947, the satyagraha 
supported the striking mill workers of Biratnagar and took the form of rallies and 
processions, defying prohibition orders in Kathmandu. It was withdrawn in June when 
the Ranas declared the granting of limited civil rights (2001: 73). In practice, 
however, these were only superficial reforms and the repression of the Mohan 
Shamsher government continued (Gupta 1964: 169). In April 1950 at a conference in 
Calcutta, the Nepali National Congress merged with the Nepal Democratic Congress, 
a party that was created in 1948 with substantial financial backing from ‘C’ class 
Ranas calling for a Constituent Assembly (CA) to be elected on the basis of universal 
adult franchise (1964: 168). The Nepal Democratic Congress advocated the use of 
force, but also realised the need for popular support to overthrow the Ranas. Together 
they formed the Nepali Congress, with the aim of replacing the Rana regime with a 
constitutional monarchy based on popular, democratic rule. 
 
Compared to the CPN, the Nepali Congress comprised various sectors and classes of 
society, ranging from wealthy Ranas, landowners and small businessmen to 
intellectuals, students and poor peasants (1964: 185)—all those who wanted an end to 
the Rana system. Although the Nepali Congress was publicly committed to a non-
violent movement, in September 1950 it adopted a programme of revolutionary armed 
struggle against the Ranas (Tewari 2001: 95) and secretly commissioned the 
organisation of the Mukti Sena. Led by K.I. Singh, it had made progress in capturing 
key towns in the Terai before being defeated and becoming a spent force (Gupta 
1964: 44). The ultimate ascendancy of the Nepali Congress was due not to the armed 
struggle but primarily to the popular upsurge that followed in the wake of the 
insurrection (1964: 45). But the Nepali Congress also had its share of problems. First, 
following the revolution, it was faced with growing opposition to its association with 
the Ranas in government; to address this issue B.P. Koirala took the decision to 
reorganise the Mukti Sena into a people’s militia, to be called the Raksha Dal, in order 
‘to counterbalance the military threat of the Ranas’ (1964: 64). Second, the Congress’ 
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pluralism meant that it was constantly fraught with personal and ideological divisions. 
When it began to take more polemical positions—against the monarchy and against 
India in particular—it began to build a national presence; several smaller 
organisations joined the Congress and it began to recruit (1964: 176). It claimed to be 
a socialist party, perhaps because its main support base was the peasantry in the 
eastern Terai following the revolution; nevertheless when it held its sixth congress in 
1956, declaring that it had made mistakes in failing to utilise the revolutionary 
possibilities of the period (1964: 176), it officially adopted democratic socialism—
similar to Nehruvian socialism in India (Whelpton 2005: 94).39 But the Congress 
could not fulfil the demands of both peasants and wealthy landowners. Third, the law 
and order situation began to deteriorate outside the capital; in the east, there was a 
complete lack of authority. Meanwhile, the Congress and the CPN were becoming 
increasingly polarised.   
 
2.2.1. Early years of the CPN 
The CPN was active in the movement against the Rana regime since its formation. 
Following the tactical line of the CPI, the CPN had recognised that the national 
leadership in India had a ‘collaborationist character’ (Gupta 1964: 200) that was 
susceptible to being influenced by imperialist forces and, as such, could not be 
trusted; it began to organise amongst peasants and workers and held that peace in 
Nepal would require more than the overthrow of the Ranas (1964: 200).40 The CPN 
was also conscious of the fact that the Delhi Compromise had been engineered to 
diffuse the anti-Rana movement and prevent the growth of the communist movement 
in Nepal (Rawal 2007: 39). It publicly criticised the pact and declared that the Nepali 
Congress had betrayed the revolution (Hachhethu 2002: 35). One of the main policy 
aims of the CPN was to minimise Indian influence and strengthen relations with 
China (Khadka 1995: 57); to that end it called for the defeat of national feudal lords, 
                                                
39 B.P. Koirala had been a probationary member of the CPI but according to Hoftun et al. (1999: 234) 
‘found communism insufficiently humanist and was particularly repelled by Stalin’s treatment of 
Trotsky’. In the late 1950s, the Nepali Congress was known to have organised poor peasants in 
opposition to landlords and moneylenders (Whelpton 2005: 98). In 1989, it joined the Socialist 
International, an international NGO of social democratic and labour parties around the world, and in 
1999 became a full member. 
40 The CPN followed the CPI despite its controversial history. Established in 1935, the CPI was banned 
shortly after its formation and worked within the Congress Socialist Party (CSP), a faction within the 
Indian National Congress that led the Quit India Movement; the CPI broke with the CSP in 1942, 
opposing support for Britain in the Second World War (Tewari 2001: 48). The CPI later backtracked 
on this position but nevertheless welcomed independence in 1947. 
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Indian capitalists and imperialist forces (Gupta 1964: 63). But the CPN also suffered 
from a lack of ideological clarity. On the one hand it wanted to establish a peace 
movement, and set up the All Nepal Peace Council; on the other, it was actively 
involved in the armed Raksha Dal, whose ranks were filled with growing unrest and 
disillusionment. In January 1952, the Raksha Dal stormed parliament to release K.I. 
Singh, who was arrested for being involved in the disturbances in the east. Singh not 
only managed to capture parliament, but also the treasury, the arsenal, the airport and 
Nepal’s only broadcasting station (1964: 69). The revolt was put down after intense 
fighting over several days, and Singh fled to China. King Tribhuvan subsequently 
called a state of emergency and banned the CPN for its involvement in the revolt, 
forcing it to organise underground, where it continued its activities by infiltrating 
other organisations and intensifying its work among agricultural labourers (1964: 
202). The ban was only lifted in 1956 by the Nepali Congress government headed by 
Prime Minister Tanka Prasad Acharya on the condition that the communists accept 
the principle of constitutional monarchy.   
 
Although the CPN was the biggest communist party, from its inception the 
communist movement itself was divided into at least twenty factions (Khadka 1995: 
58). The question of the monarchy would burden the communist parties for over half 
a century—until the abolition of the monarchy in 2008—and was a major source of 
division within the movement, between those who believed it could be abolished 
gradually and through democratic means, and those who were pushing for agitation to 
secure its immediate overthrow. There was also the question of whether and on what 
basis to work with the Nepali Congress. Gupta (1964: 208-209) argues that if the 
communists had ‘extended even a limited measure of support to B.P. Koirala’s 
policies on the basis of a broad front of democratic elements to fight autocracy, it 
would have been more difficult for the king to dismiss the elected government in 
1960. Indeed the parties had failed to come together in the aftermath of the 1960 
coup, and again before the 1980 referendum, but when they finally did join forces 
they created the conditions for revolution, first in 1990 and then in 2006; both were 
critical turning points in Nepali history.  
 
The first congress of the CPN was held underground, in 1954. Man Mohan Adhikari 
was elected general secretary, and the party adopted the programme of a republican 
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constitution and elections to a Constituent Assembly. The CPN had taken a clear 
stand against the monarchy. But when the ban was lifted, ‘reformist’ and 
‘revolutionary’ factions within the CPN emerged, with the former giving tacit support 
to Prime Minister Acharya and instructing lower level cadres to follow the 
programme of the Nepali Congress, and the latter maintaining the position that there 
could be no compromise with the monarchy (Rawal 2007: 48; Gupta 1964: 204). A 
second congress was held in 1957 in order to resolve these differences, and Keshar 
Jung Rayamajhi was elected general secretary. Rayamajhi had adopted a far more 
moderate approach to left politics, serving to deepen ideological divisions within the 
party: the earlier demand for a Constituent Assembly was rejected in favour of 
strengthening parliament under a constitutional monarchy. According to Rawal (2007: 
52), Rayamajhi also claimed that ‘it would be unwise to talk about socialism without 
industrial development’. This perspective was subsequently emphasised and upheld as 
the dominant communist line in Nepal, even amongst the more radical parties, but it 
would have damaging consequences for the movement.  
 
There were also divisions about whether to participate in the country’s first general 
elections scheduled for February 1959. In June 1958 the CPN took the decision to 
participate, but internal disagreements had already sharpened enough to prevent it 
from becoming a strong political force (Gupta 1964: 206); the party began to focus on 
electioneering rather than developing the broader struggle for communism (Rawal 
2007: 55). The CPN won only 4 out of 109 parliamentary seats. Khadka (1995: 57) 
notes that one of the reasons for the poor results was the weak party structure in the 
rural areas; the party had taken a decision in the early 1950s to focus on issues that 
could provoke discontent in the capital—despite the fact that 97 per cent of the 
population was living outside Kathmandu—and membership was drawn mainly from 
the urban population. Gupta (1964: 207) cites three other reasons for the poor results: 
the CPN continued to lack ideological clarity in its programme, and therefore failed to 
communicate its perspectives; disagreements amongst the leadership prevented the 
party from organising an election campaign on a national scale; and, the party lacked 
the necessary finances for a convincing campaign. The oppositional politics of the 
CPN in parliament made negligible impact on the masses.  
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2.2.2. Factionalism amongst the communists 
When King Mahendra took absolute power in 1960, the CPN became further divided 
between those who supported the takeover and those who took a stand against it, 
calling for a united struggle against the panchayat regime. Polarisation within the 
CPN was aggravated by ideological differences between the Soviet Union and China, 
and the Sino-Indian war of 1962, at which point the party formally split into two main 
camps (Khadka 1995: 58). The pro-Soviet Union group, led by Rayamajhi, recognised 
the USSR as the international centre of the communist movement in the belief that 
China had abandoned Marxism-Leninism. Rayamajhi’s group eventually split four 
ways in 1979, rejecting Maoism but unable to emerge as an alternative to the pro-
China group. The pro-China group was also divided into several factions, between the 
moderate majority—the first generation communists who participated in the 1959 
elections and believed that armed struggle was not the only way to power—and those 
who advocated taking up arms. One of the factions held its third congress in 1966, 
and Tulsi Lal Amatya was elected general secretary. A programme of national 
democracy was adopted and, crucially, the concept of armed struggle was rejected as 
‘adventurism’ (Rawal 2007: 73). The third congress marked a turning point, where 
political differences within the CPN went beyond reconciliation, becoming 
permanently divided between those supporting a parliamentary approach, and those 
arguing for armed struggle.  
 
Pushpa Lal formed a separate group in 1968 in an attempt to restore the revolutionary 
vision of the party and forge unity amongst left forces. The aim of establishing a 
‘people’s democratic republic’ was the main goal, and to this end Pushpa Lal had 
consistently advocated tactical alliances with the Nepali Congress (Whelpton 2005: 
106). The party expanded its presence from 10 districts to 42 districts, established 
several front organisations within Nepal and gained support amongst sections of the 
Nepali diaspora, particularly in India. Its peasants’ organisation grew to a membership 
of over 30,000 (Rawal 2007: 79). The question of whether to engage in armed 
struggle remained a matter of dispute, but the uprising in the Indian town of Naxalbari 
in 1967 had already inspired a section of communists—against Pushpa Lal’s line—
across the Nepali border in Jhapa. Working under the East Koshi Provincial 
Committee, the Jhapa District Committee of the CPN consulted and obtained support 
from the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) to launch an armed struggle. 
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On 22 April 1971, they took up arms in order to ‘annihilate class enemies’ (Rawal 
2007: 91). The Jhapa rebellion had the twofold aim of organising peasants and killing 
local landlords, and the first killings took place in May 1971. It was quickly and 
brutally suppressed by the government, hundreds were arrested, including R.K. 
Mainali, C.P. Mainali, K.P. Oli and several other leaders. There was still no clear 
party line on the question of armed struggle but it had provoked a debate across the 
political spectrum. Pushpa Lal claimed that the panchayat would not be abolished by 
targeted killings, while Man Mohan Adhikari condemned the government’s 
repression. B.P. Koirala of the Nepali Congress called for a political analysis of the 
Jhapa uprising and praised the rebels for their selflessness, self-sacrifice and devotion 
to the revolution (2007: 94). Predictably, King Birendra reproached the communists 
for the revolt, but it was the Nepali Congress—not the communists—that was 
regarded as the main threat to the regime during the 1960s and 70s (Whelpton 2005: 
106). By 1972 Pushpa Lal’s party split three ways (Khadka 1995: 59). Pushpa Lal 
died in 1978 and was succeeded by his wife Sahana Pradhan. 
 
According to Rawal (2007: 92), the rebels in Jhapa criticised all other communist 
leaders for being ‘revisionists’ and praised the political line Charu Majumdar, the 
general secretary of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), formed in 1969. 
The Jhapa movement then established the All Nepal Communist Revolutionary 
Coordination Committee (Marxist-Leninist) in 1975, in an attempt to build a united 
communist party and movement in the country. It proposed a number of pre-
conditions for the basis of this unity: the acceptance of Mao as the world authority on 
revolution; agreement that the conditions for revolution were uneven across the 
country; that armed struggle was necessary for capturing state power at local level, 
and that this struggle was to follow Charu Majumdar’s line of ‘annihilation of class 
enemies’ (2007: 95). The co-ordination committee, however, later became divided 
over the application of Mao’s strategy in Nepal, and on the question of whether to call 
for a Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless, it was the Jhapa rebels who would go on to 
form the nucleus of the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist). Although at 
least a section of the CPN (ML) was committed to guerrilla warfare, the death of Mao 
in 1976 led the party to abandon these tactics (Khadka 1995: 64). Mohan Bikram 
Singh, a prominent communist leader who had been arguing for a Constituent 
Assembly since 1961 (1995: 60), then broke away from the committee and formed the 
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Communist Party of Nepal (Masal). Masal subsequently split into five separate 
factions, including one called Mashal. Mashal was to form the embryo of the CPN 
(Maoist) that launched the People’s War.41 
 
The debate amongst the communist parties in the 1970s and 80s was over the kind of 
strategy that was needed for overthrowing the panchayat regime (1995: 60). 
According to Khadka, factionalism amongst the parties was not due to the 
incompatibility between communism and democracy but the lack of a strong 
leadership (1995: 56). While the original CPN was in disarray, different left groups 
were merging with CPN (ML), which was heavily involved in organising the student 
movements in 1972 and 1979.42 The party reorganised itself in 1982, and Jhala Nath 
Khanal was elected general secretary. Declaring itself to be the original CPN, it held 
its fourth congress in 1989, and Madan Bhandari was elected general secretary. 
Meanwhile, Sahana Pradhan held talks with Man Mohan Adhikari in 1987 and 
decided to form a new party called CPN (Marxist). Early in 1990, the CPN (Marxist) 
and the CPN (ML), together with five other communist groups and the Nepali 
Congress launched the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, the mass 
campaign that eventually abolished the panchayat and ushered in multiparty 
democracy. The communist coalition operated under the banner of the United Left 
Front (ULF). The success of the first jana andolan [people’s movement] facilitated 
the subsequent merger in 1991 of what had by then become the two main communist 
tendencies, the CPN (ML) and the CPN (Marxist), into what is today known as the 
CPN (Unified Marxist-Leninist) or UML.  
 
2.3. Geopolitics, anti-communism and the use of NGOs 
From the late 1940s the debate about foreign aid in the US was linked to the leverage 
that aid could have in realising strategic interests, and aid has figured heavily in US 
foreign policy since the Second World War. American liberalism was founded on the 
principle that the market is not only efficient but also fair; if a country was poor it was 
due to ignorance—either a lack of initiative or capacity (Augelli and Murphy 1988: 
76). Consequently, addressing poverty meant finding the correct technical solutions. 
                                                
41 The origins of the CPN (Maoist) are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
42 Today the student wing of UML is far ahead of its parent organisation in its involvement in 
campaigning, particularly in the demonstrations in the run-up to the 2006 democracy movement. This 
view is based on personal observation and from interviews with UML student leaders and activists. 
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The need to spread the scientific advances and industrial progress of the US through 
technical assistance was defined in the Truman Doctrine of 1949.43 Economic 
prosperity in the US was at its height following the war, and opening the markets of 
developing countries could guarantee continued prosperity. But since communism 
was an obstacle to liberalisation, aid also had to be used to fight communism 
(Veltmeyer and Petras 2005: 121). In the 1960s and 70s, USAID increasingly turned 
to NGOs to deliver aid.  
 
2.3.1. The US and anti-communist strategy 
The effective overthrow of the Rana regime in 1950-51 combined with the perceived 
threat of communism following the Chinese Revolution led the US to establish a 
presence in Nepal, even before Russia and the regional powers India and China. 
Khadka (1995: 66) notes that all four countries ‘were conspicuously present through 
their aid programmes’ in Nepal, and this presence inevitably influenced the 
development of the communist movement.44 The US was one of the first foreign 
donors in general to use aid in a systematic way in order to achieve its foreign policy 
objectives (Khadka 2000: 77), and was Nepal’s first bilateral donor (Skerry et al. 
1992: 1). Khadka (2000: 77) argues that there were two primary reasons for the US 
initiating the General Agreement for Technical Co-operation with Nepal in January 
1951: the growing popularity of communist parties in South Asia in general and 
Nepal in particular, and the grinding poverty found across Nepal. But the question of 
poverty, arguably stemming from a century of neglect by the Rana dictatorship and 
weak governance following the rise to power of the nascent political parties, was also 
linked to the US’s overall anti-communist offensive.45 Creating the economic 
conditions that could prevent the spread of communism was a major pillar of the US 
aid programme ‘from the time of President Truman until the collapse of communism 
in 1990’ (2000: 82). That Nepalis had overthrown the Rana regime was evidence that 
                                                
43 In his inaugural speech in 1949, US President Harry Truman spelled out this new doctrine. He 
claimed that ‘for the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve the 
suffering’ of the poor, and that it was the responsibility of the US to ensure greater production, through 
scientific and technical knowledge, as ‘the key to prosperity and peace’ for the whole world (cited in 
Rist 2002: 259-260). 
44 The Soviet Union ended its aid programme in Nepal in 1972 (Khadka 2000: 86), which in part led to 
a decline in US aid (Khadka 1997: 1053). 
45 The US government would have been aware, for example, of Indian socialist leader Jayaprakash 
Narayan’s letter to Jawaharlal Nehru commenting on the increased political consciousness of Nepalis, 
who were turning to communism and becoming increasingly anti-Indian (Tewari 2001: 104).  
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they wanted a change in their living conditions, reasoned US officials; but secondly, 
the US believed that aid could prevent people from turning to communism to address 
social problems, and prevent Nepal from becoming a focal point for communist 
activity. If aid could help Nepal experience rapid economic growth, it would be able 
to repel any communist influence from either China or the various communist groups 
in India, and even the Soviet Union.  
 
The US did not have direct security interests in Nepal, but the country was deemed 
vulnerable to communism due to colossal levels of poverty and inequality, 
particularly outside urban areas. Mihaly considered the greatest threat to stability to 
be the ‘vulnerability of the peasantry’ (1965: 31) to communism. Quoting a House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs report from 1952, Mihaly argues that the agrarian 
population was ‘a major target for communist subversion’ (1965: 32). Indirectly, it 
was important for the US that Nepal was kept independent of its neighbours, because 
this would ensure security for South Asia as a whole. For the same reasons, the Ranas 
had been keen for US involvement in Nepal as early as the 1940s. The end of British 
rule in India had exposed the Rana regime and it needed the backing of a powerful 
ally. According to Khadka (2000: 79), there were two particular events that prompted 
the US to act in favour of the Rana regime: King Tribhuvan’s refuge in the Indian 
embassy in Kathmandu at the height of the anti-Rana movement, an act that further 
intensified the movement and, second, the Chinese occupation of Tibet in October 
1950, which required a stable regime to continue to provide a buffer with China. 
Barely a month later, however, King Tribhuvan returned to Nepal, the Nepali 
Congress was heading government, and the Ranas—who were unable to hold out 
even with US support—were crumbling as a political force. 
 
Khadka (2000: 88) argues that US aid was directed according to the development 
theories and paradigms of the 1960s through to the 1980s. If modernisation theory and 
the need for higher growth rates dominated the 1960s, then from the 1970s onwards it 
was about growth with equity, including poverty reduction. Within these frameworks, 
US aid policy considered several factors, including the external communist threat, 
which could affect the security of other countries in the subcontinent; the internal 
communist threat that could be fomented amongst the poor and disaffected; the fact 
that funding could not only make visible improvements in the lives of the poor but 
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deter people from being influenced by radical forces; and finally, that economic 
growth would ostensibly lead to democracy, making Nepal more favourable to 
Western liberal values in general (2000: 88). On a diplomatic level, having an aid 
programme that allowed US officials to travel throughout Nepal and assess the social 
and economic conditions firsthand was an important source of information for 
analysing the threat of external aggression and the level of ideological penetration by 
communist China or Russia.  
 
The United States Operating Mission, the implementing agency for the US 
government in the 1950s, only began to implement a handful of aid projects in 1954; 
and the majority of US assistance was in the form of grants. Assistance focused on 
agriculture, roads, bridges, ropeways and communications.46 The US approach to aid 
was that small investments would yield large returns (Mihaly 1965: 32). With an 
initial investment of US$200,000, by 1961 the US had contributed a total of US$7.4 
million, and was the largest donor until 1965, when it contributed US$11.4 million 
(Khadka 2000: 83). If agriculture was an important sector because farmers were 
susceptible to being recruited by the communist parties, then one of the main goals 
within the sector was to introduce technologies that could increase food production in 
order to be able to export a surplus. Roads were also needed to transport agricultural 
and other industrial goods. Building roads, however, was another complex issue. On 
the one hand the US believed that Nepal’s security would be strengthened if it had 
proper transport networks; and on the other hand, it had to consider Indian interests in 
Nepal and the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty that had recently been signed between the two 
countries.47 The US’s strategic interests in general, which were to ensure the integrity 
of Nepal’s borders, weakened as its relations with China began to normalise in the 
1960s (2000: 84). Both absolute and relative funding provided by the US started to 
decline for roughly the next decade until the mid-1970s; aid contributions between 
1983 and 1990 reached US$19 million. This rapprochement was one of the main 
                                                
46 Ropeways were an important means of transport and communication to remote hill areas in Nepal. 
The ropeway built between Hetauda and Kathmandu in 1964 with US assistance replaced the original 
Rana ropeway built in 1925, but Whelpton (2005: 138) argues that it was not managed as effectively as 
it could have been because government mismanagement made it unreliable for private traders.  
47 The 1950 India-Nepal Treaty—formally known as the Treaty of Peace and Friendship—is a bilateral 
agreement between the two countries signed on 31 July 1950 that sanctions the free movement of 
people and goods over the border and details their strategic relationship on questions of defence and 
foreign affairs. The treaty officially acknowledges the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of each nation but is widely perceived to favour Indian interests.  
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reasons for why US assistance to Nepal declined after 1965; the US no longer 
considered China a threat to Nepal’s security. Khadka (2000: 85-86) lists a number of 
other reasons, including the US invasion of and preoccupation with Vietnam, the 
relative decline of aid from the Soviet Union and the involvement of Western 
European donors, in addition to the Bretton Woods institutions, which could help 
counter any communist uprising.48 Also, Britain, Germany, Japan and Switzerland, 
amongst others, had all increased their aid programmes by the 1970s.  
 
Two main aspects of the communist threat were physical aggression and ideological 
influence (2000: 81). Militarily, Nepal was no match for China, but communist ideas 
coming from China had to be countered, particularly in the context of increased 
tensions between China and Russia by the end of the 1950s; in Nepal, the communist 
parties were already becoming divided along pro-Beijing and pro-Moscow factions 
(2000: 82). The US was correct to be fearful of Chinese influence, as Chinese 
propaganda in the form of pictorial magazines and newspapers were prevalent 
throughout the rural areas in Nepal beginning in the 1960s. The US thus supported 
King Mahendra’s coup, believing the monarchy to be a far more stable force than the 
parties—one that could prevent a communist takeover and defend Nepal amidst the 
hostility of its giant neighbours, between whom a war had broken out in 1962, with 
China victorious. If the main reason was to curb the communist threat, then the 
secondary reason for supporting the panchayat was that the US deemed it to be an 
appropriate vehicle for economic development. King Mahendra’s pragmatic foreign 
policy—neutrality between the regional powers—also coincided with US interests.  
 
2.3.2. The impact of US aid 
If US assistance to Nepal in the 1950s began with the objective of containing 
communism, and the strategic element of US foreign policy was de-emphasised in 
Nepal from about the mid-1970s (2000: 89), the question remains as to whether and to 
what extent the US continued to be concerned with communist activity in Nepal. 
Khadka remarks that ‘although the US failed during the Cold War in its objective to 
prevent the growth of communism, this objective will continue to guide US foreign 
policy for some years to come’ (2000: 93). That is, even without Cold War politics 
                                                
48 The US aid programme to Vietnam, mainly in the form of grants, was US$167 million in 1960 and 
increased to US$500 million in 1966. 
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dominating US foreign policy from the 1990s, aid continued to be used for economic 
and political interests. With the UML’s election victory in 1994 and the launch of the 
Maoists’ People’s War two years later, the US remained concerned about communism 
fomenting political instability (2000: 93). During the Maoists’ People’s War it took 
strong measures to communicate its displeasure about the political situation, including 
putting the Maoists on the second tier of the US terrorist list on 30 April 2003, 
threatening to withdraw aid, and working with India—now much stronger in the 
region compared to the Cold War years—to bring the Maoists into the mainstream.49 
Khadka also points out that the US continues to view Nepal’s neutrality between its 
giant neighbours as vital, and that not pursuing US interests could undermine Nepal’s 
leverage to pursue a policy that balances the interests of both powers. China remains 
preoccupied with Tibet, and is permanently concerned that Nepali territory could be 
used to provoke unrest in Tibet; it also views Nepal’s relationship with Taiwan with 
suspicion. Similarly, India has fears that Nepal is being used by the Pakistani 
intelligence agency for anti-India activities. However, India’s foremost concern is 
engaging its business interests in Nepal, whereas China’s interests are fixated on 
maintaining its control over Tibet and ensuring that Nepali authorities have an 
impartial policy towards the tens of thousands of Tibetan refugees living within its 
borders. For these reasons, US aid is oriented towards defending strategic interests. In 
practice, a balanced policy between China and India is impossible given the economic 
ties between Nepal and India and their geographical and cultural proximity. These 
factors, together with the open border between Nepal and India, allow India to have 
an overwhelming influence in Nepal.  
 
In terms of its political uses, Khadka notes the ‘baffling problems… when aid is 
offered for one thing but expected to achieve another’ (2000: 89), for example, when 
aid is extended ostensibly for economic development but in concrete terms is 
deployed to attain strategic and foreign policy objectives. Direct links between 
strategic considerations and aid policy are difficult to prove; however, the US did play 
a role in neutralising Indian and Chinese influence in Nepal in the critical years of the 
1950s through its presence, and development projects have had concrete 
                                                
49 The Maoists have always opposed the terrorist label, arguing that they are a serious political force, 
not a terrorist group. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2995521.stm (last accessed on 5 
June 2012). 
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consequences. Khadka (2000: 90) lists the range of projects funded by USAID 
between 1950 and 1990, including education, community development, agriculture, 
health and family planning. He argues that ‘the hidden goal of these projects was to 
limit the influence of communism among the rural population’ (2000: 90). But the 
period witnessed a growing number of communists in Nepal, including the rise of the 
Maoists as a radical alternative to the moderation of the UML. While the US focused 
on education, many teachers in primary and secondary schools were recruited to 
different communist parties; US-funded community development programmes clearly 
did not have a substantial impact on preventing much of the countryside to support or 
join the Maoists; and in recent years, when USAID has prioritised youth programmes 
across Nepal, these have not stemmed the recruitment of thousands of young people 
to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and urban-based groups like the Young 
Communist League (YCL). One interviewee, a senior official with ADB who was 
also a former advisor to USAID, noted the efforts of Mercy Corps’ Youth Initiatives 
for Peace and Reconciliation Programme, in which 32,622 youth were mobilised to 
engage in development and peacebuilding projects and other non-violent activities 
aimed at community reconciliation in western Nepal. The project was a way to 
counter Maoist influence, teach non-violence and prevent young people from joining 
the Maoists.50 Khadka concludes that with regard to the aid objectives of containing 
communism, the US clearly failed.  
 
It is arguable that the US failed in other objectives; for example, in its objective of 
fostering democracy. This is because while it had always emphasised ‘democracy, 
human rights and freedom whenever aid was questioned’ (2000: 91), it lent indirect 
support to the absolute rule of the monarchy by financing its plans and maintaining 
close contacts with palace officials. During the panchayat era, the US position was 
that the regime was a form of democracy, ‘a stepping stone to full democracy for 
which the Nepali people were said to be not quite ready’ (2000: 91). In 1990, the US 
supported the people’s movement, but advised the Nepali Congress to co-operate with 
the monarchy in order to counter the expansion of communism. In terms of poverty 
reduction, the impact of US aid on poverty reduction is once again difficult to 
quantify, given the existence of other donors, and micro and macroeconomic aid 
                                                
50 Interview with Sharada Jnawali, Kathmandu, 29 April 2010. 
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effects (2000: 91). What is true is that Nepal remains one of the poorest countries in 
the world, even after six decades of state-sponsored development initiatives. While 
this state of affairs cannot be attributed solely to the shortcomings and complexities of 
US assistance, the problems associated not only with delivering aid but the basis on 
which aid is provided, must be considered. In concrete terms, there were both 
technical issues and political issues that accounted for the failure of aid to make a 
significant impact on the level of poverty. For example, one of the first development 
projects the US initiated, in partnership with the government of Nepal in 1952, was a 
village development programme. A village development training centre focused on 
agricultural development was opened in Kathmandu, in which American technicians 
provided a 6-month training course to village development workers, who were then to 
open ten centres outside the capital. Funds were donated for tools, teaching aids and 
equipment. Although Mihaly (1965: 35) does not refer to corruption in the use of 
funds, he notes that ‘the money was gradually turned to uses not envisaged by [US] 
Congress’. In the first year the project had US$240,232 for technicians’ expenses and 
US$378,335 for equipment; the next year, there was US$189,359 for technicians’ 
expenses and US$540,613 for equipment, which was available for personal use. He 
notes that ‘the definition of equipment for personal use was clearly stretched’ (1965: 
35). But there were other problems. Trainees were selected from Kathmandu who had 
limited knowledge of rural life and agricultural techniques, and trainees were required 
to take initiative and teach others, which Mihaly argues was ultimately ‘an intolerably 
large order’ (1965: 36). Mihaly also argues that Nepali village life was conservative, 
and villagers had a fatalistic approach to life that resisted change, partly due to Hindu 
tradition and partly because powerful landlords opposed any innovation that would 
threaten their control over tenants.  
 
The assumption was that technical or methodological changes to programme 
implementation would be sufficient to deal with these problems, and they were not. 
But neither was failure to do with the fact that Nepal was primitive or that Nepalis 
were resistant to change, as Mihaly suggests. The problem was that aid was 
dominated by the specific strategic and political interests of the US, not the socio-
economic interests of Nepalis: the ultimate purpose of aid was to keep the 
communists out of power (Mihaly 1965: 81). In fact, Mihaly’s direct and public 
advocacy of the communist principle ‘land to the tiller’ was an effort to deprive the 
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communists ‘of their main weapon in mobilising political support’ (Whelpton 2005: 
141). The facts on the ground suggest that the goals of US aid have largely failed, but 
the situation is not unambiguous. On the one hand, the communist movement has 
been a growing force since the 1950s onwards, and Nepal elected its first communist 
government in 1994, the UML. The Maoists launched the biggest, sustained mass 
movement in Nepali history in 1996 and since 2008 Nepal has been governed by 
either the UML or the Maoists, shifting the country to the left. On the other hand, an 
anti-Maoist alliance managed to consolidate itself towards the end of the war and in 
the post-conflict context, with the assistance of the US. 
 
2.4. Dictatorship of the panchayat  
The panchayat system in Nepal was introduced by King Mahendra, when in 1960, 
using his emergency powers, he dissolved parliament, suspended the constitution, 
banned the political parties and imprisoned Nepali Congress Prime Minister B.P. 
Koirala, ending the 18-month stint of the country’s first popularly elected government 
in 1959 (Shaha 1990; Joshi and Rose 1963). The royal coup marked the effective 
restoration of direct rule by the king (Joshi and Rose 1963: 16), more akin to the Rana 
autocracy that the parties had overthrown in 1951 than the constitutional monarchy of 
the preceding decade. Deciding that the parliamentary system was alien to Nepali 
culture and society, detrimental to national unity and incompatible with Nepal’s 
history and objective conditions (1963: 16), Mahendra promulgated a new 
constitution in 1962 investing political power in the monarchy.51 Writing about the 
panchayat in its early days, Joshi and Rose (1966: 17) argue that King Mahendra had 
far more than a change of government in mind; he wanted to experiment ‘in the 
structure, functioning and theoretical basis of the entire political system’.52 The 
panchayat assemblies, drawing authority from the monarchy, would form the basis for 
the entire political superstructure, from village to national level. 
                                                
51 According to Khagendra Nath Sharma (1973: 58), writing from the perspective of the panchayat, 
‘when the king dissolved the parliament, disbanded all parties and suspended the constitution… there 
was very little resistance. The people took it calmly, as not only something legitimate, but also 
something inevitable’. The fact that resistance, however limited, was airbrushed out of history reveals 
the extent to which the panchayat was disconnected from the mass of the population. 
52 The term panchayat refers to the village council, which in principle forms the backbone of the 
panchayat system. Rose (1963: 17) notes that an ad hoc committee was appointed by the king to survey 
the political systems of other nations, combining the ‘national guidance’ system seen in Egypt and 
Indonesia, the ‘class organisation’ system in Egypt and Yugoslavia, the ‘basic democracy’ system of 
Pakistan and the ‘panchayat’ system as practiced in several Indian states. This was the ‘rather odd but 
indigenous’ (1963: 17) system that ultimately ruled Nepal until 1990. 
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The panchayat was a tiered, partyless political regime in which a village assembly 
comprising the adult population of a village would elect an eleven-member village 
panchayat, which would then elect one representative to a district assembly. The 
district assembly would then elect an eleven-member district panchayat. All the 
district panchayats (one for each of the 75 districts) would form a zonal assembly for 
each of the 14 zones across the country, and the zonal assemblies together formed a 
kind of electoral college, whose representatives would select a majority from amongst 
themselves to form the 125-member national assembly or rastriya panchayat 
(Whelpton 2005: 101; Shaha 1990: 5).53 Apart from the village panchayat, every level 
of the system was indirectly elected, ensuring the concentration of power in the hands 
of the monarch and an extremely narrow base of popular representation at the national 
level. Burghart (1993: 1) notes that the national assembly was only advisory and, in 
the absence of political parties, the king’s ‘relations with the citizenry were 
unmediated by rival interpretations of the popular will’. According to Rishikesh 
Shaha (1990: 6), a prominent Nepali Congress figure who campaigned against the 
panchayat, Mahendra banned the parties because he believed they were ‘disruptive 
elements and faction-oriented by their very nature’. The panchayat was, however, 
portrayed as a democracy. In reality it preserved socio-economic inequality and the 
authority of the traditional elite. These characteristics were ‘inherited, unchanged, 
from the Rana era’ (Brown 1996: 50).  
 
The panchayat regime needed an ideological project that could justify monarchical 
rule and minority privilege, particularly in a country as diverse as Nepal.54 The key 
feature dividing ethnic groups in Nepal, which the law and the judicial system 
attempted to classify along lines of Hindu caste hierarchy, was the wearing of the 
sacred thread (Gellner 2007: 1823). Rooted in the 1854 Muluki Ain, the legal code of 
Nepal, the caste system places the tagadharis or wearers of the sacred thread—the 
Bahuns and Chhetris—at the top, and the matwalis, a derogatory term denoting the 
                                                
53 In 1961 King Mahendra divided the country into distinct administrative units comprising 75 districts, 
5 east-to-west regions and 14 north-to-south zones. The proposed new federal structure, due to be 
worked out in the final constitution, will reconfigure these divisions. See map for details. 
54 Although there were few studies of ethnic composition conducted during the panchayat era, other 
than Bista (2000)—first published in 1967—current statistics reveal 103 caste and ethnic groups 
speaking some 92 languages (UNDP 2009: 18) across Nepal. These statistics, however, must be treated 
with caution as data has been collected through self-representations of identity and language, and 
during a period of heightened political tensions over ethnic claims. 
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so-called alcohol-consuming castes, or janajatis, beneath them. According to the 2001 
census, the upper-caste Bahuns and Chhetris make up approximately 31 per cent of 
the population and the janajatis, a term that can be translated as indigenous tribe or 
nationality, 37 per cent. 55 The janajatis are considered above the Dalits, who 
constitute 9 per cent of the population.56 Migration is a fundamental feature of Nepali 
life, and this has only increased in recent decades with disinvestment in agriculture, 
upon which a majority of Nepalis still depend, and a shortage of jobs in urban areas. 
Building a nation, which could provide a source of legitimacy for the state (Burghart 
1993: 2), became the primary task of the panchayat regime. With the monarch as the 
symbol of national unity, the project of national integration drew on the twin pillars of 
Hinduism and the Nepali language (Whelpton 2005: 173); but national integration, in 
turn, needed a practical focus that could address the material conditions of the Nepali 
masses: providing services through bikas [development] became a further source of 
legitimacy for the state (Pandey 2006: 92). Through the official media, the message to 
the public was that Nepal was on the path to bikas. Whelpton (2005: 173) notes that, 
‘bikas, in fact, took on something of the status of an established religion’. The specific 
form of Nepali nationhood thus provided the state legitimacy on a political level, 
whereby Nepal could continue to claim autonomy as a nation and at the same time 
integrate the scores of different ethnic minority communities within the country; but it 
could also claim a measure of legitimacy on an economic level: material advancement 
that millions of Nepalis could expect through state-led development.  
 
2.4.1. Development as a nationalist project 
Des Chene (1996: 263) explains how development as a phenomenon dominated the 
latter half of 20th century Nepal, and became an even greater event than either the 
initial formation of the state of Nepal in 1768 or the subsequent project of nation 
building. This is because development was not only a story of unification; it was 
ostensibly about liberation. Nepal was to be restored to its former glory not through 
territorial expansion but by being ‘developed’. As the bikas machine grew in strength, 
‘the rhetoric of uniqueness, independence and the cultural specificity of Nepal’s 
                                                
55 Gilles Boquérat (2006) points out that when janajati is translated as nationality, it conveys a political 
rather than an anthropological connation. 
56 Again, it must be noted that all figures are contested. Gellner (1997: xxiii) points out that according 
to Harka Gurung, renowned geographer and statistician, only 43 of the 59 officially recognised janajati 
groups in Nepal were recorded in the 2001 census; on this basis Gurung believes that the actual janajati 
population is much higher, at 42 per cent. 
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modern state grew in kind’ (1996: 264). The panchayat, with its native brand of 
democracy, was central to this rhetoric. The burgeoning development industry, argues 
Des Chene, was also useful for panchayat ideology in other ways: it allowed a tiny 
educated elite to dictate the course of modernisation for Nepal and Nepalis; it 
provided an argument against the individualism of the West and the development of 
group-oriented identities within Nepal, thus ensuring a level of cultural 
homogenisation; and finally, it produced a target population for development, 
legitimising the imposition of a single national culture while at the same time paying 
lip service to cultural diversity (1996: 265). Although the project of bikas came to 
dominate panchayat ideology and continues to dominate post-panchayat ideology, the 
story of the nation always had a place in the public imagination, albeit one that is 
‘schizophrenic’ (1996: 266). Des Chene explains that on the one hand Nepal is 
classified as a ‘Least Developed Nation’ but on the other is rich in cultural tradition; it 
is a country that is almost completely dependent on aid and has virtually no control 
over the terms of its development, imposed as it is from outside, but is also proud 
never to have been colonised. But if in reality the bikas industry, as ‘a transnational 
capitalist enterprise’ (1996: 261), works against the goals of social equality and social 
welfare for the majority, then the political organisation of Nepali society—enveloped 
in an ideology which binds Nepalis to the idea of Nepal—takes on greater importance. 
 
Establishing Nepal as a Hindu kingdom allowed the panchayat to uphold what were 
seen as the Hindu mores of tolerance and unity, and define panchayat democracy as 
civil society (Burghart 1993: 6). Burghart explains that ‘the public domain was 
personally represented by the sovereign, whose will was executed by his state agents 
for the common good of an indivisible body politic’ (1993: 7). Under this ethical 
code, the king and his subjects were regarded as one and indivisible. According to 
Shaha (1990: 9), subjects of the king were compelled to ‘merge their individual selves 
into the king and the king himself is powerless to change this value system’. This 
vision of civil society emphasised duties over rights, although both were guaranteed 
in the constitution, and viewed private interests as swarth [self-interest], which was 
antithetical to public unity. Conflict or competition, embodied by the political parties, 
could not be openly expressed in the public domain. Within the domain of civil 
society, the panchayat also constructed the concept of social classes, whose interests 
could be legitimately expressed in public and were guaranteed in the constitution: 
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peasantry, youth, women, workers and ex-servicemen.57 Government funds were 
provided for local and national class organisations, and their activities were reported 
in the government press (Burghart 1993: 8). But, as Burghart points out, when it came 
to particular groups of workers, rickshaw pullers for example, or peasants of a 
particular persuasion, such as Maoists, these were considered private-interest groups; 
from the state’s point of view their motivations were founded on self-interest (1993: 
8). The five social classes, on the other hand, were only working for the public 
interest; there was never any question of workers going on strike, for example. 
Welfare was provided through and by these class organisations, eliminating the need, 
from the government’s perspective, for representative political parties.  
 
Despite the ban, however, the political parties were still operating. Although 
Mahendra had sought to subordinate public life under the monarchy, the 1962 
Constitution did not strictly bar political parties from operating; but nor did it sanction 
their activities (Rose 1963: 23). The system paradoxically allowed the parties to 
function on a quasi-legal basis (Brown 1996: 96). ‘Parties had their own offices, 
vehicles and stationery, and the statements of their leaders were reported at length in 
the press’ (1996: 96). The rationale was that driving the opposition underground 
would increase radical elements within the parties and potentially make them even 
more popular. The monarchy’s strategy was to relax its grip specifically on the 
Congress in order that it could be the vehicle for dissent, isolating the extreme left 
(1996: 96). They became known as the pratibandit [banned] political parties, and their 
work was an open secret (Burghart 1993: 11). In the face of consistent agitation by the 
parties, the panchayat was the only dependable support base for the monarchy. 
Although some members of the Nepali Congress had defected into panchayat 
institutions, the system was essentially designed to make the parties lose their 
influence and control. Along with the creation of class organisations, Mahendra had 
taken several steps towards greater national integration: all public media was under 
government control, emphasising the monarchy as the symbol of national unity, 
including for the various ethnic groups; a new legal code was established outlawing 
caste differences, though caste discrimination was still practiced; an attempt was 
                                                
57 Class organisations also existed before the panchayat, but were reconfigured under the panchayat 
because of fears they were becoming too close to the political parties and being used by them to 
advance party interests (Rose 1963: 23). The monarchy aimed to ensure that peasants in particular 
‘remain[ed] aloof from party politics’ (1963: 23). 
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made to standardise the education system across the country; roads and 
communication facilities were improved; certain land reforms were introduced and 
currency was circulated throughout the country (Shaha 1990: 7). There were also 
attempts to construct a Nepali culture: the Nepali language was made a requirement 
for citizenship; a national flag, flower and songs were adopted, and a Nepali national 
dress was acquired. One infamous panchayat slogan was ‘one language, one style of 
dress, one country’ (Whelpton 2005: 183). These ideological innovations were 
symbolic rather than a reflection of a real support base, but were to become the source 
of major social division in the future. 
 
In 1972, King Mahendra suddenly died of a heart attack, and was succeeded by his 
eldest son, Birendra. Phadnis (1981: 439) notes that Birendra had been ‘steeped in a 
dual socialisation process’, growing up in a milieu of palace conservatism but also 
exposed to a Western liberal education. He had envisaged the liberalisation of Nepal 
early on, ‘with economic development and political decentralisation uppermost in his 
mind’ (1981: 439). With the additional pressures of balancing between the conflicting 
interests of India and China, one of King Birendra’s first initiatives was an attempt to 
have Nepal recognised as a Zone of Peace. In an historic address to the nation at his 
coronation in 1972, he declared the following: 
 
And if today, peace is an overriding concern with us, it is only because 
our people genuinely desire peace in our country, in our region and 
everywhere in the world. It is with this earnest desire to institutionalise 
peace that I stand to make this proposition—a proposition that my 
country, Nepal, be declared a zone of peace. (Quoted in Shaha 1990: 14) 
 
Nepal’s foreign policy under the panchayat pursued this aim, and obtained the support 
of 116 countries when it became a member of the UN in 1955. Exceptions included 
India and Bhutan and all the permanent members of the Security Council apart from 
Russia. As Shaha (1990: 14) notes, ‘India continued to view Nepal’s peace zone move 
as a thin edge of the diplomatic wedge to upset the existing treaties and arrangements 
for mutual security and development’. Birendra also directed politics towards 
development, convinced that his efforts would produce results. He set up the National 
Development Council in 1972 and revitalised Mahendra’s Back to the Village 
National Campaign (BVNC) launched in 1967, both of which were intended to focus 
people’s energies on development. The BVNC had a network throughout the country, 
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functioning more like a political party designed to circumvent opposition and create a 
core of elites that could challenge the parties in the rural areas. As Shaha (1990: 17) 
argues, it was ‘merely another official agency designed to promote popular 
mobilisation and participation’ and as such, was doomed to failure because such 
mobilisation could not be initiated from above. Similarly, Phadnis (1981: 433) writes, 
‘the BVNC was discredited as an oppressive and corrupt machine which, instead of 
being a channel for facilitating mass mobilisation, tended to restrict it’. After 
becoming part of the constitution in 1975, the BVNC folded in the wake of popular 
agitation only four years later. 
 
Burghart (1993:8) observes that during the panchayat, the Nepali state, in addition to 
claiming a monopoly over the legitimate use of force, also claimed a monopoly over 
public services: ‘Hardly a day would go by without some member of the royal family 
or some cabinet minister being depicted in the government press opening a bridge, 
dam, school, hospital, seminar on national development, etc.’ Although Nepal had 
moved towards becoming a centralised, bureaucratic state with a focus on 
development during the panchayat, and there had been some progress on development 
indicators, this concealed an ultimately fatal weakness. The panchayat could neither 
solve macroeconomic problems nor address the devastating levels of poverty and 
inequality. In collaboration with the private press—as opposed to the official 
government-sanctioned media—the political parties began to expose the inner 
workings of the panchayat: corruption and inefficiency were rampant, and the regime 
was almost completely lacking legitimacy. The inevitable disjuncture between reality 
and panchayat rule became so pronounced, that ‘the structures of the panchayat 
democracy began to acquire a fictional character’ (Burghart 1993: 11). It was no 
better than the parliamentary system the king had abolished on the grounds that it was 
unsuitable to Nepal and against the wishes of its people. By the mid-1980s, prisons 
were overflowing with prisoners of conscience (Shaha 1992: 148) and both the 
political parties and the panchayat were competing for public sympathy. This 
competition, however, went against the public unity that the panchayat aimed to 
uphold: by fighting against the parties, representatives of the panchayat ‘became 
effectively a political party of partyless people and Nepal was transformed from a 
partyless democracy to a one-party state that was run by the partyless party’ (Burghart 
1993: 10). Burghart termed this state of affairs the ‘counterfeit reality’ (1993: 9) of 
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the panchayat, which contained within it the seeds of its own destruction. The 
proceedings of the panchayat were irrelevant to the everyday lives of most people 
and, in any case, it had become clear that it was the king and not the panchayat who 
held real power because ‘the king could revoke everything’ (1993:13), in particular 
the limited rights of the 1962 Constitution. At the same time, having experienced a 
brief period of democratic rule during the 1950s, dissent amongst political party 
leaders and the educated elite began to grow.  
 
2.4.2. Legislating for NGOs 
Since the 1950s, foreign funding consistently made up more than half the 
government’s development budget. Diwaker Chand (1991: 25), writing one of the 
first relatively comprehensive, mainstream assessments of NGOs in Nepal, notes that 
80 per cent of the government’s First Five-Year Plan of 1956/61 came from foreign 
assistance, mostly in the form of grants but also loans; this increased to 89 per cent in 
the Second Five-Year Plan of 1962/65.58 High priority was placed on infrastructure 
development, particularly building roads and developing industry, while the social 
sector tended to have ‘residual priority’ (1991: 22). As early as the first plan the 
panchayat government realised they could not reach the rural areas to deliver even 
basic services; they gave these opportunities to NGOs, both national and international. 
The Family Planning Association of Nepal was opened in 1959, the Nepal Red Cross 
Society in 1963, and other NGOs established hospitals and health centres. Chand 
(1991: 26) estimates that during this time, 67 per cent of NGOs were indigenous, 
which meant that they had no direct or indirect funding from foreign donors. This 
began to change with the establishment of the Societies Registration Act. 
 
The 1959 Societies Registration Act was the first attempt by the government to 
institutionalise NGOs, bringing them into the government fold, but no mechanisms 
were developed to monitor NGO activities or regulate conduct. Chand (1991: 30) 
notes that other than an inventory of basic information about NGOs that were 
receiving government funding, the government ‘remained virtually oblivious of the 
programmes, activities, problems and achievements being accomplished by the 
NGOs’. The law stipulated that NGOs were at liberty to initiate any programme of 
                                                
58 The Second Five-Year Plan could not be materialised due to the palace coup in 1960. It was only 
introduced in 1962 and covered only three years. 
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activity that was specified in the constitution, and the period witnessed the first 
extensive growth of the NGO sector. While NGOs were essentially treated as entities 
that could be called upon by the government to supplement its activities, the 
government had no direct intervention in the workings of NGOs, nor were there 
procedures in place to maintain financial accountability. Questions regarding 
domestic or external funding flows to the NGO sector and how productively this 
funding was being used were both ‘unasked and unanswered’ (1991: 31). NGOs had a 
great degree of control over their own conduct, but overall control remained with 
donors. Chand (1991: 32) argues that ‘NGOs literally impersonated the role of a 
subdued and silent actor, while the donors performed the role of directing the entire 
show, editing wherever and whenever felt necessary’. He asserts, however, that 
donors could not be blamed for this state of affairs; while they would have liked to see 
funds used productively—and were aware that efficiency and effectiveness within the 
sector could have been vastly improved—NGOs were keen to ensure that funding 
flows remained intact. In reality, both NGOs and donors were responsible for 
problems in the sector—the duplication of efforts, the lack of democratic practice and 
the restriction of activities to Kathmandu, amongst others. 
 
In the early 1970s, as development assistance increased, the panchayat regime took 
further measures to institutionalise the NGO sector, beginning with a series of 
national meetings of social workers, but which included all those concerned with 
social welfare, particularly government and NGO workers. The plan was to engender 
the systematic development of the NGO sector, ensuring that there was a measure of 
integration with government plans and that it was co-ordinated as a sector. Three 
significant conferences were held between 1971 and 1976, where problems could be 
analysed and proposals for their resolution discussed. NGOs had voiced concerns that 
social welfare programmes should not be confined to government, and that NGOs 
should have discretion over their own activities. Thus a balance had to be struck 
between the aspirations of NGOs, maintaining a degree of co-ordination with 
government and the fiscal power of donors. The result was the establishment of the 
SSNCC in 1977, under the leadership of Queen Aishwarya. The aim of the SSNCC 
was to co-ordinate NGO activities within the NGO sector itself, in order to better 
manage national and international funding, but also to harmonise development 
activities with government development plans (1991: 35). The SSNCC and its various 
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sub-committees were given legitimacy by the promulgation of the Social Service 
National Co-ordination Council Act 1977. To facilitate registration, the Organisation 
Registration Act 1977 was created, replacing the 1959 Societies Registration Act. 
NGOs could register with any local administration throughout the country, while the 
SSNCC would provide certificates of association with the Council. Quarterly progress 
reports would be submitted to the SSNCC, but all funds sourced from foreign donors 
would be transferred into the convertible bank account of the SSNCC (1991: 43), 
which would then disburse the funds accordingly at the local level.  
 
2.4.3 Corruption and the status quo 
The SSNCC had the authority to purchase, sell, raise loans and accept grants and 
assistance (1991: 36) in its efforts maintain co-ordination amongst NGOs, determine 
NGO standards, provide training to NGOs and regulate agreements with donor 
governments. Most significantly, the SSNCC served to ensure that NGOs worked in 
co-operation with government; according to Chand (1991: 36), the SSNCC ‘shall in 
no way work in contradiction and opposition to the prevalent government rules, 
regulations and programmes’. Thus in reality, the SSNCC was a mechanism, firstly to 
control and appropriate foreign funding and, secondly, to control political activities 
against the regime. Brown (1996: 68) argues that the SSNCC was ‘an instrument 
through which the very highest levels of the elite, including the royal family, took a 
substantial cut from the aid purse’. Indeed, following the success of the democratic 
movement and the dismantling of panchayat institutions, the queen resigned from her 
role as chairperson of the SSNCC amidst allegations of corruption and using the 
Council to further her own interests. The monarchy had exercised tight political 
control over both national and international organisations and ‘stamped upon any hint 
of independent political expression’ (1996: 94). While the rhetoric of participation 
was utilised, there was no sense of people determining the terms of their own 
development. The SSNCC wanted NGOs to act as dependable, apolitical mechanisms 
for delivering social services limited to welfare activities. Chand (1991: 72) argues 
that while the SSNCC had always made it clear that political affiliation was not 
tolerated in the social service sector, there were no mechanisms to differentiate social 
workers from political workers, and one would often be ‘in the guise of the other’. 
Increasingly, frustration with the political system led oppositionists linked to the 
banned political parties to channel political activity through a variety of different 
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mechanisms, including NGOs. This trend became particularly prevalent in the 1980s, 
when political workers came under attack. To some extent, NGOs themselves 
promoted the implausible notion of non-political engagement in the social process. 
For example, in early 1990 when the political parties were preparing to launch the 
people’s movement in Kathmandu, major NGOs were in Pokhara, organising the 
Regional Conference of Social Organisations, busy insisting that the government 
recognise the role of NGOs in national development (1991: 74). The contrast between 
these approaches is revealing, but the contradictions of this position were bound to 
unravel, and in the political upheavals of the 1980s and changed political context of 
the 1990s, the NGOs’ claim to be apolitical became less and less convincing. In 1992, 
the SSNCC was dissolved and replaced by the SWC. 
 
Despite extensive development assistance since 1950, with aid levels reaching US$5.2 
billion by the end of the 1990s from donor governments (Whelpton 2005: 128), the 
panchayat regime could not escape the fact that Nepal was still one of the poorest 
countries in the world. While national unity was constructed and enforced by the 
state, economic growth and development had not worked, and Nepal remained 
amongst the least developed nations (Burghart 1993: 12), including the poorest in 
South Asia. Mihaly (1965: 214) argues that the US$90 million in foreign aid that had 
been extended to Nepal following the 1950 revolution could have substantially 
improved socio-economic conditions, but the Nepali elite was unwilling to undertake 
structural reforms around land ownership and taxation, which would compromise 
their interests. Mihaly’s conclusion was that Nepal was unprepared for political and 
economic change: ‘in a country unprepared for change, aid that attempts to advance 
more fundamental political objectives—such as bringing about political stability for 
furthering the cause of representative government—invariably faces the risk—even 
the probability—of defeat’ (1965: 218). The point was not that Nepal as a country 
was unprepared for change, implying that its people were unprepared, but that the 
Nepali elite was unwilling to accept change. The events of the 1950s at least in part 
demonstrate the desire for change. In the late 1970s and 80s, faced with a 
deteriorating economic situation and few prospects for the growing population of 
educated youth, people became desperate for change. This was demonstrated by the 
mass protests that erupted at the end of the 1970s. 
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2.5. NGOs and the birth of oppositional politics  
Although the political parties were banned, political dissent could be expressed 
through the press, class organisations or through violence (Baral 2006: 4). Hoftun et 
al. (1999: 94) suggest that the reasons for increasing support for the parties were the 
links made between Nepal and the wider world over the previous three decades and a 
population increasingly conscious about alternatives to a traditional mode of life. 
Until the end of the Rana regime, for example, superstitions, religious taboos and 
caste-restrictions were prevalent (Sharma 1973: 4). Transistor radios were also 
becoming more common, several towns had cinema halls and the number of people 
reading newspapers was expanding. Educational opportunities were becoming more 
widespread, and expectations for employment went far beyond what the panchayat 
economy and the level of industry could offer. Increased education and literacy 
amongst increasing sections of the population had important political implications; it 
was arguably the student protests of 1979 that set in motion a political process that led 
to the ultimate fall of the panchayat regime.  
 
2.5.1. Competing ideologies: The 1980 referendum 
The central internal contradiction of the panchayat regime—its theoretical defence of 
democratic structures but its refusal to integrate political opposition—was becoming 
increasingly untenable by the late 1970s (Baral 1980: 197). The 1980s became a 
decade of competing ideologies (Hoftun et al. 1999) between the parties and the 
monarchy. The regime held out for another decade, but the historical import and the 
charged political context in which the 1980 referendum took place cannot be 
underestimated. The referendum marked a critical turning point in the quest for 
national consensus over the nature of the political system (Phadnis 1981: 431). 
Amidst a crisis for the regime, growing repression and increasing support for the 
parties, voters were offered the choice of a reformed panchayat system or a multiparty 
system, and though the former won by a narrow margin—54.7 per cent on a 66.9 per 
cent turnout (Gurung 1982: 304)—the result severely weakened the legitimacy of 
monarchical rule, marking the beginning of the end of the regime.  
 
King Birendra had been forced to call the referendum in the face of mass student 
protests opposing the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the former Pakistani Prime 
Minister, in the spring of 1979. Lasting several weeks, the demonstrations began on 6 
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April and were organised by student groups from Tribhuvan University affiliated to 
each of the three political parties—the Nepali Congress and the pro-Beijing and pro-
Moscow factions of the CPN. An estimated few hundred joined the first 
demonstration, clashing with the police as they marched towards the Pakistan 
embassy.59 What started off as protests against Bhutto’s killing, however, quickly 
became about much more; following clashes with the police, students drew up a list of 
22 demands, including the right to organise independent student unions at campus and 
national levels. This was followed by a student strike and the closure of the university 
for one week (Phadnis 1981: 436). These actions were in direct opposition to the New 
Education Plan imposed by the regime in 1972, which was partially aimed at 
depoliticising the campuses (Baral 1980: 198), and which favoured more privileged 
students (Phadnis 1981: 437). Student agitation quickly spread to towns across the 
country, now involving secondary school students. The protests became an expression 
not only of general dissatisfaction with the education system but wider socio-
economic policies. Students complained about fee increases, which were imposed in 
the midst of inflation, uncertain employment opportunities for young graduates, and 
the poor condition of teaching facilities.  
  
Likewise, for much of the population, the student protests came to represent general 
dissatisfaction with the status quo: ‘parents who felt penalised by the high-fee levy, 
farmers suffering from exorbitant land taxes, and rural people unhappy with the 
newly-imposed panchayat development taxes’ (Phadnis 1981: 438). The movement 
escalated into a nationwide crisis in which 37 out of 75 districts participated, and 
there were further clashes with the police (Shaha 1992: 51). In the district of 
Makwanpur, not far from Kathmandu, the local population held a government 
minister incommunicado for ten hours. At the same time, unrest in some factories 
broke out in the industrial towns of Janakpur, Birgunj, Hetauda and Bharatpur 
(Phadnis 1981: 438). On 23 May several thousand students gathered at Amrit Science 
Campus in Kathmandu to publicly denounce two student leaders for siding with the 
panchayat. The demonstration quickly swelled to tens of thousands. But since much 
of the police force had already been sent out to deal with protests in the districts, the 
                                                
59 Phadnis (1981: 435) argues that initial demonstrations were actually directed against the king and the 
panchayat, as well as the hanging of two Nepali Congress activists in February 1979, who were found 
guilty of treason and attempting to assassinate King Birendra in 1974.  
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army was deployed in the capital; as protesters burnt government vehicles and 
buildings, the army fired shots into the crowds. It was at this point that the movement 
began to present a huge challenge to the government and the legitimacy of the 
monarchy.60 The demonstrations only subsided with the announcement of the 
referendum. On the morning of 24 May, the king proclaimed: 
 
Accordingly, with the objective of clearly ascertaining what type of 
changes our countrymen desire in the context of the situation prevailing in 
the country today, and taking appropriate steps thereafter, we hereby 
proclaim that arrangements will be made to hold a referendum by secret 
ballot of the entire Nepali people throughout the Kingdom of Nepal on the 
basis of adult franchise. Such a national referendum will be held on two 
basic questions: Should the existing Panchayat System be retained and 
gradually reformed? Or should it be replaced by a multi-party system of 
government? (Quoted in Baral 1980: 199) 
 
The king also promised that supporters of either form of government could hold 
meetings to propagate their views and canvass voters (Phadnis 1981: 441). However, 
mounting pressure within the palace and a potential victory for the parties later forced 
him to take steps to ensure the vote would preserve the panchayat: in a declaration to 
the nation he spoke of national harmony and the lack of alternative systems that could 
secure fundamental rights, and the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the country. He further made it clear that whichever form of government was 
adopted, politics would be reformed. The referendum was to be held a year later, on 2 
May 1980. The political parties, still organising underground, debated whether to 
boycott the referendum on the basis that the government would use repressive 
measures to obtain an acceptable result. Indeed, several prominent leaders 
campaigning on the multiparty side were harassed or beaten by opponents (Baral 
1980: 200). Irregularities were also reported, such as higher turnouts in more remote 
districts than the national average (Hoftun et al. 1999: 93). Panchayat leaders 
announced a series of reforms on the eve of the referendum, including universal adult 
franchise from village to national levels, and they were publicly criticised by 
opposition leaders. The king also declared an amnesty for many of the political 
prisoners filling the jails, a move that was seen as yet another attempt to assuage 
public distrust of the panchayat. But since the referendum itself was considered a 
                                                
60 Interview with Padma Ratna Tuladhar, 10 May 2010. 
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massive advance, almost all the parties—bar a selection of extreme left groups—
decided they would respect the outcome. 
 
Even with a narrow victory, the monarchy could claim it had the support of the 
population. Although the government did introduce the promised reforms, at least on 
paper, it was becoming increasingly intransigent.61 But it was also forced to concede 
the growing legitimacy of the political parties. That several panchayat committees at 
district levels had campaigned for the multiparty side (Hoftun et al. 1999: 93) meant 
that the parties were a force that could no longer be ignored. The acknowledgement of 
the existence of the parties was considered a compromise by the government. The 
Nepali Congress, for example, could now have an office in the capital. The parties 
held several public meetings after the referendum arguing against the panchayat 
system (Baral 1980: 200). In subsequent years they were also more confident to run in 
elections, and although few Congress and communist candidates stood in the 1981 
elections, greater numbers stood in the 1986 elections as independents (Gurung 1982: 
304).62 Many were successful in being elected to the panchayat, exacerbating and 
exposing divisions from within the ruling establishment. Those politicians who spoke 
in favour multiparty democracy were becoming very popular, while those defending 
the panchayat held that the multiparty system would encourage national 
disintegration, since foreign interests were influencing the parties.  
 
Despite increased freedom to operate, the Nepali Congress was in a quandary about 
where to focus its efforts. Its most prominent leader, B.P. Koirala, died in 1982 and no 
single leader could take his place. A collective of three leaders was given the mantle: 
Ganesh Man Singh, the most progressive of the three and who advocated unity with 
the Left to bring down the panchayat; G.P. Koirala, the half-brother of B.P. Koirala 
and who was relatively conservative, advocating reconciliation with the king; and 
                                                
61 The Panchayat Policy and Evaluation Committee, for example, was set up to implement reforms to 
the system. But it was only considered to have effectively replaced the hated BVNC, independent of 
parliamentary oversight and more powerful than any other collective body in the country (Hoftun et al. 
1999: 98). There was also the bizarrely named National Sports Council, which had almost nothing to 
do with the promotion of sports; according to Hoftun et al. (1999: 98), it was the body that ‘organised 
and trained the storm-troopers of the panchayat system’, and it was widely believed to be responsible 
for rigging elections and carrying out physical attacks on opposition party activists. 
62 Padma Ratna Tuladhar, describing himself as an ‘independent left’ candidate, recounted in an 
interview on 10 May 2010 how he went underground during the last days of his election campaign in 
1986, when he stood in the constituency of Kathmandu, because the government wanted to arrest him.  
 90 
K.P. Bhattarai, who mediated between them. The defeat following the referendum had 
left the party shocked and disoriented, and they needed a new strategy. They decided 
to launch another satyagraha—in May 1985 against the ban on political parties. The 
left parties launched a similar programme several days later (Hoftun et al. 1999: 103). 
Estimates vary but activists claimed that several thousand were rounded up by the 
police for interrogation and detention, and several were disappeared as a result of the 
movement (Brown 1996: 98). The following month Birendra read out an address from 
the throne, declaring that it is the duty of all panchayat representatives to ‘counter 
those who seek to create an atmosphere of instability in the country by spreading 
unnecessary confusion about the system chosen by the people themselves in free 
exercise of their will’ (Shaha 1990: 42). Shaha notes that the speech was merely ‘a 
pedestrian recital of the development activities that His Majesty’s Government would 
be carrying out in the coming twelve months’ (1990: 41). As if to highlight the fact 
that order could not be imposed from above by a mere declaration, a series of bombs 
went off in several towns across the country over the next three days in response. 
Several people were killed, including an MP. The king and queen left Kathmandu 
after two bombs went off outside the palace gates (1990: 42). Ram Raja Prasad Singh 
of the Janabadi Morcha [People’s Front], which was operating out of India at the 
time, claimed responsibility. The government labelled them terrorists opposed to the 
monarchy, national integrity and the panchayat.63 Further arrests were made in the 
ensuing chaos, and the Nepali Congress promptly called off the movement. 
 
Any course of action taken by the Congress would inevitably influence the 
communists; but it was not the case that the Congress remained uninfluenced by the 
communists. In the late 1980s, a few years after it launched the second satyagraha for 
democracy, the Nepali Congress faced a dilemma: if it drew closer to the panchayat, 
its credibility as a party at the forefront of the struggle for democracy would suffer, 
and the Left would benefit; on the other hand if it continued its anti-panchayat 
campaign it feared the loss of more members and party workers (Khadka 1986: 449). 
Such was the popularity of the Left that the Nepali Congress felt it had to get back 
                                                
63 Rumours circulated in Kathmandu that operatives inside the palace were responsible for the bombs, 
with Prince Gyanendra, the king’s brother, involved. The rumour was that they had paid Ram Raja 
Prasad Singh, a leftist who had been elected to the panchayat, Rs. 300,000 for an admission of guilt. 
When Singh’s colleague, Baidyanath Gupta denounced Singh’s admission as a lie, he was mysteriously 
murdered two days later (Hoftun et al. 1999: 04). When Singh died in September 2012, he was hailed 
as a revolutionary leader and given state honours. 
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into active politics after the failure of the satyagraha, otherwise the communists 
would completely takeover local panchayat bodies and come close to gaining power 
in the general elections scheduled for 1991 (Brown 1996: 99). But it was the Nepali 
Congress itself that had called off the satyagraha when the bombs went off in 
Kathmandu in 1985, fearful of the situation escalating out of its control. Lacking a 
clear political focus following the abandonment of the movement, the Congress 
became disillusioned, and uneasy about the growing influence of the Left. This is 
despite the fact that sections of the Left supported the movement under the leadership 
of the Congress, and the movement had a high degree of popular support. Even the 
regime had calculated that the movement could prove to be a serious threat. This was 
a phenomenon that the Left was to experience during the subsequent revolutions. 
 
Despite their growing influence, the parties were unable to win the referendum 
outright because of the inability to form a united front against the panchayat (Phadnis 
1981: 447). They also suffered from a lack of human and financial resources, while 
the panchayat benefited from being identified with the king. Phadnis (1981: 448) 
notes that traditional village leaders took advantage of the fact that the existing system 
was identified with the monarchy, and ‘the presence of such leaders in fairly 
backward areas helped to tilt the people’s verdict in favour of the panchayat system’. 
Interestingly, Gurung (1982: 313) points out that it was not factors such as ethnic 
composition that determined which way people voted but differing levels of social 
and economic development. Higher literacy rates in general meant greater support for 
the multiparty system. But if the parties were divided, so was the panchayat, and the 
promise of democratic reforms would further expose these divisions. As Shaha (1990: 
22) notes, despite hostile propaganda against the multiparty system over two decades, 
combined with constant praise of the panchayat system, 45 per cent of voters still 
favoured the multiparty system. The 1980 referendum thus laid the basis for the 1990 
people’s movement for democracy.  
 
2.5.2. Origins of the human rights discourse 
The ban on political parties following the royal coup in 1960 provided the context for 
an increase in the number of political prisoners. The Jhapa uprising in 1971 followed 
by the repression of the 1979 student demonstrations encouraged pro-democracy 
activists to begin organising against government and police repression and around 
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human rights. But there was another major factor that facilitated the turn towards 
human rights: donor agencies began linking grants to the panchayat regime with 
progress on human rights. Most activists were associated with the Nepali Congress, 
but both Congress and communist activists set up groups demanding the release of 
political prisoners. One of the most prominent was the Committee for the Release of 
Political Prisoners. Following the Jhapa uprising, the number of communists in jail 
increased dramatically and many communist sympathisers felt an organisation aligned 
to Congress could not adequately campaign on behalf of the communists.64 
International organisations were also reluctant to campaign for the release of 
communist leaders. Activists associated with the communist parties thus began to 
organise separately, and an informal group called the Prisoners’ Care Group was 
established in the early 1980s with the help of left activists such as Padma Ratna 
Tuladhar and Mathura Shrestha. Their activities included visiting prisons, advocating 
for better prison facilities, and supporting the families of political prisoners. 
 
Not surprisingly, the panchayat regime both feared and detested any organising 
around human rights that was not under government control because this could expose 
the government’s abysmal human rights record to international audiences. But the 
panchayat regime also needed money, and the fact that donors were linking grants to 
progress on human rights, meant that it also had to take up—if not in practice at least 
in rhetoric—the language of human rights. It was at this time that the banned political 
parties—both the communist parties and the Nepali Congress—turned to a focus on 
human rights. If the regime was taking it up, then the parties could also raise human 
rights issues. This worked in favour of the parties because they could use human 
rights to expose the panchayat regime in their struggle against it. A nascent human 
rights movement began to emerge in the country, but at the same time—in sharp 
contrast to those NGOs registered with the SSNCC—human rights groups were 
considered illegal and came under severe state repression. It was also well known that 
they were established with the implicit goal of establishing a multiparty system and 
worked closely with the banned political parties.  
 
                                                
64 Interview with Padma Ratna Tuladhar, Kathmandu, 10 May 2010.  
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By 1985, as a result of the failed satyagraha movement and general unrest, thousands 
of political activists were in prisons throughout the country for protesting the ban on 
the parties (Shaha 1990: 41). The 1980 referendum had facilitated the further 
polarisation of the human rights movement along party lines. Following the 
referendum, the king’s offer of a general amnesty to political prisoners only applied to 
Congress activists, not the communist prisoners who were jailed for the Jhapa 
rebellion. Congress leaders and other intellectuals were not convinced that the 
communists also had to be released. Once again, communist sympathisers felt they 
had to form their own human rights organisation, and established the Forum for the 
Protection of Human Rights (FOPHUR) in 1986. A number of European expatriates 
working in INGOs in Kathmandu funded FOPHUR, and within a few years, 
FOPHUR quickly established links with several international human rights 
organisations in Asia and Europe, advocating for the release of the communist leaders 
at national and international levels. Since most FOPHUR activists came from the 
CPN, those not associated with the CPN felt the need for another organisation. A 
reflection of the distrust between the Congress and the CPN, these activists 
subsequently formed the Human Rights Organisation of Nepal (HURON) in 1988, led 
by Rishikesh Shaha, a former minister under the panchayat, and who later became a 
Congress activist supporting the movement for democracy. Most activists in HURON 
came from the Nepali Congress, but in an apparent bid to show an impartial and 
broader base, several left activists and liberal panchayat loyalists were included in the 
organisation. Baburam Bhattarai, a leading communist activist at the time and who 
later became the Maoists’ chief ideologue and prime minister in 2011, was one of the 
founding members of HURON. These were the first human rights organisations in the 
country. They became some of the staunchest opponents of the government, and they 
were severely repressed by the panchayat regime. 
 
Many of the activists involved in the first human rights organisations were also 
professionals—lawyers, professors, journalists and doctors—linked to the opposition 
parties. Most professional organisations, unlike human rights organisations at the 
time, were legal bodies registered with the government, specifically as ‘non-political’ 
organisations. But they also began to take up human rights issues. The Nepal Bar 
Association, for example, began a human rights project with Norwegian assistance in 
the second half of the 1980s. Several doctors, particularly those close to the 
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communist parties, were working with Physicians for Social Responsibility. 
Professional organisations were also divided into Congress and communist camps. 
Congress supporters referred to themselves as ‘democrats’ and the communists as 
‘progressives’. Even at the height of panchayat repression, professors and lawyers 
fought elections to the executive bodies of the Nepal University Teachers’ 
Association and the Nepal Bar Association in 1989 on the basis of political ideology, 
with one faction accusing the other of seeking favour with pro-palace elements. 
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III. Neoliberal reforms, the 1990 revolution and the production of civil society 
 
Within the span of roughly a decade, Nepal had embarked on a major programme of 
neoliberal economic reforms, undertaken a revolution that abolished the panchayat 
dictatorship and witnessed the establishment and influx of NGOs on a massive scale 
as part of its development efforts. This chapter describes the 1990 revolution—a mass 
movement led by political parties from across the political spectrum and supported by 
NGOs and other opposition forces—and analyses the opening up of political space 
post-1990. Although the 1990 movement was triggered in the immediate by an 
economic crisis following the closure of the border by India, the movement was also a 
response to the effects of neoliberal reforms that began in the mid-1980s. It is argued 
here that neoliberal development, largely the result of international pressure, 
contributed to increased poverty and inequality in Nepal, and if one response to 
growing social inequality was the establishment of NGOs, another was the emergence 
of the Maoist movement. But the influx and establishment of NGOs was not only a 
response to reforms—NGOs were also an integral part of the reforms. The chapter 
also describes the roots of Nepal’s economic dependence on India, and argues that 
Nepal’s integration into the world economy was the consequence of its economic ties 
with India. This dependence has allowed India to heavily influence the course of 
political change in Nepal, from facilitating the end of Rana rule in 1951 to 
demobilising the Maoists in 2006. These changes have not always been in the 
interests of democracy but coincide with the economic interests of the ruling elite in 
India. Finally, the chapter outlines how the construction of a discourse around civil 
society has been useful for strengthening the NGO industry.  
 
3.1. Economic development in Nepal 
Nepal has been a predominantly agricultural country for much of its history. At the 
time of unification, agricultural lands were the most important natural resource 
(Regmi 1999: 15). The main agricultural crops grown in the Terai plains were paddy, 
oilseeds, cotton, jute, tobacco and sugarcane, while at higher altitudes maize, millet 
and cotton were the most important cash crops (1999: 18). Land in the hill regions 
was also valuable for the extraction of copper, iron and lead, but the vast majority of 
inhabitants depended on agriculture for a livelihood (1999: 25). The peasantry 
cultivated land through different land tenure systems that varied in different regions 
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according to political, economic and historical factors; for cultivators it was of little 
significance whether the landlord was an individual, a religious institution or the state: 
‘in each case, the surplus produce of the land, that is, whatever was left after meeting 
the essential costs of cultivation and providing him with a minimum subsistence, was 
taken away from him without any consideration’ (1999: 29). Mikesell (1999: 194) 
describes the situation of peasants at the time of Prithvi Narayan Shah’s takeover, 
arguing that previous kinship-based forms of communal ownership were subordinated 
by private property-owning classes: 
 
Village peasants were subject to heavy exploitation, abuse and slavery by 
a collusion of elements of a landed property class consisting of petty 
Rajput princes, allied families and priests, who from the twelfth century 
began to spread the hegemony of exploitative class relations based on 
private property… to the hills of Nepal. 
 
Prospects for industrial development and technological innovation were not improved 
by the ascendancy of Jang Bahadur Rana. The Rana establishment deliberately 
isolated Nepal from the industrial revolution (Lohani 1973: 203). But when the East 
India Company extended its railway network to the Terai, the Ranas began to clear 
the heavily forested area and produce grain for export; the peasantry also took 
advantage from being able to sell surpluses for competitive prices in India (1973: 
204). The railway—and subsequent increasing economic ties to India—had the effect 
of gradually monetising the economy and developing commercial and industrial 
enterprises, but this growth could not be maintained. Prakash Chandra Lohani (1973: 
205), who initiated Nepal’s first neoliberal reforms as finance minister, argues that 
there were three reasons for failed economic growth at the time: first, the low level of 
agricultural technology in Nepal could not keep up with increased production; second, 
the Ranas feared that innovation would lead to increased consciousness amongst the 
popular classes; and third, Nepal had signed a trade treaty with British India in 1923, 
allowing almost unrestricted imports of British goods into Nepal, which discouraged 
the establishment of new industries. Political and economic conditions following the 
outbreak of the Second World War broke this period of stagnation. Several factories 
were established in the Terai to relieve shortages in consumer goods and raw 
materials such as jute, but many of them went into liquidation at the end of the war 
(1973: 206). Investor confidence crumbled, producing barriers to economic progress 
(Mihaly 1965: 13). Industrial expansion in the 1950s was insignificant; however, the 
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overthrow of Rana rule allowed the establishment of physical and economic 
infrastructure that would facilitate further industrialisation in the future. Much of this 
progress was directly attributable to foreign aid and Indian investment (Joshi and 
Rose 1966: 471). Road links between Kathmandu and the Indian border were opened, 
and a USAID-funded programme to rid the Terai of malaria was established, bringing 
new farmland under cultivation. In 1959 the Nepal Industrial Development 
Corporation was established and new laws were enacted—the Industrial Factory Act 
and the Factory Workers Act in particular—to provide financial, technical and legal 
assistance to new entrepreneurs. A trade and transit treaty with India was also signed, 
assuring ‘virtual domination of Nepal’s economic life’ (Lohani 1973: 206); this 
consolidated Nepal’s integration into the Indian economy, but allowed Nepali 
products free and unrestricted access to Indian markets.  
 
3.1.1. Capitalist development 
The priority for Nepal’s First Five-Year Plan, introduced in 1956, was to improve 
living standards by creating employment opportunities and encouraging growth. The 
plan placed heavy emphasis on urban-based import substitution industrialisation (ISI): 
these industries ‘were granted heavy protection in the form of high tariffs and/or 
import restrictions and they had access to important inputs at lower tariffs, making the 
effective rate of protection excessively high; in some cases over 200 per cent’ 
(Sharma 2006: 556). Sharma (2006: 556) argues that this strategy contributed to 
deteriorating poverty and inequality because it attracted resources away from rural 
areas and caused agricultural productivity—upon which the vast majority of the 
population depended—to decline. The argument was that while the ISI policy 
accelerated growth, it failed to benefit 86 per cent of the population living in rural 
areas, and rural-urban inequality significantly increased (2006: 552). Over the next 
two decades, Nepal had developed a large number of ISI industries, including jute, 
sugar, cigarettes, matches, cement, paper, metal, crafts and textiles; factories were 
also developed for pharmaceuticals, shoes and leather under the Second Five-Year 
Plan (Pradhan 1984: 57). By the Third Five-Year Plan beginning in 1965, there were 
rice, flour and oil mills, brick and tile factories, saw mills, printing presses and a 
furniture-making industry (1984: 62). Export-oriented industries were limited to rice, 
jute, timber and hide. A portion of rice and jute had to be sold to the Nepal Food 
Corporation below international market prices, forcing commercial producers to move 
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towards ISI industries and away from export-oriented industries. Agricultural 
investment and productivity continued to fall, and by the mid-1980s, exports declined 
to about 5 per cent and a severe macro-economic crisis ensued (Sharma 2006: 557), 
prompting the government to submit to international pressure for reforms. According 
to Sharma these reforms created a bias against agricultural investment and, combined 
with cuts in development expenditure, exacerbated poverty and inequality.  
 
3.1.2. Nepal’s integration into the Indian economy 
That Nepal’s integration into the global economy is largely the result of its integration 
with and dependence on the Indian economy (Karmacharya 2001: 88), means that if 
India had not begun to adopt liberalisation polices from the early 1990s, ‘whatever the 
pressure of international agencies, the Nepali government would have [had] difficulty 
in pursuing liberalisation and privatisation in such a radical manner’ (Paudel 2009: 
126). Landlocked and without easy access to ports, accessing the markets of the rest 
of the world other than through India is time-consuming and expensive for Nepal 
(Karmacharya 2001: 89). Sole reliance on India for trade and transit inhibited Nepal’s 
ability to develop commercial relations with other countries. The long open border 
with India also created other problems; India’s superior infrastructure, technology and 
skills, the unofficial and unrecorded movement of goods across the border 
(Karmacharya 2001: 89), and the economies of scale provided by its large domestic 
market, acted as disincentives to the development of industry in Nepal (Khadka 1998: 
157). Following the liberalisation of trade policies, imports from India have rapidly 
increased, creating a trade deficit for Nepal, which Khadka (1998: 158) argues cannot 
compete without a measure of government protection of domestic industries. Roka 
(2011: 185) notes that Nepal’s trade deficit with India grew from US$267 million in 
2000 to US$1.3 billion in 2008.  
 
The post-Rana government viewed economic development as one of its top priorities. 
Nepal requested aid from India, which responded with technical and economic aid in 
1952 by building roads, airfields and communications networks (Khadka 1997: 1047). 
To dissuade Nepal from the influence of China, India became Nepal’s largest donor 
between the mid-1960s until the 1970s, when Japan assumed the role (1997: 1048). 
Meanwhile, China offered aid to Nepal in the wake of King Mahendra’s coup in order 
to reduce Nepal’s economic dependence on India and, in general during the 1960s and 
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70s, when Indian aid increased, aid from China and the Soviet Union also increased 
(1997: 1053). Khadka (1997: 1049) notes that while there was a positive correlation 
between aid and GDP growth rates, they were not significant. He argues that ‘an 
increased reliance on aid did not contribute much to improve Nepal’s economy during 
the panchayat years (1997: 1051), failing to produce expected economic results. 
Instead, from 1970-1989, total external debt increase from US$3 million to US$1.3 
billion, while the major beneficiaries of aid were ‘unquestionably the supporters of 
the panchayat system’ (1997: 1051), including influential businesspeople and 
powerful bureaucrats. This reliance on India has an important implication that Brown 
(1996: 81) observes: ‘Penetration of Indian capitalism into Nepal… accelerated 
during the post-Rana years and integrated Nepal even further into global capitalism as 
the periphery of a periphery’. This integration and associated dependence continues. 
 
3.1.3. The rise of neoliberalism  
The causes of political unrest and change in Nepal over the last three decades cannot 
be understood without examining the economic reforms that began to be implemented 
in the mid-1980s. The remarkable and enduring changes to Nepal’s economy—from 
essentially a state-led to a market-led system—were entirely based on IMF and World 
Bank policy prescriptions (Paudel 2009: 115), and demonstrate that Nepal was neither 
immune from the global trend towards liberalisation nor isolated from the global 
economy (Seddon 2001; Mikesell 1999). Neoliberal reforms began with the first 
structural adjustment loan from the World Bank in 1986, which was designed to 
stabilise the economy and promote economic growth. These objectives would be 
accomplished by encouraging private investment in agriculture, trade, forestry and 
industry, improving public sector efficiency, cutting subsidies, making the currency 
convertible, reducing the scope for state intervention, relaxing licensing requirements 
for the private sector and privatising state-owned enterprises (Paudel 2009: 119; 
Khadka 1998: 151). By World Bank measures, Nepal made progress on all these 
fronts, and in 1989 received another structural adjustment loan. The aim of the second 
loan was to reinforce liberalisation by revamping the tax system, cutting development 
spending, restructuring two of the largest state-owned banks and opening up the 
financial sector. Foreign direct investment was also encouraged by allowing 100 per 
cent foreign ownership in all industries except those related to defence, public health 
and the environment, though this achieved limited success (Karmacharya 2001: 95). 
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Nepal’s privatisation programme accelerated during the 1990s under pressure from 
the World Bank, USAID and UNDP, which assisted the Ministry of Finance in 
formulating a strategy for privatisation (Paudel 2009: 119).65 Regardless of the 
ideological tendencies of the government in power—whether the Nepali Congress or 
UML—each was committed to continuing and strengthening economic liberalisation 
measures (Khadka 1991: 151). The short-lived UML government, however, failed to 
actually move the privatisation agenda forward (Joshi 1996: 233), and when the 
Nepali Congress was back in power in a coalition with the National Democratic Party 
and the Sadbhawana Party, it promised to pursue a liberalisation policy that would 
also preserve the rights, interests and welfare of labourers (Paudel 2009: 122). 
Nevertheless, privatisation continued, and there is evidence to suggest that this has 
had disastrous consequences on the poor and the working class in Nepal. 
 
By the early 1990s, poverty remained chronic: between 7 and 8 million out of the total 
population of 19 million lived in absolute poverty (Seddon 1993: 145). Devendra Raj 
Pandey, who became finance minister after the 1990 revolution, stressed that while 
structural adjustment reforms remained relevant and necessary, development 
assistance undertaken by donors had also to focus on raising the living standards of 
ordinary people (Shaha 1990: 122-3). The dearth of consistent data makes it difficult 
to identify the specific impacts of liberalisation on poverty and inequality, however, 
‘given the unprecedented progress toward the integration of poor, developing 
economies into the global economic system’ (Wagle 2007: 1836), attempting to 
understand the effects of liberalisation and whether liberalisation and inequality 
reinforce one another, is vital (2007: 1840). Comparing indicators for liberalisation 
and inequality in Nepal as part of a wider study across South Asia, Wagle (2007: 
1842-43) found that as liberalisation increased, there were parallel rapid increases in 
the Gini ratio and consumption differentials; Nepal’s experience epitomised the 
highest degree of inequality in South Asia during the period 2000–03.66 Table 3.1 
shows that while poverty is decreasing, inequality is on the rise. 
 
                                                
65 By 1992, the first three public enterprises were privatised: a brick and tile factory, a pulp and paper 
factory and a leather and shoe factory. In the following year, 14 more public enterprises were 
earmarked for privatisation but only five had been privatised (Paudel 2009: 121). 
66 Indicators for liberalisation were foreign direct investment (FDI), import, export, external debt and 
debt service, which Wagle argues captures a more accurate degree of liberalisation. Indicators for 
inequality were Gini and consumption ratios and poverty incidence at one dollar a day.  
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 1980s 1990s 2000-03 
Gini index indicating deviation from 
zero at perfect equality 
0.305 0.426 0.472 
Ratio of consumption from top to 
bottom quintile 
4.336 7.633 9.100 
Poverty incidence at  
US$1 a day of income  
39.72 39.13 24.10 
Table 3.1: Measures of inequality and poverty. Source: Adapted from Wagle (2007: 1842) 
 
Furthermore, analysing the data with variables including population growth suggests 
that ‘liberalisation favours cheap labour thereby inducing countries with more rapidly 
growing populations to liberalise faster’ (2007: 1847). Wagle concludes that not only 
do liberalisation and inequality have ‘simultaneous, positive, but yet nonlinear 
relationships’ (2007: 1849)—despite variations in country experiences—but also that 
countries with higher degrees of inequality are more likely to liberalise, creating a 
perpetuating cycle leading to greater inequality.67 In later studies, Wagle (2010: 573) 
notes that ‘the share of the top quintile in the distribution of income and consumption, 
for example, increased from 40 per cent in 1984 to 47 per cent in 1996 and further 55 
per cent in 2004’. More specifically, while the bottom 10 per cent have access to 1 per 
cent of resources the top 10 per cent enjoy 50 per cent of resources or more, making 
Nepal one of the most unequal countries in the world (2010: 577). Although 
liberalisation policies led to limited economic growth—in the 1960s and 70s GDP 
grew on average at 2.6 per cent per annum, while during the 1980s this figure was 3.4 
per cent (Khadka 1998: 152-153)—evidence suggests that benefits accrued to the 
upper classes did not trickle down to the poor. With the removal of subsidies to 
electricity, water, fuel and basic consumption goods such as sugar, prices rose 
significantly (Sharma 2006: 558). Khadka (1998: 153) also notes that while per capita 
income doubled in the 1980s and 90s, prices increased by three-fold, making the 
living conditions of the average population worse. Fertiliser subsidies were also 
removed, making farmers worse off because of declining levels of productivity 
(Sharma 2006: 558). The failure to improve performance in the agricultural sector 
affected not only growth in other sectors of the economy but the socio-economic 
conditions of the vast majority. 
 
                                                
67 This is in part because elite interests at a national level that control cheap labour coincide with the 
interests of external economic players who need to exploit cheap labour. One of Nepal’s key exports is 
now cheap labour to the Middle East and the Gulf. 
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Privatisation and deregulation were pursued both because of pressures from the IFIs 
but also by the perception amongst Nepali bureaucrats that public enterprises were 
operating unsatisfactorily; in particular that poor management and financial losses 
associated with public industries were not conducive to economic growth (Sharma 
1983: 906). Sharma argues that the reasons for disappointing economic achievements 
were that economic policies were based on ‘political rather than economic 
considerations’ (1983: 897) and a weak administrative capacity to implement reforms. 
A more conventional reading suggests that the government undertook structural 
adjustment reforms in the belief that growth would trickle down and reduce poverty 
(Acharya 2011: 3), address growing inequality and the bias against agriculture and 
make industry more efficient; that the government failed to do this was the result of 
half-hearted implementation and technical weaknesses, compounded by political 
instability and poor governance (Sharma 2006: 565). The conclusion from this 
analysis is that what is needed is not less but more reform, combined with targeted 
development assistance in terms of social services and infrastructure (Karmacharya 
2001: 101; Khadka 1998: 164). Acharya (2011: 49) argues that the World Bank and 
IMF later realised that their policies were anti-poor, and in the second phase of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme from 1992, emphasised generating government 
revenue. The realisation was that the devaluation of local currencies and the 
withdrawal of subsidies were detrimental for the poor, and thus the Bank developed 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. The Bank would make poverty reduction 
a more explicit aim of a growth-oriented economic strategy, while at the same time 
continuing liberalisation. According to Roka (2011: 177), reforms created even 
greater inequalities. Wagle (2010: 573) also argues that reforms created an ‘overall 
policy environment providing a powerful impetus to create and sustain inequality’, 
ignoring evidence that reforms had led to an increase in inequality (2010: 577) and 
suggestions that there was a trade-off between liberalisation and poverty (Acharya, 
2011: 49). Furthermore, the current wave of inequality coincided with the 
liberalisation policies of the 1990s, ‘further intensifying integration of the national 
economy into the regional and global markets’ (Wagle 2010: 574). Nepal’s growing 
integration into the world economy was not only producing questionable results, but 
has implications for the notion that the economy remains ‘semi-feudal’ to this day.  
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3.2. The first people’s movement 
The immediate aim of the 1990 people’s movement was to lift the ban on political 
parties. It was not a movement singularly directed against King Birendra but one that 
aimed to attack the system that institutionalised his power. According to Hoftun 
(1993: 15), the parties ‘wanted to take away the king’s political power without 
harming him as a symbol of national unity’ in practice. Not only did the parties 
succeed in lifting the ban but they also brought an end to absolute rule by the 
monarchy. Several factors had already weakened the panchayat regime, not least of 
which was the 1980 referendum. While it continued to portray itself as a strong 
regime with mass support, according to Burghart (1993: 10), this was fiction. When 
the parties began to organise the movement, which would begin on Nepal’s official 
‘Democracy Day’ on 18 February, the regime responded in a show of both confidence 
and repression. It organised rallies and produced favourable media coverage of 
various government programmes, but also disconnected all the phone lines in the 
capital and arrested all the main party leaders. In the end it took only six weeks to 
remove the 28-year-old regime, but it was accomplished by a combination of internal 
factors—primarily an economic and political crisis that the parties could unite 
against—and external factors, which included the democratic revolutions sweeping 
Eastern Europe. The panchayat regime had always attempted to control social and 
political organisation outside state patronage, but it was beginning to find itself in an 
impossible situation, wedged between growing criticism both within and outside its 
ranks. Ultimately it could not contain the opposition, and the crisis culminated into a 
situation where things could no longer stay the same.  
 
The political context that preceded the movement was the now infamous trade 
embargo imposed by India preventing fuel and kerosene from entering Nepal. The 
Indian embargo was the single biggest factor that further weakened the panchayat 
regime, but the discontent generated and the confidence gained by opposition forces 
towards the end of 1989 contributed to creating the conditions for the 1990 
movement. Trade and transit has always been an issue for Nepal and there were 
frequent disputes with India over these issues (Hoftun et al. 1999: 265). Landlocked 
and sharing a 1,690 km border with India, Nepal is effectively surrounded by India on 
three sides, and India has used Nepal’s economic vulnerability to its advantage. While 
the resolution of trade and transit disputes tended to favour India, Nepal has also 
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attempted to use relations with China to counter Indian dominance. In 1988, for 
example, King Birendra negotiated a special arms deal with China, and the arms were 
delivered directly overland from China (Mishra 2004: 633). Nepal had also eased 
customs duties on Chinese goods and introduced a system of work permits for Indian 
nationals working in Nepal (2004: 633), but it was the arms deal that led India to 
retaliate by using the issue of trade and transit to remind Nepal of its special 
relationship with India (Riaz and Basu 2007: 95). India argued that under the 1950 
India-Nepal Treaty, Nepal must consult India before purchasing arms; Nepal argued 
that this provision was not applicable if the arms were not transiting through India 
(Mishra 2004: 633). India was not convinced. The embargo began on 23 March and 
fuel shortages were immediately felt across the country. Previous trade and transit 
treaties between India and Nepal had expired on 1 March 1988, but instead of 
renewing these treaties, India insisted on reverting to an older arrangement, whereby 
trade and transit were covered under a single treaty. Nepal had always argued that the 
two issues be dealt with separately since trade depended on mutual agreements, 
whereas because Nepal is landlocked, it should have transit facilities by right (Hoftun 
et al.1999: 110). India had let things stand for over a year before suddenly closing 19 
of the 21 trade routes and 13 of the 15 transit routes (Mishra 2004: 633), causing 
enormous damage to the Nepali economy (Riaz and Basu 2007: 95), not least because 
of the disruption to fuel supplies (Chaturvedy and Malone 2012: 295). According to 
Hoftun et al. (1999: 110), ‘Everything in India’s power was done to make the transit 
through India of goods for Nepal as difficult as possible’. But as the months wore on 
and prices continued to rise, general discontent began to grow. Instead of attempting 
to resolve the issue, the government of Nepal began to dig its heels in; it declared a 
national crisis and launched a propaganda campaign not only calling on Nepalis to 
unite against India, but urging the international community to recognise Nepal’s 
precarious position. It announced strict austerity measures and a new economic policy 
to make Nepal less dependent on India. If the authorities in Delhi were surprised at 
this tenacity, the Nepali public was beginning to vent real anger, including in both 
urban and rural areas (1999: 110-111). For a time it made the panchayat regime 
appear strong, but levels of discontent went from bad to worse.  
 
Although it is likely that India was attempting to use the weak government in Nepal to 
impose a more favourable trade treaty, and the opposition did not want to be seen to 
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be supporting India, it nevertheless heavily criticised the government for its inability 
to solve the problem. But seizing the opportunity to launch a movement created by 
these conditions also required leadership. Unwilling to come together during the 1980 
referendum, this time opposition parties—the Nepali Congress and the communists—
joined forces in order to participate in the official movement. On 10 January, seven 
moderate communist parties announced the formation of the ULF, led by Sahana 
Pradhan.68 On the far left, the parties that had any significant following in 1990 were 
three Maoist parties: the CPN (Fourth Congress), led by Nirmal Lama, and which had 
previously been one of the strongest and most organised communist parties in the 
country (Rawal 2007: 85); the CPN (Masal), which split from the Fourth Congress in 
1983 under the leadership of Mohan Bikram Singh; and the CPN (Mashal), which was 
one of the factions resulting from an earlier split within Masal in 1985 and was led by 
Prachanda, who had been newly elected as general secretary (Thapa 2003: 35).69 As 
both Masal and Mashal considered co-operation either with the monarchy or with the 
Nepali Congress impossible, they instead came together to form the United National 
People’s Movement (UNPM) with other radical groups to participate in the 
movement. Baburam Bhattarai, who was then part of Masal, led the UNPM. Their 
main demands were republicanism and elections to a Constituent Assembly. 
 
The unity of the opposition parties was a decisive factor in the victory of the 
movement. But there was also a new group of intellectuals that had come to the 
political forefront in Kathmandu and other cities since 1980, and which was becoming 
increasingly influential. Hoftun (1993: 16) explains that ‘the appearance of this new 
intelligentsia was most evident in the formation and rapid growth of several human 
rights organisations. The membership of these organisations consisted to a large 
degree of young professionals with no previous affiliation to the banned political 
parties’. Hoftun notes that Padma Ratna Tuladhar was one of the main representatives 
of this group of politicised intellectuals, defining himself as an ‘independent leftist’ 
(1993: 16)—part of the Left but with an appeal across the political spectrum. 
                                                
68 In addition to CPN (Fourth Congress), the United Left Front consisted of six other left groups: CPN 
(Marxist-Leninist), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, CPN (Marxist), CPN (Burma), CPN 
(Manandhar) and CPN (Amatya). The Fourth Congress’ analysis was that feudalism was the main 
enemy, not India, and as such could tolerate making alliances with the Nepali Congress. 
69 The Fourth Congress is also sometimes referred to as the Fourth Convention.  
 106 
Professional associations such as the Nepal Bar Association, Medical Association and 
various teachers’ associations also became involved in the movement. 
 
3.2.1. The view from the ground 
From the first day of agitation on 18 February, demonstrations and strikes grew 
steadily. People organised new and creative forms of protest as government repression 
intensified, including ‘voluntary blackouts at certain times in the evenings, silent 
marches, and the public burning of various symbols of the regime’ (1993: 17). At the 
outset it was unclear where the movement would lead, and as Hoftun argues, ‘the 
general impression was that the struggle could last for a long time’ (1993: 17). Then 
on 30 March, unrest in the district of Bhaktapur, not far from Kathmandu, spread to 
Patan, only a few miles from the capital.70 While during the last years of the 
panchayat Nepal had experience a growth in ethnic consciousness and the beginning 
of a movement for ethnic rights, the events in Bhaktapur and Patan were different; 
they were explicitly not of an ethnic nature. As Hoftun describes it, ‘the political goals 
were solely of a general and national character’ (1993: 24). The police opened fire, 
several demonstrators were killed and the situation changed dramatically.  
 
For a start, people were outraged at the level of police brutality, and demonstrations 
grew in size and strength. As the government warned people not to take part in strikes 
and demonstrations, the police raided and looted the homes of those thought to be 
most active. This was met with even more anger against the police. Left parties and 
associated student groups began holding mass meetings all over Kathmandu 
proposing action against police repression. People immediately began to organise 
themselves, block by block, digging trenches, erecting barricades and organising 
blackouts (Ogura 2001: 118). Within days, people in the municipalities of Kirtipur 
and Patan seized control of their city centres, keeping out the police. Students, 
industrial workers and even housewives staged strikes across the country. Over 200 of 
Nepal’s best writers and artists staged a sit-in demonstration outside one of the main 
campuses of Tribhuvan University in the centre of Kathmandu; 158 were arrested but 
released later that day (Hoftun et al. 1999: 126). The professional associations also 
                                                
70 The three districts of Kathmandu, Lalitpur (Patan) and Bhaktapur, formerly three separate kingdoms, 
today make up the Kathmandu Valley and cover an area of about 220 miles. Before the unification of 
Nepal in 1768 as outlined in Chapter 2, only the Kathmandu Valley was known as Nepal. 
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began to organise strikes, and employees of Royal Nepal Airlines also went on strike. 
A general strike was organised on 2 April. Two days later, massive crowds had 
gathered at the biggest temples in the Kathmandu Valley to mourn the dead. Hoftun et 
al. (1999: 129) describe the scene: ‘By now the town centres of Kathmandu, Patan 
and Bhaktapur resembled war zones. There were roadblocks everywhere. Debris 
littered the streets, fires blazed and the shells of overturned, burned-out vehicles lined 
the roads’. Then, the climax of the revolution arrived.  
 
First, foreign minister Shailendra Kumar Upadhyaya resigned, protesting government 
repression. The cabinet was reshuffled and on the morning of 6 April the king issued a 
royal proclamation announcing talks with the banned parties, an investigation into the 
killings and the establishment of a commission to oversee constitutional amendments 
(1999: 130). Hundreds of thousands had gathered in Tundikhel (an open-air green 
space in the centre of the city) and its vicinity, to hear the proclamation. The police 
were instructed not to interfere, but to allow the mass gathering to take place. Later 
that day, the state media announced the release of all detainees, unless criminal 
charges could be brought before them. The mood was mixed; celebratory on the one 
hand because of the immediate concessions that had been granted, but also because 
people felt the movement had made real gains: a series of far-reaching political 
changes, even victory, was imminent. But on the other hand there was also 
dissatisfaction because many felt that the king’s concessions did not go far enough 
(Hutt 1993: 29). Sections of the movement were even calling for the abolition of the 
monarchy itself. That afternoon, the mood turned into anger, now directed not only 
against the government but directly at the king and queen. From Tundikhel a large 
crowd moved towards the palace. Once again the police opened fire, killing more 
people than on any other previous day during the movement (Hoftun et al. 1999: 18). 
According to Hutt (1993: 29) ‘security forces shot several dozen unarmed 
demonstrators’ outside the royal palace. Finally, on 8 April, the king announced that 
the ban on the political parties was lifted.  
 
3.2.2. Bringing the movement to an end 
The four main leaders of the movement—Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and Girija Prasad 
Koirala from the Nepali Congress and Sahana Pradhan and Radha Krishna Mainali 
from the ULF—were granted an audience with the king that very evening. In a 
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television interview immediately after the meeting, in response to the question about 
whether the movement had ended, K.P. Bhattarai gave the following answer:  
 
Of course, I declare it, so that all the people listening can understand 
clearly. His Majesty has proclaimed the deletion of the world “partyless” 
from the constitution and lifted the ban on political parties, meaning that 
all political parties can now function freely. It means that multiparty 
democracy has been realised. Since the main objective of the movement 
has been achieved, I declare that the movement has ended. (Quoted in 
Ogura 2001: 198) 
 
But the unrest persisted. People kept coming back out onto the streets, partly out of 
for fear that the movement had been called off too early, and partly to pressure the 
king to implement the changes he had promised. In the months that followed, 
movement leaders were consistently criticised for compromising with the king. 
Activists in the ULF and others argued that demands should have included the 
abrogation of the 1962 Constitution. The UNPM reaffirmed its demand for CA 
elections and encouraged the movement to continue demonstrating (Thapa 2003: 35). 
Criticism was directed at the Nepali Congress in particular, but Congress leaders 
argued that since the demands were not made during the movement itself, it would not 
be credible if they were made now (Hutt 1993: 30). Ultimately, it was not the 
opposition leaders but the movement on the streets that forced the king to implement 
his promises. The crucial question remains, however, that if the leadership—or at 
least sections of the left leadership—had not called off the movement but instead 
allowed it to continue, it may have had the confidence to press for more far-reaching 
change. It was precisely the incompleteness of the revolution that set the Maoists on 
the course towards the People’s War. The violence of the regime and its suppression 
of the democracy movement can be seen as an expression of its weakness (Hoftun 
1993: 21), which in turn gave the opposition confidence. But this confidence was 
fleeting, since after the lifting of the ban, the parties felt they had to assert control not 
by leading the movement but by suppressing it themselves. 
 
The royal proclamation came on 16 April, dissolving the panchayat and invalidating 
the provisions of the 1962 Constitution inconsistent with multiparty democracy. The 
next day, the king named K.P. Bhattarai, a moderate who had spent 14 years as a 
political prisoner, as prime minister and head of the interim government. The 
 109 
government also freed all political prisoners, lifted control of all domestic and foreign 
publications, and established a commission, known as the Malik Commission, to 
investigate the loss of life and property. Once the mainstream parties came to power 
there was almost immediately an accommodation with the mainstream approach to 
development: Nepal must continue the process of liberalisation to match the new 
democratic dispensation. There was a sense that development would work this time—
unlike during the panchayat—because of the introduction of multiparty democracy 
following the people’s movement, and the help of NGOs, who had themselves played 
a role in the movement and whose international NGO partners were seen as closer to 
the aspirations of ordinary people than government donors. The movement was 
demobilised by Congress and the UML, seeking a settlement with the monarchy. That 
the mainstream parties, including the UML, called off the movement had not gone 
unnoticed by a number of smaller parties to the left of the UML. 
 
3.3. NGOs and the production of civil society 
Liberal interpretations of civil society, which have been influential in development 
studies and within the aid industry and promoted by the World Bank over the last two 
decades, tend to view civil society as distinct from both the market and the state 
(Edwards 2011: 4; Lewis and Kanji 2009: 121), primarily acting as a counterbalance 
to the power of the state. Civil society is seen as a relatively uncontested space of 
associations of free individuals, where civic virtues such as volunteerism and 
philanthropy can be practiced (De Tocqueville 1990) and where social capital can be 
built (Putnam, 2000). Warning against the domination of public life by the state, and 
where NGOs can ‘act as a bulwark against such a tendency’ (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 
131), the liberal view easily accommodates the neoliberal rhetoric of a minimal state. 
The convergence between the liberal approach to civil society and the promotion of 
neoliberal values is most clearly reflected in the ‘good governance’ agenda. The good 
governance agenda adopted by the World Bank in the 1990s, which brought the 
concept of civil society into development policy and was later imposed as part of aid 
conditionality, assumed civil society to be one of three sets of institutions, alongside a 
competitive, market-based economy and an efficient government (Lewis and Kanji 
2009: 128). While such a prominent role for civil society asserted a space for 
politics—a space where NGOs and movements and other collectives could articulate 
demands outside of formal structures—it also facilitated the promotion of market 
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values (2009: 129), whereby a dynamic civil society would contribute to market-led 
economic growth. According to Edwards (2011: 4), such an instrumental and 
reductionist conception of civil society has come under greater scrutiny and 
questioning from scholars and activists, while it has grown in popularity amongst 
politicians and policymakers. Civil society is relegated by the mainstream to the status 
of being residual, that which only exists to compensate for the weaknesses of other 
institutions (2011: 5). It is precisely because of the explosive potential of civil society, 
which is implicitly recognised by the mainstream, that civil society must be contained 
and, in a sense, neutralised. Appropriating the concept of civil society and 
popularising a liberal interpretation, in particular through the policies and practices of 
good governance, has at moments been relatively effective in limiting this potential. 
 
The mainstreaming of civil society into development policy, or ‘strengthening’ civil 
society, has had three major and interrelated consequences. The first is that it has 
facilitated a more interventionist role for those promoting good governance—the 
World Bank and major Western donors—whereby civil society actors are expected to 
conform to legal, bourgeois democratic processes that impose limits on acceptable 
action. If the idea of civil society is deemed to constitute a free and fair media, 
elections, human rights and so on—elements that constitute a democracy—then 
strengthening civil society means greater scrutiny on these questions as part of a set of 
imposed reforms.71 The focus on human rights in Nepal beginning in the late 1980s, 
as has been shown in the previous chapter, was also part of moves towards 
strengthening civil society in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Second, the 
promotion of civil society has allowed donors to fund projects that might otherwise 
have the potential to threaten capitalist relations, and ‘siphon discontent’ (2011: 5) 
into more moderate forms of protest. Funding has become a major tool through which 
Western powers have been able to advance their interests. Hearn (2001: 47) 
demonstrates the various mechanisms through which donors have used funding to 
contain opposition within civil society. In Ghana, donors funded sections of civil 
society to create broad-based consensus for pushing through the controversial 
structural adjustment programme, while in South Africa donors funded only those 
                                                
71 The US has justified humanitarian intervention after 9/11, for example, on the basis of human rights 
violations and a lack of democracy, linking explicit foreign policy goals to a strengthened civil society 
in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere (Edwards 2011: 5). 
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civil society organisations that promoted procedural over substantive democracy, 
redefining democracy to mean elections rather than equal access to housing, jobs and 
other material benefits (2001: 48). In Uganda, civil society organisations and NGOs 
were funded to work more closely with local government in providing services, 
preventing NGOs from agitating on issues such as debt, land and political systems by 
making an artificial distinction between civil and political issues (2001: 51). This has 
also been the case in Nepal, where in 1999 the Nepali Congress government framed 
the Local Self-Governance Act, facilitating and encouraging NGOs to work in 
partnership with local government (Dhakal 2007: 63). Organising around political 
issues outside the bounds of the state—much like during the panchayat—was met 
with unease by government officials. Finally, NGOs in particular have been used to 
play a ‘bridging role’ within civil society (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 133) between the 
poor, middle classes and elites. By attempting to create consensus across the political 
spectrum, they effectively neutralise interests that cut against elite interests, denying 
that these interests are incompatible and in direct opposition to one another.  
 
3.3.1. Hegemony, civil society and the state 
An alternative and opposing interpretation of civil society—regarded as ‘radical’ from 
the standpoint of the liberal understanding—has its roots in the writings of the 
German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel, and was taken up by Marx and later Gramsci. In 
this interpretation, civil society is not only recognised as a sphere of conflict and 
contestation but also a site where one class dominates—under particular social, 
political and economic conditions—over another class. Gramsci’s often-quoted 
passage from the Prison Notebooks refers to two superstructural ‘levels’, civil society 
and political society:  
 
We can now fix two major superstructures levels—one that may be called 
“civil society”, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 
“private”, and the other that of “political society” or the State. These two 
levels correspond on the one hand to the function of “hegemony” which 
the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to 
that of “direct domination” or command exercised through the State and 
“juridical” government. (Cited in Thomas 2009: 168) 
 
In arguing that Gramsci was concerned with the popular classes’ attempt to assume 
leadership in society, Thomas (2009: 160) contests a number of received assumptions 
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associated with the concept of hegemony, and by extension assumptions about 
Gramsci’s conception of civil society. At least two of these assumptions—ultimately 
mistaken, according to Thomas—are relevant here; first, that hegemony is a strategy 
that involves the production of consent, as opposed to coercion, and second, that civil 
society, as opposed to the state, is the terrain in which hegemony is exercised. 
Accordingly, hegemony is viewed as a strategy aimed at the production of consent 
and one that directly pertains to civil society (Anderson 1976: 21). Thomas argues 
against this partial conception in favour of a total, dialectical picture that spans civil 
society and political society.  
 
Thomas argues that, for Gramsci, civil society is not an uncompromised space that is 
entirely distinct from the state—one that either comes before the state or lies beyond 
it: ‘Rather, it is an ensemble of practices and relations dialectically interpellated by 
and integrated within the state’ (2009: 180). That civil society is the dominant sphere 
of control in which the ruling classes maintain their hegemony via consent is quite 
common—but it is a distortion, or at least a simplification, of Gramsci’s position. In 
reality, the state exercises hegemony through a combination of consent and coercion 
(Simon 1991: 22). Hegemony in the Gramscian sense means assuming the leadership 
of an alliance of forces plus the domination of opposing forces; domination and 
leadership are therefore two moments of the same process (Thomas 2009: 163). 
Political society, which Gramsci uses as a synonym for the state (2009: 190), and civil 
society constitute the ‘integral state’ such that they reinforce each other: political 
institutions have historical roots in and grow out of the wider fabric of civil society, 
constituted by the economy, the family and other associational forms. But having 
arisen, political society then crystallises the power relations that exist in civil society 
and reinforces them. Thus although civil society and political society form a 
dialectical unity, they are not of equal social weight; they are conceived of not in a 
spatial but a functional sense (2009: 194). As Thomas argues, ‘their equilibrium, like 
that of consent and coercion, is a stable disequilibrium’ (2009: 192), whereby political 
society contains civil society, surrounding it and fundamentally reshaping it (2009: 
189). Social forces within civil society—those forces that are capable of effecting 
social change—have been transformed into particular forms of political power, but 
these forms are not necessarily the only ‘truth’ of those social forces. However, ‘the 
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state will remain the “truth” of civil society until the latter becomes aware of its own 
“secret”: its capacity for self-organisation and self-regulation’ (2009: 193).  
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this interpretation of civil society. First, civil 
society is not a neutral, apolitical space of pure consensual politics, in which politics 
can be evaded; it is a space of conflict because it is integrated with and influenced by 
political society or the state, which consistently uses its coercive power in addition to 
its consensual power. Political society is the sphere in which hegemonic projects find 
their institutional and open ideological expression. Gramsci observed that in 
bourgeois society, the state is primary because it organises civil society, and thus it 
appears that civil society is subordinate to the state. Second, the appearance of civil 
society and political society as separate, unrelated realms is a mechanism of ruling 
class control; the appearance of civil society as depoliticised, for example, is part of 
what keeps neoliberal institutions intact. The Gramscian interpretation of civil society 
is necessarily political because it explains the mechanisms through which social 
forces are integrated into the hegemony of the state. Accepting the apparent 
separation between civil society and political society denies the ways in which 
institutions in civil society are influenced by state, on ideological and practical levels. 
Finally, because political society is the mechanism whereby the status quo is 
maintained (2009: 227), then any struggle within civil society must automatically 
raise questions of state power. In other words, the struggle for hegemony in civil 
society is necessarily a struggle for hegemony in political society, or a struggle for 
political power. But the attempt to forge political hegemony must be done before 
seizing state power: ‘without such an attempt to transform leadership in civil society 
into a political hegemony or into the nascent forms of a new political society, civil 
hegemony itself will be disaggregated and subordinated to… the existing political 
hegemony of the ruling class’ (2009: 194). This interpretation of civil society, in 
which social forces provide leadership and direction and have the potential to create 
civil hegemony—directly challenging political hegemony—allocates a role for the 
agency of social forces, with profound implications for social transformation.  
 
3.3.2. The rhetoric and reality of civil society in Nepal 
Contemporary notions of civil society have been influenced by liberal rather than 
radical interpretations (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 135; Tamang 2002: 311), and have 
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become associated with NGOs to the extent that policymakers and activists often refer 
to NGOs as constituting the entirety of civil society (Holmén and Jirström 2009: 441; 
Lewis and Kanji 2009: 123; Sinha 2005: 165). Donors have supported NGOs as 
‘proxies for civil society’ (Lewis and Kanji 2009: 139) because NGO support is easier 
to operationalise, monitor and control. NGOs themselves have reinforced this notion 
in order to concretise their roles and identities, and this is no less true in Nepal (Bhatta 
2012: 189; Heaton Shrestha and Adhikari 2010: 295; Tamang 2002: 316). The turn 
towards the rhetoric of civil society by neoliberal institutions has meant that the term 
itself has lost much of its original meaning, where civil society is a sphere of society 
that is part of the state but also in opposition to it. Instead, civil society has become a 
technical rather than a political concept. Having been appropriated, the definition of 
civil society as applied by donors in the developing world has become vague, difficult 
and rather illusive (Shah 2008a: 3; Tamang 2002: 314). Its reification as the site of the 
panacea to underdevelopment is equally problematic (Tamang 2002: 310). Writing on 
civil society in Nepal, the late anthropologist Saubhagya Shah (2008a: 3) notes that 
‘The indeterminate conceptual and organisational formulation of civil society may 
even enhance its effectiveness’ for the elites because it serves to legitimate action 
undertaken by a range of actors with multiple projects, including democracy, 
development, security or foreign policy objectives. Despite the rejection of the 
identification of civil society with NGOs by Nepali intellectuals (Heaton Shrestha and 
Adhikari 2010: 295), it is almost impossible to discuss the concept of civil society in 
Nepal without slipping into a discussion of NGOs. Donors have been effective in 
ensuring that the liberal discourse of civil society has resonance in reality, first by 
romanticising and then by depoliticising civil society in theory and, second, by 
remaking it to fit neoliberal agendas, effectively substituting civil society for NGOs. 
Thus they disguise what is an active, economically partisan and loaded intervention as 
merely reinforcing the space for an apolitical ‘good’ in society. 
 
Interpretations of nagarik samaj [civil society] by leading Nepal scholars have tended 
to view civil society as a Western concept that has been imitated in the developing 
world (Bhatta 2012: 185; Shah 2008a: 2; Tamang 2002: 341).72 Onta (2004: 142) 
argues that the domestication of the use of civil society has led to its overuse and to 
                                                
72 Onta (2004: 142) points out that while nagarik samaj is taken as the English equivalent of civil 
society, its actual meaning in Nepali is ‘citizens’ society’. 
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ambiguity. Tamang (2002: 310) describes civil society as the bridge between the 
realms of society and the state, while Heaton Shrestha and Adhikari (2010: 295) assert 
that civil society in Nepal is autonomous from the state, largely voluntary and elitist. 
Bhatta (2012: 190) suggests three traditions of civil society—an activist version 
constituted mainly by human rights organisations that advocate on behalf of 
marginalised sections of the population; a neoliberal version, where other forces 
within civil society are needed to moderate the shocks associated with structural 
adjustment; and an oppositional version concerned with regime change, and which is 
‘interest-bound, partisan and polarised’. Following Gramsci, Shah (2008a: 2) argues 
that in Nepal, ‘rather than being separate from the political society [sic], civil society 
is intrinsically linked to the political process and its contestation over power and 
resources’. To illustrate this point, he notes that 48 seats were allocated to civil 
society leaders in the 330-member interim parliament in 2007 (2008: 11). Further, he 
argues that civil society is the arena in which ‘oppositional and subaltern groups can 
potentially create their own alternative hegemonies’ (2008: 8). Yet this is a 
misinterpretation of Gramsci insofar as it is claimed that for Gramsci ‘the state-civil 
society convergence makes the total system resilient to both internal and external 
challenges’ (2008: 8), because this interpretation cannot explain how the system has 
been challenged. Shah (2008a: 12) also notes that the construction of civil society—
both historical and contemporary—as a moral force, through its claim to universal 
knowledge and values, selflessness and impartiality, can only be realised by eliding 
individual, partisan interests. The messy reality of civil society as a realm of 
competing and conflicting class interests, integrated within the state, however, negates 
its interpretation as an inherently moral force.  
 
In the practical application of the concept of civil society, Tamang (2002: 330) 
analyses the donor regime in its attempt to ‘civilise’ civil society in Nepal. Examining 
how the relationship between civil and political society plays out in Nepal, she 
discusses the ways in which donors are constantly seeking ‘good NGOs’ to fund 
because of the ‘incessant need and unyielding drive to spend funds in order to raise 
more funds’; how donors have actively impeded access to information by screening 
the reports they commission from NGOs and consultants and preventing them from 
appearing in the public sphere (2002: 333); and the fact that donors have tended to 
prioritise political interests over the interests of democracy, exemplified by their 
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support for the anti-democratic actions of King Gyanendra when he dismissed the 
prime minister and replaced him with a royal appointee, while at the same time 
calling for the reinforcement of the rule of law (2002: 338). In the process, and bound 
by ‘the profoundly anti-democratic impulses of the global neoliberal establishment’ 
(2002: 334) themselves, donors have prevented the emergence of democratic space. 
They are faced with an ostensible dilemma: on the one hand, civil society needs 
‘strengthening’ and, on the other, if civil society organisations become too strong, 
they run the risk of creating unrealistic expectations—‘expectations that cannot be 
met within the limitations of neoliberal prescriptions’ (2002: 335). In other words, a 
politicised civil society that raises expectations and exceeds the limits of what the 
neoliberal order can offer is not only discouraged but will be actively suppressed. 
Ultimately, donors in Nepal have gravitated towards those NGOs with whom they 
share an ideology. According to Tamang, ‘it cannot be assumed that those parts of 
civil society donors choose to promote is [sic] based on a disinterested, apolitical and 
technical basis’ (2002: 339). Donors have promoted a particular interpretation of civil 
society, as elsewhere in the world, to legitimise the Nepali neoliberal state. But the 
idea that NGOs operate in an apolitical realm, where the ideals of development or 
democracy require mere technical inputs, is deceptive. One NGO leader described the 
relationship between donors and NGOs like this: 
 
The main objective of donors is to promote an ideology; social justice is 
not of concern. When it comes to NGOs, I don’t think there is any kind of 
resistance, there is only acceptance because there is no other way; there 
is no other option. We know about the imposition of ideology but we have 
to work in this reality. For different NGOs, for me also, we face some kind 
of co-option. Within this co-option, civil society actors, journalists and 
others they try to make a small difference, which is better than making no 
difference. But there is increasing dependency and money isn’t being 
properly utilised. Seminars are useless when people are dying.73 
 
If donors have responsibility for generating and reinforcing inequalities (Tamang 
2002: 326) by sanctioning the reputation of local NGOs based on their ability to 
conform to international standards (2002: 331), NGOs also share this responsibility. 
As they concede to the requirements of the global development industry—writing 
English-language reports that only a minority elite can read, buying into the idea that 
beneficiaries must moderate ‘unrealistic expectations’ (2002: 335), and refraining 
                                                
73 Interview with Dipendra Jha, Kathmandu, 17 February 2010. 
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from criticising the abuses of foreign aid—they consolidate their roles as 
intermediaries between donors and beneficiaries. This demonstrates their agency but 
it also means that they wield a degree of power over donors, who need NGOs to fund. 
In other cases, donors have created NGOs to implement donor agendas outright. Von 
Einsiedel et al. (2012: 374) suggest that these NGOs are unlikely to question the 
system. They further comment on the role of INGOs:  
 
Civil society in Nepal comprises many organisations, some focused on 
self-help, local improvement, and certain forms of economic and social 
activity, generally of a useful sort, and others heavily politicised—with 
many NGOs being largely an extension of their political ‘mother parties’ 
or creations of foreign donors. These latter NGOs are unlikely to call into 
question a corrupt system they are inherently a part of, whereas the 
former ones will tend to stick to their local knitting. The monitoring 
activities of international NGOs and even the activities of the Office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, although useful in exposing 
and documenting the worst excesses of the combatants and the body 
politic, have brought about little major change.  
 
Ultimately, well-funded NGOs are ‘not more likely to develop networks of 
accountability to citizens’ (Tamang 2002: 320) or play a leading role in wider 
processes of social change; rather, their intermediary roles make them closer to 
donors that those they claim to represent. Despite evidence of the failures and flaws of 
donor funding (Bhatta 2012: 196; Tamang 2002: 329; Chintan 2000: 134), NGOs—as 
one of the primary actors of the contemporary idea of civil society—perpetuate 
current practice and the ideology of capitalist development in which it is framed. Any 
project that wants to challenge the status quo and the power of political society, 
however, has to mount a challenge that is both social and political. 
 
3.3.3. The revolutionary left after 1990 
The 1990 revolution was a turning point in Nepali political history. If the 1950–51 
revolution marked the end of a feudal dictatorship, ushering in not an entirely new 
order, but a 40-year transition that steadily weakened the old structures of power, then 
the 1990 revolution, in contrast, set Nepal on a trajectory where everything could be 
challenged—the monarchy, upper-caste rule, ethnic disparities and the stark class 
divisions that had characterised Nepali society for centuries. It was the beginning of a 
new kind of revolutionary process: it was the birth of Nepal’s democratic revolution. 
The Maoists were crucial agents in this process because they pursued and advanced it 
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from 1990 until the abolition of the monarchy in 2008, but then held it back and 
ultimately contained it. It was the Maoists, however, more than any other political 
force, who had recognised the objective possibility of fundamental social change in 
Nepal. They seized the opportunity, understanding that expectations for change 
immediately following the 1990 revolution were high. With the movement having 
forced the king to make major political concessions, the Maoists sensed there was an 
urgency—amongst women, ethnic minorities, and the poor in the countryside—to 
take the movement further rather than demobilise the population; for this they saw no 
other alternative to armed struggle (Mikesell 2001: 17). Whether this would 
democratise the economic sphere, in addition to the political, was another question.  
 
With the panchayat out of the way, the 1990s once again brought the battle of 
competing ideologies between the Left and Right to the fore. Post-revolution there 
was no single communist party that had a mass base; those calling for the 1990 
revolution to continue were marginal and disorganised. The most militant individuals 
in this camp were later to form the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist): they 
recognised the possibility of advancing the movement beyond the overthrow of the 
panchayat, and they denounced the Nepali Congress and moderate communists for 
calling off the movement once an agreement with the monarchy had been reached 
(Hoftun et al. 1999: 134). The political situation was in flux, and if the Left had 
grasped the need to capitalise on such a context, so did the right. The Nepali Congress 
and others, backed by the World Bank and an assortment of donors, vigorously began 
to pursue the path of liberalisation, modernisation and capitalist development. NGOs 
came in with hope and determination, and were accepted with open arms—first by the 
Kathmandu elite who had high hopes for development and, secondly, by ordinary 
people who believed that this time, unlike during the panchayat, they could also reap 
the benefits of development. Of course, the collapse of communist governments 
around the world had weakened the Left in Nepal, and there were divisions within the 
communist movement about the way forward. Much of the population went along 
with the promises of the mainstream approach to development: projects here and 
there, large and small, government and non-government, across a range of social 
sectors, would eventually lead to big changes. At least sections of the Left were 
sceptical of this approach, and embarked on the long process of developing the mass 
base necessary to challenge the existing political order.  
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The post-1990 context raised many questions for the Left. On what ideological 
premises should a mass base be developed? Should the Left concentrate forces on 
being an opposition to the Nepali Congress in parliament, or pursue an alternative 
politics that could expose the limits of bourgeois democracy? But how to criticise 
parliament in a context where millions of Nepalis had struggled for it, and won? The 
UML made its choices early on; it also gained considerable benefits from aligning 
itself with the growing NGO industry. But those to the left of the UML understood the 
limits of this approach. It was not merely a question of not trusting the palace to 
follow through with the concessions it had promised, but that those concessions 
would ultimately prove to be inadequate to address the vast array of Nepal’s social 
problems. The far left—along with virtually the entirety of the population—had 
plenty to be sceptical about given the record of corruption and power struggles within 
the establishment. Hutt (1993: 32) notes that they made ‘a hue and cry each time the 
king appeared to take decisions without what they considered sufficient 
consultation’.74 When King Birendra attempted to present his own draft of the 
constitution, for example, left parties, students and others came out onto the streets, 
burning copies of the palace draft. But the far left, dominated by the Maoists, also had 
more moderate left forces to deal with, forces that were always willing to compromise 
with the king. Those from the ULF who were part of the newly formed Constitution 
Recommendations Commission, including Bharat Mohan Adhikari, Madhav Kumar 
Nepal and Nirmal Lama (Malagodi 2013: 112) ‘virtually dismissed out of hand’ (Hutt 
1993: 36) concerns about language, ethnicity, religion and regional issues, which 
made up the vast majority of suggestions to the Commission. The Maoists would once 
again raise these issues, including the possibility of ethnic autonomy—a current 
source of debate in the restructuring process—in the 40-point document presented to 
the government before the start of war. The 40-point document itself reflected a 
realisation amongst the Maoists that the pledges made in the 1990 Constitution were a 
compromise. Others have argued the same. According to Hutt (1993: 42), the 
constitution ‘generally favoured the demands of the democratic movement, but still 
reserved important powers and privileges for the monarchy’, including emergency 
                                                
74 This included King Birendra’s formation, without consulting the new interim government, of a 
Constitution Reforms Recommendation Commission consisting of seven people who would 
recommend reforms to the 1962 Constitution and submit them to the king. Parties from across the 
political spectrum immediately rejected it, and a Constitution Recommendations Commission was 
formed, its members nominated by the prime minister, to draft a new constitution (Hutt 1993: 35).  
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powers, which King Gyanendra was to later use with dramatic effect. In her in-depth 
study of the 1990 Constitution, Malagodi (2013) also argues that the constitution 
came to represent a compromise, one that ultimately reinforced historical patterns of 
social and religious exclusion.  
 
But there was also a realisation amongst the Maoists that the party needed to organise 
in a new way in order for its demands to have any credibility with the wider public. 
The Maoists began to develop the position, based on an analysis of the material 
conditions and level of class struggle in Nepali society, as well as the international 
situation, that revolution in the form of armed struggle was the only option.75 In the 
Maoists’ strategy and tactics document adopted in March 1995, there were serious 
debates over how to transform the party from one that is used to ‘reformist and 
parliamentary activities’ (UCPN 2004: 21) into one focused on armed struggle. 
Various questions and concerns were raised:  
 
Is it possible to transform gradually through study, training, reformist 
struggle, and small scale resistance struggle? Or for that some leap, a 
rupture with the past, a decisive step or any big push is necessary? [sic] 
Will our Party be able to enter into armed struggle smoothly, without 
causing any damage to the fundamental class and organizational 
structure? After the start of the guerrilla war what will be its consequence 
and the process of its development? (UCPN 2004: 21) 
 
Later, in developing the theoretical premises for the People’s War, which were 
adopted in September 1995, the Maoists concluded that challenging state power was 
the principal goal, that ‘everything is an illusion except state power’ and that political 
power had to be captured ‘for the people’ (UCPN 2004: 24). Armed struggle would 
be initiated in rural Nepal, in areas where the Left was historically strong, and by 
uniting workers and poor peasants under the leadership of the Maoists. Although this 
strategy would have contradictory consequences and was ultimately unable to deliver 
on the broad and challenging tasks the Maoists set themselves, it would be unduly 
cynical to claim that the Maoists’ only intention from the beginning of the People’s 
War—and indeed the aim of the war—was to capture power for personal gain, to 
‘foment chaos, destroy all institutions and due process, and be there to reap the 
fallout’ (Dixit 2011: xiii). That the various anti-Maoist forces did reassert themselves 
                                                
75 These debates are further explained in Chapter 5. 
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in Nepal, managing to violently (and non-violently) counter the Maoists’ own use of 
violence, does not hold up as evidence that the Maoists’ project itself was purely self-
interested or irrational. This view, however, was a relatively predominant one 
amongst the ‘international community’ of donors and other Western observers, 
security and diplomatic circles and the Nepali elite, all of whom were mainly based in 
Kathmandu and were attempting to understand the Maoist movement—particularly 
after its escalation in 2001—not from a historical or materialist perspective but from a 
partial and arguably elitist perspective. It was also the prevailing view amongst most 
NGOs, whether it was those that were suffering from the lack of development space, 
or those that were documenting human rights violations on both sides, or those that 
were attempting to build peace or strengthen democracy.  
 
One of the more prominent figures in Nepal who holds a rather extreme version of 
this view is publisher, entrepreneur and writer Kanak Mani Dixit, who wrote that the 
Maoists’ People’s War was ‘an opportunistic game by what was then one small party, 
to get to centre-stage, utilising violence and populist rhetoric to bring young cadres 
and supporters to its side’ (2011: 30). While providing several useful insights, one of 
the many weaknesses of this particular piece of writing was, by his own admission, 
that it was not written based on social science scholarship (2011: xiv); this drawback, 
however, makes a serious response to his work all the more challenging. Dixit’s main 
criticisms of the Maoist movement are that it was based on violence and that it was 
‘built on a weak or non-existent philosophical foundation’ (2011: 43). The Maoists’ 
method of struggle was to take up arms, but the PLA was always subsumed under the 
leadership of the party, at least in theory. The number of hardcore fighters numbered 
in the thousands—cautious estimates range from 5,000 to 8,000 (ICG 2005a: 8)—a 
fraction of the hundreds of thousands of members and supporters across the country. 
In addition, the existence of trade unions, student unions, cultural groups, and various 
other organisations affiliated to the party suggests that the ideas driving the movement 
were more than only violence. Perhaps more significantly, Dixit’s criticisms imply a 
discounting of the ideas of Marxism—one of the most influential currents of modern 
thought over the past century—that have at least partly informed the Maoists’ project, 
and the decades of research and writing by various Nepali intellectuals who have 
subscribed to Marxist ideas.  
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Dixit’s approach is also conventional and nationalistic: any non-Nepali scholar, 
observer, activist or otherwise who is attempting to understand the movement and 
who expresses solidarity, a measure of support, the faintest agreement with the 
Maoists or even a plausible explanation for their actions, are branded as outsiders who 
do not, according to Dixit ‘recognise the fundamental desire of the people’ (2011: 78) 
for peace, democracy and social justice.76 There are several problems with this 
approach. First, the ends are confused with the means: there is little disagreement with 
the goal of social justice from across the political spectrum; what is contentious is the 
means to achieve it, and the theoretical and ideological foundations on which these 
means are based. Second, Dixit is in danger of speaking for ‘the people’ in the same 
way that he accuses the Maoists of claiming to represent the will of the people (2011: 
30). Third, criticisms launched against international observers on the basis that they 
are non-Nepali, and not on the content of their views, is patronising. Dixit himself 
concedes ‘the danger of falling into the pit of xenophobia’ (2011: 73), and while he 
does not deny the role of internationals, he asks whether ‘it is not too much to ask for 
a sense of humility from the guest, to expect that he or she learn the reality of the host 
society rather than look at its players as one-dimensional caricatures’ (2011: 73). But 
this assumes that it is impossible to understand Nepal at all, since this understanding 
is not merely a question of which passport one holds. Ultimately, by focusing solely 
on the secondary aspects of the Maoist movement and not challenging it with a rival 
socio-political theory, Dixit’s arguments cannot explain the dynamic of the 
movement, nor the popular support it once enjoyed.   
 
Leading scholars such as Shah and Onta are also sceptical of the Maoists’ project. 
Shah (2004: 206) explains that the government was reluctant to use ‘the legitimate 
force at its disposal’ because of a lack of political will and unity within Nepal’s new 
ruling class, and a political culture that to some extent identified with the Maoists’ 
progressive, anti-establishment and populist approach, having spent decades in exile 
and opposition itself. Elsewhere Shah authoritatively documents and analyses a 
specific ‘revolt event’ (2008b: 494) where local women rose up against the Maoists’ 
new regime in Dailekh, western Nepal. Onta argues that were it not for the duplicity 
of the political, commercial and civil society sectors in Nepali society, the Maoist 
                                                
76 UNMIN and the International Crisis Group are singled out for particular censure (Dixit 2011: 77). 
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movement would not have had fertile ground in which to flourish. The duplicity and 
corruption of civil society ‘has failed to provide a strong collective resistance to the 
Maoists, be it ideological or organisational’, and the Maoists have been able to 
‘advance their political agenda with relative ease’ (Onta 2004: 144). Onta also singles 
out the king for ensuring that ‘the army was never a serious threat to the Maoists’ 
(2004: 144), at least for the first half of the People’s War; the media, for not being 
determined enough to expose the Maoists’ excesses (2004: 148); and left intellectuals, 
many of whom lack the organisational backing to effectively counter Maoist 
propaganda (2004: 150). Similarly, the reports and journal articles produced by 
various strategic, defence and diplomatic think tanks focus on an analysis in which the 
starting point is the Maoists’ violence and not their political positions; this kind of 
engagement centres mainly on military solutions, only secondarily on non-military 
solutions and even more rarely at a political or theoretical level. 
 
Aside from whatever one may think of the Maoists’ ideology, they have been unable 
to accomplish what they set out to, even by their own standards. But these failings do 
not constitute a justification for the dismissal of movement’s goals. At least three 
factors support the view that the Maoists’ failings were not intentional or the result of 
inherent corruption or deceit: the self-sacrifice and commitment of the vast majority 
of Maoists, from the rank and file to the leadership—at least initially—up to and 
including death; the hundreds of documents produced, based on a theoretical and 
scientific analysis of the possibilities for social change; and the Maoists’ success in 
mobilising hundreds of thousands of people across Nepal to support the goals of the 
revolution. Disagreement with the Maoists’ theoretical position or the use of 
particular strategies or tactics is a reasonable response; but characterising the Maoists’ 
project as entirely self-interested is not only to misunderstand its historico-political 
dynamic, but suggests that the millions who supported them are victims of false 
consciousness or essentially lacking agency.  
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IV. NGOs and the de-radicalisation of the UML 
 
The communist movement in Nepal has an admirable and animated history, rooted in 
the independence struggle in India, driven by a desire to end poverty and inequality in 
Nepal and elsewhere, characterised by moderate and militant tendencies, and not 
immune to the pressures of factions and splits that plague much of the Left throughout 
the world. If NGOs in Nepal share the same ambition as the left parties of ending 
poverty and inequality, then the debate between the Left and the NGO industry is 
essentially over one of approach. This chapter explores how sections of the Left, in 
particular the UML, became inseparable from the work and role of NGOs. It begins 
with the origins of the UML, analyses the sharpening contradictions of the UML 
following the introduction of multiparty democracy, and argues that not only has the 
NGO industry had a role in the transformation of the UML from a left-wing party into 
a centrist party, but that the UML itself has served to strengthen the role of NGOs in 
Nepal. The transformation of the UML has allowed NGOs to hegemonise civil society 
space in Nepal, promote a moderate and relatively ineffectual approach to social 
change, and discredit comparably militant approaches that at least have the potential 
to challenge the ruling elite. The UML’s decisions following the 1990 revolution have 
had a number of consequences, including their failure to challenge the process of 
liberalisation that began in the mid-1980s and the loss of a progressive vision, which 
has been at least partly responsible for exacerbating the political and economic crisis 
in Nepal, and undermining prospects for fundamental social change. 
 
4.1. Origins of the UML 
Amidst the fragmentation of the original CPN, which began over the Sino-Soviet split 
of the early 1960s, there was also a series of mergers over the years, particularly with 
the CPN (Marxist-Leninist). As described in Chapter 2, the CPN (ML) was 
established in 1978 and had its roots in the 1971 Jhapa rebellion. It dominated the 
1979 student movement but also began to work underground in several districts across 
the country in the late 1970s and 80s, setting up ‘base areas’ and developing a 
network of support (Shneiderman 2010: 50). Villages were chosen on the basis of two 
factors: the density of landless, agricultural labourers and poor peasants, and the 
remoteness of the area from urban centres (Hachhethu 2002: 59). During that time 
CPN (ML) cadres undertook the patient work of organising amongst villagers and, 
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although the party had made a decision to distance itself from its Naxalite-inspired 
origins shortly after its formation, and replaced the tactics of armed revolution with 
building front organisations following the defeat of the Jhapa rebellion (2002: 61), 
CPN (ML) cadres continued to be treated as terrorists by the panchayat regime 
(Shneiderman 2009: 295).77 According to Hachhethu (2002: 61), the CPN (ML)’s 
strategy was characterised by ‘organisational flexibility, penetration, non-
confrontation, and maximisation of political space’. Shneiderman (2003; 2009; 2010) 
shows how in the village of Piskar in the eastern district of Sindhupalchok, CPN (ML) 
cadres were successful in using this strategy to introduce communist ideas and 
produce a heightened political consciousness. But like other communist parties, by the 
late 1980s the CPN (ML) had already accepted the idea that ‘conventional multiparty 
democracy could be a stage on the road to achieving naulo janabad [new people’s 
democracy] (Hoftun et al. 1999: 238) because of the ‘semi-feudal, semi-colonial’ 
nature of Nepal. It was the CPN (ML) that merged with the CPN (Marxist) after the 
success of the 1990 movement, to form the UML.78 While the UML was historically 
one of the most popular communist parties in Nepal, its rightward shift generated 
disillusionment amongst its supporters, leaving them open to Maoist recruitment in 
the late 1990s (Shneiderman 2010: 47). 
 
Several factors explain the widespread acceptance of communist ideas in the 1970s 
and 80s, despite efforts to contain them: the active intervention of communist leaders 
in developing the political consciousness of villagers in base areas; the response of the 
state to heightened political activity; and the interaction between politics and 
consciousness within the movement (Shneiderman 2010: 74). Shneiderman argues 
that the success of the Maoists in Piskar can be traced back to the history of political 
organising by the CPN (ML): ‘There is no question that it was the CPN (ML) activists 
who first built a communist consciousness in the area, which the [Maoists] took 
advantage of later’ (2010: 74). Again, the conventional view of the communist 
movement is that people joined out of fear and coercion; that villagers were seen as 
victims of a false consciousness; and that people were caught between a repressive 
                                                
77 By and large the communists were treated with particular disdain by the panchayat regime. However, 
at times the palace used the communists to undermine the oppositional strength of the Nepali Congress, 
granting limited concessions to the CPN (ML) and their underground activities. The CPN (ML) also 
took pains to maintain personal rapport with local panchayat administrators (Hachhethu 2002: 61).   
78 The UML split in 1998 due to personal differences amongst the leadership, but reunited again in 
2002 (Shneiderman 2010: 51). 
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state on the one hand and the violence of the Maoists on the other—as if these forces 
were of equal weight and as vicious as the other. Contrary to this view, Shneiderman 
(2009: 292) argues that those who formed the rank and file of the movement were 
exercising agency when they joined the movement. Furthermore, given the experience 
of peasant life, supporting or actively participating in the communist movement can 
be understood as logical (2009: 292). While it is important to question the motivation 
of people who joined the movement, the conventional view denies the agency of 
villagers. That Piskar residents subsequently supported the Maoists was not 
inevitable, but neither was it incomprehensible.  
 
As the communist parties were celebrating the end of the panchayat era in Nepal, they 
also had to contend with new realities following the end of the Cold War, causing 
intense debate within the movement. The communists themselves had recognised the 
need to justify their continued relevance in a context when a global consensus seemed 
to be emerging about the ostensible victory of capitalism over communism, when 
Russia and to some extent China were adopting neoliberal economic policies, and 
when democratic revolutions were taking place across Eastern Europe, and 
Tiananmen Square had erupted in protest but ended in the brutal suppression of 
protesters by the Chinese Communist Party. As Hoftun et al. (1999: 238) put it, ‘the 
communists desperately needed to defend an ideology which was manifestly dying 
elsewhere in the world and show that it was still politically viable for Nepal’. Despite 
factionalism and disunity within the movement, it had steadily gained support 
throughout the panchayat years. As described in Chapter 2, one of the main sources of 
disagreement following the 1990 change was over whether to participate in the 
parliamentary system, exposing it from within or from the outside, or reject it 
altogether. There were many communists—even from the early days of the 
panchayat—who had felt that working within the system was the best way to achieve 
their goals (1999: 235). The panchayat stressed class co-ordination instead of class 
struggle, but the interpretation of class struggle by many communists was closer to 
class co-ordination; several communist parties professed not a dictatorship of the 
proletariat but an alliance between classes—in particular the peasantry and the 
national capitalists, in the absence of a large industrial working class. In practice, this 
alliance was meant to operate under the leadership of the communists themselves 
(1999: 235). This interpretation would lay the foundation for unity and moderation, 
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based on a compromise with Marxist principles and a formal abandonment of Maoism 
(1999: 238); it became the strategy for large sections of the communist movement, 
and they would be rewarded with positions of power.  
 
4.2. The UML and its contradictions 
The product of a series of splits and mergers, with a history that could be traced back 
to the rebellion in Jhapa, the UML forged its strength on the basis of a compromise 
with the ruling elite. There were ongoing debates within the party over whether to 
engage in armed struggle or stand in elections, but forces within the party that 
favoured parliamentary politics won decisively, and the UML managed to establish 
itself as the communist alternative in parliament, promoting an image of moderation 
(Upreti 2009: 45). It was argued that given the underdeveloped nature of the urban 
proletariat, and the fact that the Jhapa uprising had failed to make advances, the party 
had to place ‘greater concentration upon proselytising amongst the middle class’ 
(Brown 1996: 100). When it took part in the 1991 elections, it won a respectable 69 
out of 205 seats. Its election manifesto argued for the need for building infrastructure 
and implementing social services—much like the Congress manifesto—but with an 
emphasis on land reform aimed at ending feudal land ownership, which involved 
reducing the land ceiling, ending dual ownership of land and introducing rights to the 
tiller (Hachhethu 2007: 145). The UML proposed reservations for disadvantaged 
groups and for making the Upper House of parliament an assembly of minority ethnic 
groups.79 Other social policies included the abolition of untouchability and bonded 
labour; free education up to secondary level and the right to primary education in any 
mother tongue; price controls and the distribution of ration cards; and the abrogation 
of the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty, as well as attempting to create a balanced foreign 
policy towards China and India. On questions of the economy, the UML wanted to 
create a ‘self-sufficient nationalist economy’ (2007: 146) but otherwise favoured 
selective privatisation and liberalisation and the expansion of the private sector. The 
UML espoused relatively progressive policies on paper, particularly in terms of social 
welfare, but was unable to fully implement them in practice. In part this was due to its 
weak position in government; if it wanted to pass any radical policies in parliament 
this depended on the main opposition parties abstaining. What is clear is that its 
                                                
79 Despite this relatively radical proposal, the UML was unable to implement it; as will be shown in 
Chapter 6, it was the Maoists who seriously attempted to address the ethnic question. 
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position as a communist party in Nepal from the late 1980s onwards, in the context of 
Congress hegemony, and a culturally strong but politically weak monarchy, put the 
UML in an uncomfortable place, which made for a contradictory ideology. 
 
In the new democratic context, in which the UML emerged as the largest communist 
party, it held its fifth congress in 1993. This congress is considered to be one of the 
most significant meetings of the party, not only because it took place post-1990 and 
after the unification of the two main communist currents, but because it marked the 
UML’s historic shift to the right.80 Formally, the congress had adopted multiparty 
democracy, which included pluralism, the rule of law and human rights as its political 
programme. Madan Bhandari, who headed the more conservative group within the 
party, proposed this line under the banner of bahudaliya janabad [multiparty people’s 
democracy]. Bhandari was ultimately credited with being the chief architect of the 
transformation of the UML into a moderate party (Hachhethu 2002: 177). Although it 
was adopted as the dominant line, the party nevertheless continued to suffer from 
factionalism and a polarisation between moderate forces and those that believed the 
party had compromised its principles. A more radical group associated with C.P. 
Mainali, a veteran of the Jhapa uprising and one of its key figures, continued to argue 
for a programme of naulo janabad [new people’s democracy]. It was not that 
Bhandari believed that communism was unsuitable for Nepal, but that it could only be 
achieved under certain objective conditions, which were absent in the aftermath of the 
democracy movement, given that ‘the balance of national and international forces 
were extremely unfavourable to the UML’ (Brown 1996: 185). While working within 
the system entailed an acceptance of the monarchy, such ideological compromises 
were believed to be temporary (1996: 186). These divisions were never fully resolved. 
Only two months later, Bhandari was mysteriously killed in a car accident along with 
Jeev Raj Ashrit, a central committee member.81 Madhav Kumar Nepal was elected 
general secretary. The UML subsequently won the mid-term elections of 1994, 
securing 88 seats compared to the Congress’ 83 seats out of 205. Only 15 seats short 
of a majority, the UML formed a minority government (1996: 195). Man Mohan 
                                                
80 Interview with Ganashyam Bhusal, Kathmandu, 25 February 2010. 
81 The rumour was that the two men were poisoned before their jeep plunged into the Trisuli River; 
there was no evidence of this, but neither was there evidence that the deaths were accidental. 
According to Brown (1996: 187), the impact of Bhandari’s death was immense, as he was seen to be a 
leader that could hold the party together amidst ideological disputes.  
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Adhikari became the first communist leader to become prime minister, to the surprise 
of the international media, though he was considered more of a social democrat than a 
communist (1996: 197). While the UML had broken the tradition that only the Nepali 
Congress had the monopoly to govern (Gupta 1994: 3191), the party served a mere 
nine months in office before being ousted again by the Congress.  
 
4.2.1. UML in government 
For nine months beginning in November 1994, Nepal had the distinction of being the 
only country in the world with a democratically elected communist government under 
a Hindu monarchy (Shneiderman 2010: 51). During its tenure, the UML government 
headed by Man Mohan Adhikari was concerned mainly with consolidating party 
organisations and using state machinery to build a support base. For example, it 
appointed UML cadre to secretarial positions in various ministries and as Chief 
District Officers, and replaced almost all the executive boards of public corporations 
with UML supporters (Poudyal 1996: 211). The UML government was constantly 
under attack from the Nepali Congress, but the left-wing UPF also criticised the UML 
for failing to challenge the liberalisation policies of the Congress and intensifying 
unemployment and inflation (1996: 211). The populist and controversial Afno Gaun 
Afai Banau [Build Your Village Yourself] campaign, whereby Rs. 300,000 was 
distributed to each of the 4,000 Village Development Committees (VDCs) across the 
country, was an attempt at decentralisation and making villages the focal point for 
development. The scheme would be administered by central government and 
monitored by special committees representing the political parties and the electorate 
(Hoftun et al. 1999: 208). The programme was criticised for being ‘a perfidious 
means of extending and consolidating the UML’s party organisation in the villages’ 
(Brown 1996: 201), but it was credited for creating expectations amongst the 
population that put pressure on subsequent governments to continue at least some of 
the welfare measures the UML had begun (1996: 225). The UML also instituted a 
Land Reform Commission to undertake a series of land reforms financed through 
foreign loans, and attempted to introduce more transparency in the bureaucracy, partly 
by replacing various government posts and Chief District Officers with communist 
sympathisers (1996: 198). Ultimately, however, the UML could scarcely be 
distinguished from the Nepali Congress. While it prevented the Congress’ 
privatisation plans from moving forward, it failed to propose its own alternative 
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development strategies (Upreti 2009: 46). From the perspective of the radical left, the 
UML was a ‘comprador bourgeois organisation’ incapable of radicalism because it 
had sanitised its politics in order to compete with the Congress on an electoral plane 
(Brown 1996: 187).82 The Maoists in particular recognised the problems with the 
UML as early as the mid-1990s, before taking the decision to start the People’s War. 
Bhattarai (Human Rights Server 1995) had forcefully argued: ‘The CPN-UML is an 
extreme right revisionist party, which has degenerated into an openly reactionary one 
after it vowed to serve and strengthen the existing constitutional multiparty system 
and formed its own government under this rotten reactionary system’. 
 
On an international level, in order to allay potential fears donors might have had about 
working with a communist government, the UML had to contain any lingering or 
prospective radicalism, pursuing policies acceptable to Western interests. According 
to Padma Ratna Tuladhar: 
 
One thing is clear, when any party decides their strategy or objectives to 
be based on national and international circumstances they will be 
compelled to have a pragmatic policy. So UML also thought that any 
armed revolution is not possible in Nepal, because India is there, America 
is there, and in those days the king backed by a strong military was there. 
So in the communist movement they had serious discussions amongst 
themselves, and they split along this line into several groups. One group 
said, for the emancipation of Nepali people from all kinds of exploitation, 
armed struggle—armed revolution—is the only option. There is no [other] 
option. But others said this is not the time. Because the imperialists are 
very strong, they could support [the establishment] with arms, even 
intervene. The feudals, the capitalists are very strong, and a strong 
military was there.83 
 
All of the UML’s relatively progressive policies in the 1991 manifesto, amongst 
others, were upheld in its 1994 election manifesto, but the shift away from 
progressive, social democratic politics became apparent in its 1999 manifesto and 
subsequent policies and, to some extent during its time in government. To start with, 
the proposal for equal property rights for women was dropped in favour of 
programmes to ‘uplift womenfolk’; republicanism was abandoned and constitutional 
                                                
82 It is important to note, however, that popular support for the far left also eroded in the years 
following the 1991 election, in which Bhattarai’s UFPN secured nine seats; the reason for this was 
because, according to Brown (1996: 194), ‘the public was thoroughly weary of its repeated calls for 
general strikes which brought chaos without any apparent results’.  
83 Interview with Padma Ratna Tuladhar, Kathmandu, 10 May 2010. 
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monarchy became central; abrogation of the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty was amended to 
calling for a review of the treaty; and support for privatisation in the areas of trade, 
commerce, finance, industry, tourism and urban development was, according to 
Hachhethu (2007: 149), ‘allegedly adopted in order to satisfy Western donor 
countries’. But while the UML’s economic policy favoured an increased role for the 
private sector, including encouraging greater foreign investment, creating joint public-
private partnerships and privatising public industries that were losing profits, the 
UML was able to stop further privatisation, which had been initiated by the Nepali 
Congress (2007: 149). The UML was also credited with introducing subsidies, which 
kept the prices of essential goods in check (Hachhethu 2002: 235). Thus although the 
UML’s election manifesto for the 1994 elections promised land reform, jobs and 
homes, and a review of the unequal treaties between Nepal and India (Brown 1996: 
193), the UML’s transition into a party of the mainstream had already taken place. 
Khadka (1997: 1054) notes that while the UML had once been opposed to aid from 
imperialist countries, it immediately declared its commitment to liberal economic 
policies and foreign investment after coming to power; and in order to alleviate the 
fears of donors, the new UML government claimed that foreign policy would no 
longer be pegged to ideology (1997: 1055). Brown (1996: 196) cites several factors 
that forced Nepali Congress and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party, a right-wing pro-
monarchy party that won 20 seats, to sanction the new communist government in 
1994. First, the country could not afford the cost of another general election; second, 
no single party was in a position to mount another election campaign; third, in order 
to preserve the credibility of the relatively new multiparty system, the democratic 
process had to be seen to be working efficiently and the Nepali Congress did not want 
to be seen to be obstructing this process; and finally, the opposition parties were keen 
to see the UML fail to implement the ostensibly utopian promises it made as an 
opposition party before the election, thereby damaging its credibility. Predictably, the 
UML was unable to live up to its manifesto; however, because it was identified with 
equality, justice and land reform, it was genuinely popular with young people and the 
poor (1996: 163). When the Maoists were later to expose the limits of the UML’s 
moderation, the UML responded by accusing the Maoists of engaging in terrorism 
(Upreti 2009: 107). UML’s fear was that the hegemony it had held within the 
communist movement in Nepal was now being undermined.  
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4.2.2. Relations between the communists and the Nepali Congress 
Relations between the UML and the Nepali Congress at times only served to 
exacerbate the UML’s contradictions. Although the CPN and the Nepali Congress 
originated from the same anti-imperialist tradition, and both B.P. Koirala and Man 
Mohan Adhikari participated in the Biratnagar Jute Mill strike and the Quit India 
Movement (Tewari 2001: 96), they differed on several fundamental issues. First there 
was the question of the monarchy. The Nepali Congress had opposed the Ranas, but 
considered the king ‘a friend of the revolution’ (2001: 112), and had the backing of 
the Indian government in its support for the monarchy. Historically at least, the 
communists had rallied against the monarchy as a reactionary institution. Second, 
having been created in opposition to the Nepali Congress—a party with the backing 
of the powerful Indian National Congress—the UML also had differences over 
whether to take an adversarial approach to India, given its expansionist ambitions in 
the Nepali economy and administration, and its support for the ruling elite in 
Kathmandu (Khadka 1995: 63). Finally, on the question of whether to push for 
reforms or pursue revolution, the Congress and the communists were intense political 
rivals. Almost from its inception, there were disagreements within the CPN over 
which approach to party building could challenge the hegemony of the Nepali 
Congress and provide an alternative political programme capable of realising 
communist ideals. Dilemmas over how to take the communist movement forward 
under what were perceived to be unfavourable conditions—combined with the 
constant pull towards moderation, particularly after the Cold War—have been 
common features of the communist parties in Nepal.  
 
The communists had employed a range of policies to deal with the Nepali Congress, 
from outright opposition and confrontation to proposing united fronts. In the 1950s, 
the communists launched a fierce anti-Congress campaign when the Congress 
attempted to exclude it from the movement to overthrow the Rana regime and then 
accepted the terms of the Delhi Compromise. In the 1960s, after the king’s takeover 
of power, the moderate communist parties entered into an alliance with the Congress, 
but gave up the strategy when it offered unconditional support to the king in 1968 
(1995: 71). As both parties were banned under the panchayat, the possibility of joint 
struggle existed, but it was not until April 1990 that co-operation between the parties 
materialised. Differences amongst the communists over how the Nepali Congress 
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should be dealt with became embedded within the communist tradition in Nepal; these 
differences sharpened during and after the People’s War as moderate communist 
parties—in particular the UML—consolidated earlier moves to the right, vacillating 
between whether to view the king or the Nepali Congress as the bigger enemy. 
Khadka (1995) describes the factionalism within the communist movement in Nepal 
in some detail; but these debates were not trivial or gratuitous—they were serious 
theoretical and tactical debates and, for the pragmatists, the monarchy was considered 
to be the only force that could balance the divergent interests of India and China. On 
balance, however, between the competing ideologies of the Congress and the 
communists and their influence on the mass of the population, more has been stacked 
against the communists over the past several decades than that of the Congress. After 
all, the Congress also had the backing of the US, whose primary objective in Nepal, as 
described earlier, was to counter the spread of communism. 
 
4.3. Embracing NGO ideology 
There is a widespread perception in Nepal that the UML is linked to the largest and 
most influential NGOs in the country.84 This perception is not unfounded, and is 
discussed in the mainstream media. Jha (Republica 2010: 6) argues that links between 
the UML and the NGOs have had a negative impact on the functioning of the party 
and on its public image, contributing to a degeneration of the party in which cadres 
are more concerned with NGO affiliations than the party. In December 2011 UML 
Chairman Jhala Nath Khanal tabled a 12-point proposal barring senior leaders from 
engaging in NGO work without permission from the party, with UML Secretary 
Yubaraj Gyawali adding that all NGOs involving senior party leaders would come 
under the control of the party, and that the party would take decisions on how to 
operate them (Ekantipur 2011). The ideological shift of the UML towards establishing 
and leading NGOs—perhaps more than any other indicator—both demonstrates and 
partly explains the UML’s rightward trajectory. By embracing NGOs from the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the UML was able to deal with some of the pressures it faced, 
both in government and as a communist party in opposition. Thus the establishment of 
NGOs was a deliberate, strategic move on the part of the UML. Senior leaders within 
the UML acknowledge this: 
                                                
84 The UML is commonly referred to as the ‘NGO party’ and the perception is that the NGOs ate the 
UML i.e. that it is dominated by foreign funding and therefore beholden to foreign donors. 
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In Nepal as a political party we are very near to NGOs, very near to 
NGOs. This is because we sent some of our good cadres to start the NGO 
movement. So from the first convention of the NGO Federation, we had 
good relations with all NGOs, all NGOs. We trust [our cadres] and we 
gave them responsibilities, those that we could not manage in the name of 
our party. The UML has strategically set up NGOs. We divided our 
people in different sectors. They work there according to our principles, 
according to our belief.85  
 
There were three main reasons for the development of these links, which relate to 
both internal and external pressures on the UML. As it consolidated its position in the 
Nepali political landscape, there were several pressures the UML faced. First, with the 
end of the Cold War and the ostensible death of communism, the UML was under 
considerable pressure to reinvent itself as a viable electoral alternative with a relevant 
ideology, particularly given the splits that had characterised the Left over the previous 
40 years.86 While the Nepali Congress came to be fully accepted by the donor 
community, the UML still faced the stigma of being a communist party in the new 
post-communist world. It responded by adopting a human rights discourse that 
allowed it to cultivate links with the international community and NGOs, and create a 
perception that it was a communist party willing to modernise itself. It also became a 
champion for the signing of a number of international human rights treaties. This put 
pressure on the Nepali Congress, because the UML could then use human rights 
treaties to criticise Congress policies. Members of the UML leadership were not 
always comfortable with this policy. Some sensed that NGOs were not neutral 
organisations and that behind them stood foreign donors, with their own interests that 
were likely to conflict with those of ordinary Nepalis. There was also a perception 
that NGOs were vehicles for the pursuit of more general, ideological goals: 
 
I don’t have any kind of proof but I think donors have an ideological 
drive. Why do they demand proposals that they like? Why can’t they 
accept programmes made by local people in their own interests? There is 
a conflict between donors and local people. If I give money to someone 
I’m giving him my own ideology too, at the same time.87 
 
                                                
85 Interview with Pradip Nepal, Kathmandu, 15 February 2010. 
86 Interview with Padma Ratna Tuladhar, Kathmandu, 10 May 2010. 
87 Interview with Pradip Nepal, Kathmandu, 15 February 2010. 
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Younger leading members of the party go further and argue that if the UML is to have 
an orientation against neoliberalism it must also fight an ideological and practical 
campaign against NGOs. NGOs are seen as being used deliberately by the donors to 
disorientate opposition movements. They are accused of organisationally defusing 
opposition movements, but also of disarming them theoretically by promoting a 
mainstream neoliberal ideology:   
 
We need to make young people more ideological, and the next generation 
will definitely be anti-NGO. The issues revolutionary communist parties 
raise, the NGOs are now raising. This is confusing people. To defuse the 
revolution, they [donors] deploy NGOs. We need to agitate, and it is the 
young generation we need to influence. And then the NGOs will not be 
able to survive. There is a lack of clarity about NGOs on a theoretical 
level and what they are trying to do.88 
 
The fact is, however, that integral relations with NGOs have become so normalised 
within the UML, that while there is clearly a growing perception of antagonistic 
interests between the NGOs and at least the more radical sections of the party, there is 
also a certain sense of fatalism about the possibility of reversing the direction of the 
party. The result is that even the younger generation of UML cadre vacillate between 
talking about the need for confronting this question, and the need for maintaining 
political consensus within the party. One central committee member admitted to 
growing discomfort with the ubiquity of NGOs within the party, and a strong sense 
that their influence has generated deep problems. But he also suggested that the 
debate about NGOs has subsided within the organisation and that it will only become 
a live political issue some time in the future:  
 
Some years before, it was a matter of deliberation and debate within the 
UML. But not now. We have become accustomed to these NGO officials. 
But there is a ground to contradict with this direction [sic]. In the days to 
come this matter will be a matter of debate within the party.89 
 
As suggested in Chapter 2, working with NGOs provided two major assets for the 
UML: funding, which was necessary for the fledgling party, and a liberal ideology 
that was backed by the international community. Since many UML members worked 
for the party full-time, unlike Congress members, the party needed funds to pay these 
                                                
88 Interview with Ram Kumari Jhankri, Kathmandu, 29 April 2010. 
89 Interview with Ganashyam Bhusal, Kathmandu, 25 February 2010. 
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workers. Developing links with international human rights organisations for projects 
in Nepal meant that the party could draw on these funds, and NGOs came to play 
useful roles in channelling money to the party.  
 
The second major advantage of its close relations with NGOs concerned its roots in 
Nepali society. As it was almost always in opposition and rarely leading government, 
the UML also needed to develop an alternative support base at local level to rival the 
Nepali Congress. Following the 1990 democracy movement, the Nepali Congress 
took in many former panchayat politicians as members, and grew to be the biggest 
and most influential party in Nepali politics. The UML developed its own base of 
support by working through the NGOs at local levels, and finally in Kathmandu and 
through networks across the country.  
 
In the beginning when the NGOs came to Nepal, they hired UML people, 
UML cadres. They were NGO-paid workers. Because they had the 
capacity to go the people, they had a base. I can share with you one thing. 
You know Devendra Raj Panday. He hired most of the cadres from UML. 
But in decision-making, [there was] no UML. Because UML [came] from 
the people’s movement, they were in the [NGO] movement from the 
beginning, [and] now they are masters of NGOs.90 
 
Finally, there has been a factional dynamic within the party over the relationship with 
NGOs. Conservative forces inside the UML have long faced pressures from the more 
radical communists over various aspects of its political vision, in particular its support 
for constitutional monarchy and what this means for the transition to socialism, and 
whether to launch a struggle against the Nepali Congress. The resources and the 
ideological support provided by NGOs were invaluable to ensuring that those leaders 
arguing for peaceful social transformation came to the fore. Initially arguing for 
civilian control over the army and a secular state, the UML compromised on 
constitutional monarchy, whose powers were ill defined. This marked the ideological 
shift of the UML to the right, but many observers argue that this shift had already 
started by the late 1980s.91 Although the party retains some elements of former 
progressive policies, it has been supportive of neoliberal reforms. As the largest 
                                                
90 Interview with Ganashyam Bhusal, Kathmandu, 25 February 2010. 
91 Interview with Muma Ram Khanal, Kathmandu, 27 April 2010. 
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communist party before the rise to prominence of the Maoists, it has been unable to 
withstand these very real internal and external pressures. 
 
4.4. The transformation of the UML 
Three main tactical shifts taken in the early 1990s reflect the UML’s wider strategic 
transformation. The first was distancing itself from its radical past. Quoting a senior 
UML party member, Hoftun et al. (1999: 240) explain the UML’s reorientation: ‘Our 
extreme thinking and violent movement had to change. The situation of the country 
was no longer favourable to an armed revolution, so we changed ourselves and 
reformed our thinking’. The second shift was to adopt a commitment to pluralism. In 
October 1991 the party embraced support for ‘multiparty people’s democracy’ instead 
of ‘new people’s democracy’, which almost all the communist factions had agreed on 
at the end of the 1980s. The final tactic was an acceptance of the monarchy and an 
abandonment of republicanism, which Hoftun et al. (1999: 241) note ‘showed signs of 
evolving into long-term accommodation’. Sahana Pradhan, who had led the ULF 
coalition of communist parties that initiated the 1990 people’s movement for 
democracy together with the Nepali Congress, put it explicitly: ‘The world is 
changing and we shouldn’t be dogmatic… We decided it was better to join hands with 
the Congress and say we believe in constitutional monarchy and the multi-party 
system. For these things we believe that peaceful methods should be used. We no 
longer believe in violence’ (1999: 242). The goal was to unite on a social democratic 
platform rather than a communist one; to the extent that the UML kept any communist 
principles, communism came to be interpreted from a national perspective, a 
particular Nepali form of communism that emphasised national conditions, which 
included consideration of Nepal’s semi-feudal economy and the role of the Hindu 
monarch in Nepali society. 
 
The UML has faced an ideological dilemma since its shift to the right. Although it had 
participated actively in the democratic movement of 1990 as a communist party, it 
indirectly promoted the idea that democracy and communism are incompatible: on the 
one hand it wanted to dissociate itself from the radical communists in order to 
maintain its reputation as a party with faith in the democratic parliamentary process; 
on the other, it wanted to maintain its association with the communist movement 
insofar as it represented the poor and oppressed (Upreti 2009: 46; Brown 1996: 186). 
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According to Brown (1996: 186), its success in elections only reinforced the dominant 
view within the party that political progress could be achieved more quickly through 
the ballot box than through a revolutionary line. The UML thus adopted a dual policy, 
and its distinguishing feature became its centrism, not giving ground to the relatively 
radical elements within the party but at the same time having to prove its communist 
credentials by developing and defending progressive policies. Although it has 
remained an opposition party for much of its existence, the real challenge to the UML 
came not from the Nepali Congress but from those to the left of the UML (Gupta 
1993: 1916). The decline of the UML as a political alternative has been in part 
because of its declining base in the rural areas—this base having been captured by the 
Maoists—and in part because of its ideological and strategic vacillation between the 
Maoists and the Nepali Congress. Following the entry of the Maoists into the 
mainstream, the UML has been reduced to a poor third position, after the Nepali 
Congress. This was confirmed by the CA election results, in which the Maoists’ 
popularity became an undisputed fact. Since then the party has neither been able to 
appeal to the mass of the population, many of whom were radicalised during the war, 
nor to liberal democrats, because of its communist tag. The evolution of communist 
parties into moderate, centrist parties is a common story, but in Nepal it has been a 
story with NGOs at its core. Through the mediation of NGOs, Nepal’s perceived 
dependence on international aid and the apparent necessity to attract foreign 
investment has helped ensure that the UML gradually compromised its radicalism, 
and consolidated its ideological shift rightward.  
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V. Reluctant revolutionaries: Maoists and the NGOs 
 
This chapter analyses the emergence of the Maoists’ People’s War in Nepal and 
describes the Maoists’ analysis of, engagement with, and policy towards NGOs. 
Although the Maoists were conscious of the UML’s transformation, and instituted a 
relatively determined anti-NGO policy in strategic base areas during the war in an 
attempt to prevent the same kind of co-option, they—like the UML—ultimately made 
the decision not to challenge the NGOs. This decision was made towards the end of 
the war and opened the way for an accommodation with NGOs at different levels, and 
which had profound effects. Given the identification of NGOs with the state, any 
convergence with NGOs in effect meant not only reinforcing NGOs as the dominant 
force in civil society but also adopting an approach to social change that failed to 
fundamentally challenge the status quo. The chapter also draws on field research 
conducted in the districts of Rolpa and Rukum—the most prominent Maoist base 
areas—and considers the history of specific donor projects in these districts that 
appear to have had some influence over the emergence of left-wing consciousness in 
the region. It argues that the Maoists’ choice of developing Rolpa and Rukum as the 
heartland of the movement is not unconnected to the history of both left-wing activity 
and donor projects in the region, but that the Maoists’ policy during the war and in the 
post-war period seems contradictory.  
 
5.1. Origins of the Maoist movement 
In November 1990, months after the people’s movement had been called off, the 
Fourth Congress and Mashal came together to form a new, self-proclaimed 
revolutionary party called CPN (Unity Centre), with Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka 
Prachanda) as general secretary. Leading a split away from Masal following a 
disagreement with Mohan Bikram Singh over whether to participate in the 1991 
elections, Baburam Bhattarai joined the Unity Centre, and the new party consolidated 
its strength. It then created a political wing called the United People’s Front Nepal 
(UPFN) to stand in the 1991 elections. The UPFN won nine seats. In his analysis of 
the 1991 elections, Whelpton (1993: 59) notes that the aim of fighting elections was 
not to provide credence to the constitution but to expose the limitations of 
parliamentary democracy and use it as a platform to reach out to people. The UPFN 
could use its position in parliament to attack the Nepali Congress government, while 
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Unity Centre activists would foment unrest in the streets. Elsewhere, Whelpton (2005: 
119) observes that most voters were not aware of the specific features distinguishing 
all the different parties, but could tell the difference between the conservative ones 
and the radical ones. In an opinion poll shortly before the election, across the country 
there was a perception that the Congress represented the elite, and the various 
communist groups represented the poor. Of course there was truth in this perception, 
and it was also one that the left parties would exploit in subsequent elections.  
 
One of the first agitations following the end of the movement was a civil servants’ 
strike in July 1991, which was supported by both the Unity Centre and the UML, and 
which ultimately ‘rekindled the traditional mutual antipathy between the Left and the 
Nepali Congress’ (Thapa 2003: 41). In February 1992 the Unity Centre and Masal 
came together under the Joint People’s Agitation Committee to launch a series of 
protests against Nepali Congress Prime Minister G.P. Koirala. In March the 
committee submitted a memorandum to the government consisting of 14 points 
demanding fixed wages, price controls, an end to discrimination against minorities 
and the protection of the gains of the 1990 movement, amongst others. In April the 
committee called a general strike, and the Congress responded with brute force, 
killing over a dozen people (2003: 42). The next wave of political unrest came when 
Madan Bhandari, general secretary of the UML, was killed in May 1993, allegedly in 
a car accident. The government’s investigation confirmed that his death had been an 
accident, but the UML and the rest of the Left claimed foul play, and launched 
nationwide protests against the Congress government. The movement only retreated 
in July when a series of devastating floods hit central Nepal. The communist parties 
were back onto the streets in July 1994 when Prime Minister Koirala dissolved 
parliament and called for fresh elections.  
 
The early 1990s were thus characterised by what Thapa (2003: 42) describes as a 
pattern: various sections of the Left would take to the streets in opposition to the 
Congress’ policies of privatisation, removal of government subsidies, discrimination 
against ethnic minorities and passive acceptance of Indian interference, and the 
Congress would respond with often violent repression in order to maintain law and 
order. The reluctance of the moderate left parties to take the democracy movement 
forward, combined with severe repression meted out by the Nepali Congress, led the 
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Unity Centre to pass a resolution to initiate a People’s War in Nepal as early as 
December 1991 (2003: 43). But divisions within the Unity Centre over the question of 
armed struggle had been brewing from the outset. Nirmal Lama was not in favour of 
armed revolt immediately and had been opposed to Dahal’s political line of making 
preparations for the possibility of armed struggle. Dahal and others felt that the 
repression of the Nepali Congress had to be confronted directly, but also that patient 
organising was necessary to rebuild the Left. Differences grew and finally led to a 
split in May 1994, which also divided the UPFN along the same lines. Bhattarai’s 
faction of the UPFN allied with Dahal’s faction of the Unity Centre, bringing the two 
leaders closer together. Both factions of the UPFN, the other led by Niranjan Govinda 
Vaidya, one of the founders of the original CPN, sought recognition from the Election 
Commission. The commission recognised Vaidya’s faction supported by Lama, 
leading Bhattarai to call for a boycott of subsequent elections. 
 
Dahal’s faction went underground following the split and began organising for its 
Third Plenum in March 1995. This was the historic meeting that renamed the party 
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and decided to give up parliamentary politics 
altogether. It argued that the UML was revisionist and reactionary for defending the 
monarchy and imperialism; it berated Masal for engaging in parliamentary politics 
and supporting parties like the UML; and it criticised the rival Unity Centre for 
treating the Maoists as enemies (2003: 45). The plenum was followed by six months 
of hectic preparations, not only to lay the theoretical foundations for the People’s War 
but also to turn the organisation into a fighting machine. There were seven principal 
premises in the plan adopted by the party’s central committee in September 1995 to 
initiate the war: first, a commitment to the theory of People’s War as developed by 
Mao, based on the strategy of encircling the city from the countryside; second, that 
the aim of armed struggle would be the capture of political power for the people and 
relentless struggle against deviation from this aim; third, that the first phase of the 
struggle would be the completion of the new democratic revolution and, after the 
defeat of feudalism and imperialism, the focus would be the movement towards 
socialism and ultimately communism through cultural revolution; fourth, that the 
struggle would be based on the proletarian internationalism of the Revolutionary 
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Internationalist Movement (RIM);92 fifth, that the struggle would build both a 
revolutionary united front and a revolutionary army under the leadership of the party; 
sixth, that agrarian revolution would be the axis of the struggle and would rely 
particularly on the poor peasants but also on the labouring classes; and finally, a 
recognition that the war would not develop along a linear path but would develop in a 
complex manner (UCPN 2004: 24-25). On the basis of this plan, the Maoists began to 
organise a series of public meetings all over the country under banner of the UPFN. 
On 7 December 1995, over 50,000 people attended a mass meeting held in 
Kathmandu (Dahal 2003: 202). 
 
The Maoists also launched the infamous Sija campaign in 1995 in the districts of 
Rolpa and Rukum in the mid-western hills, named after two prominent mountains, 
Sisne in Rukum and Jaljala in Rolpa. According to Ogura (2007: 474), it was mainly a 
political campaign to recruit and mobilise party members to spread the ideology of 
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (MLM), but it also included social work in the area. 
There were three main factors that led to left activism in the area. First, there was a 
history of left-wing activity in the region. Mohan Bikram Singh had worked tirelessly 
in the 1950s to build support for the CPN in his home district of Pyuthan, which 
neighbours Rolpa, and the surrounding region. As Thapa (2003: 65) argues, there 
were many communist leaders active in the region but if ‘there is any single person 
who can be credited with the growth of radical communism in the mid-west (and even 
in Nepal), it has to be Mohan Bikram Singh’. According to Whelpton (2005: 203), 
Singh was particularly successful in the village of Thawang, in northern Rolpa; in the 
1959 general election only 3 of the 703 people on the electoral roll voted against the 
communists. Second, as living standards declined and local grievances increased, 
support for the communists grew during the panchayat years, and the Nepali Congress 
had virtually no support in these areas. In 1980, ‘a local with a very strong 
personality’ (De Sales 2007: 346) called Barman Budha, was elected mayor. He was 
known for having boycotted the referendum and burned portraits of the king and 
queen. In the 1991 elections he became an MP under the UPFN, along with Maoist 
leader Krishna Bahadur Mahara, both of whom were from Rolpa. Finally, the region 
                                                
92 Founded in 1984, RIM was an international network of Maoist parties that upheld a version of the 
theory of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism. The organisation appears to be defunct following public 
disagreements between various member organisations, including criticism of the Nepali Maoists by the 
Revolutionary Communist Party in the US. 
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was inhabited mainly by Kham Magars, who had refused to use Nepali and retained 
their original language and religious practices; Singh had promoted minority ethnic 
rights as part of the Fourth Congress manifesto since its founding in 1974 (Whelpton 
2005: 203), and gained much support for this. Thawang, with its history of resistance, 
was later declared the Maoists’ capital.  
 
The success of the Maoists’ recruitment campaign in Rolpa and Rukum was 
threatening enough to provoke the Nepali Congress-led government to organise a 
major anti-Maoist operation in November 1995 called Operation Romeo. The 
communists had, over the years, consistently faced harassment from local Congress 
politicians. But since G.P. Koirala had become prime minister in 1991 and the UPFN 
won seats in Rolpa and Rukum, there were increased reports of clashes between the 
Congress and the communists in these areas. It was known that Koirala detested the 
communists and had begun the process of stacking the state machinery with Congress 
loyalists (Thapa 2003: 69). The Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), a well-
known human rights NGO in Nepal, reported in their annual Human Rights Yearbook 
1992 the torture of teachers and party workers by the police and incidents where ‘the 
ruling power had taken political revenge’ (quoted in Thapa 2003: 69) against non-
Nepali Congress supporters. The UPFN also attacked Nepali Congress activists, but 
the state response was ‘always out of proportion’ (Thapa 2003: 70) compared to the 
initial offensive. When he came to power in 1995, Prime Minister Deuba continued 
this tradition of antagonism. Under Operation Romeo, a code name for Rolpa, the 
Congress government dispatched the police, setting out to prove that they could 
control opposition in the district and surrounding region and prevent further unrest. 
But the ruthlessness of the operation instead became a decisive factor in the Maoists’ 
war plans. The inability of the police to deal with the insurgency was clear from the 
outset. The police treated everyone as a potential Maoist, effectively assuming guilt 
until proven innocent; many were arrested, tortured and killed on scant evidence of 
involvement with the Maoists. Karki and Seddon (2003: 23) note that ‘The police 
actions resulted in a substantial proportion of the local population making common 
cause with the Maoists and the mid-west was effectively confirmed as a Maoist 
heartland’. Sharma (2004: 50) also notes that police excesses led people to join the 
Maoists on grounds of obtaining revenge. Instead of being seen as independent 
enforcers of the law, the police began to be seen as symbols of corruption and 
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exploitation (Shneiderman and Turin 2004: 94), with a record of brutal killings and 
torture. As Mikesell (2001: 18) observes, because the police have been trained and 
organised on a colonial model, and have been politicised by various governments in 
power, they have been ‘feared and hated by the general populace’. 
 
Operation Romeo was a vicious, indiscriminate police offensive that targeted Maoists 
but ultimately backfired in its attempt to quell the movement. Khum Bahadur Khadka, 
a ruthless politician known for election violence and who had become the new home 
minister, largely orchestrated Operation Romeo. He was responsible for more than a 
thousand arrests, sending people into police custody on fictitious charges of engaging 
in anti-democracy and anti-monarchy activities, which he incorrectly claimed were 
prohibited under the constitution (Thapa 2003: 71). Many women who were suspected 
of supporting the Maoists were raped and tortured by the police (Sharma and Prasain 
2004: 158; Shakya 2003: 395). Unlike Deuba, who was willing to enter into 
negotiations with the Maoists, Khadka was in favour of comprehensively obliterating 
the movement. When the war started, he famously claimed that it would be brought 
under control within four or five days (Sharma 2004: 49). Six years later, as he was 
serving a second term as home minister, the Maoists could claim to control the vast 
majority of the countryside.  
 
Thapa (2003: 48) argues that Operation Romeo ‘suited the Maoists very well’. On the 
one hand it did help the Maoists’ cause, since it exposed the weakness of the state, its 
defensiveness against being challenged both at an ideological level but also in terms 
of the lack of development, and its brutality against innocent civilians. It also gave the 
Maoists a direct justification for launching the People’s War. But Operation Romeo, 
and subsequent operations, also made the war more violent. Even though the Maoists 
had a policy of fighting the state with inferior weapons in order to expose the level of 
state oppression, increased violence was ultimately not beneficial for the movement 
because it encouraged the use of violence as a central part of the Maoists’ own 
strategy. Not only did this give credibility to claims by the Nepali ruling elite, 
together with NGOs and donors, that the movement was bereft of political aims—or 
at best allowed them to question whether the struggle for justice was worth the level 
of violence—but the Maoists could not have sustained a military stalemate with the 
army in the face of superior weaponry, intelligence and training from Western powers 
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and their allies for any length of time. Unless an entirely new strategy was found, the 
options for the Maoists were limited: either continue fighting and suffer heavy losses, 
which would ultimately result in limited political gains, or find a way out of the war, 
which would entail a level of compromise.  
 
5.1.1. The People’s War begins  
On 4 February 1996, the Maoists issued a 40-point demand to Prime Minister Deuba. 
It contained a number of radical proposals under the labels nationalism, democracy 
and livelihood: the abrogation of the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty, an end to all racial and 
regional discrimination, and secularism, among others (Thapa 2003: 189-194). 
Remarkably, one of the demands under the section concerning nationality called for 
the cessation of the work of NGOs and INGOs: ‘the invasion of colonial and imperial 
elements in the name of NGOs and INGOs should be stopped’ (2003: 191). This may 
have been intended as an attack on the UML—the Maoists’ main political competitor 
at the time—as it was becoming increasingly associated with the NGO sector in both 
rural and urban areas. But there was also a very real sense, from the Maoists’ 
perspective, that NGO interests were not limited to poverty alleviation but were 
ultimately serving the interests of the imperialist donors. The content of the 40-point 
demand was more social democratic than strictly communist, but it combined 
democratic with socio-economic concerns, and was far more ambitious than anything 
the other political parties had ever put forward. In the letter accompanying the 40-
point demand, the Maoists criticised the parties for blindly adopting policies of 
privatisation and liberalisation, serving the interests of imperialism over the interests 
of Nepal. They argued that unproductive capital should be invested to promote 
industrialisation, while the property of middlemen and ‘comprador’ capitalists should 
be confiscated and nationalised. They also warned that if these demands were not met 
by 17 February, they would launch an armed struggle. 
 
Ignored by the Congress government and Prime Minister Deuba, who was in India at 
the time, the Maoists decided not to wait for the deadline stipulated in their letter. On 
13 February they distributed a leaflet to hundreds of thousands of people in more than 
60 districts across the country, in which they outlined their basic aim: to establish new 
democracy and make use ‘of all forms of struggle in keeping with the historical stage 
of development of Nepal… according to the strategy of encircling the city from the 
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countryside, with agrarian revolution as the axis and from the midst of and in 
conjunction with rural class struggle’ (Karki and Seddon 2003: 192). Narrating 
several different accounts of what happened on that day, the Maoists’ magazine The 
Worker notes that young groups of men and women took possession of banks, police 
posts and other key targets, such as liquor and other factories owned by multinational 
companies, and raided the houses of notorious landlords (Thapa 2003: 49-50). Almost 
all these actions took place in rural areas outside Kathmandu, where young Maoists 
would explain to the assembled villagers the mechanisms of exploitation, while the 
rest of the group would seize cash, explosives and weapons, and burn loan papers 
worth several million rupees. When the office of the Small Farmer’s Development 
Programme of the state-owned Agricultural Development Bank was taken over in 
Gorkha, ‘the whole thing was over within about half an hour and the nearest police 
outpost about a kilometre away was caught totally unawares’ (2003: 49). At this 
initial stage, the Maoists had a policy of not killing any policemen, and nobody was 
hurt in any of these incidents.  
 
Within a month of launching the war, it is estimated that the Maoists had conducted 
over 6,000 ‘people’s actions’, including those classified by the Maoists as publicity, 
destruction of infrastructure and other activities (Karki and Seddon 2003: 23). During 
the first few years of the People’s War the Maoists made major tactical gains outside 
Kathmandu. They were also successful in boycotting the 1997 local elections, and no 
elections were held in 83 VDCs in the districts of Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan and Jajarkot. 
A number of significant and widely reported attacks on the police by the Maoists 
eventually succeeded in ridding villages in several districts of the police and the 
administration, mainly in what has been described as the epicentre of the movement: 
the mid-western hill districts of Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Jajarkot, Kalikot and Pyuthan 
(Sharma 2004: 43). In response, the government began to amalgamate police posts; of 
the 39 police posts in Rolpa, only two were left operational. Rukum was also left with 
two police posts, down from 37 (2004: 44). On the one hand, the government was 
keen to reduce the insurgency to a question of law and order (Karki and Seddon 2003: 
23) and, on the other, was preparing for the next major police offensive: Operation 
Kilo Sierra II. On the second anniversary of the People’s War in February 1998, the 
Maoists announced the formation of a Central Military Commission headed by 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal. In April, G.P. Koirala was re-elected prime minister and, 
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visiting the areas under Maoist influence, decided that the situation was getting out of 
control. The disruption of local elections was a particular setback for the Nepali 
Congress and Congress hegemony, but Koirala was also keen to deal with the 
Maoists’ challenge to state authority in general.  
 
Operation Kilo Sierra II was launched in May 1998, the police having been given ‘a 
single-point brief to crush the insurgency’ (Thapa 2003: 93). There was no 
consideration of how to deal with the issues raised by the Maoists, who in contrast to 
the police were a highly motivated and organised group. But the operation backfired 
on the government. It served to intensify the war, strengthen opposition against the 
police and further expose the government’s brutality. More comprehensive than 
Operation Romeo, approximately 500 people were killed by the police under Kilo 
Sierra over the period of a year, even though its existence was consistently denied by 
the police (2003: 92).93 The police operation was also an abysmal failure in stemming 
the Maoists’ influence; from having 8 or 10 districts under their control initially, by 
February 1999 the Maoists had a strong presence in some 20 or more (Karki and 
Seddon 2003: 26). The palpable failure of the strategy of outright repression forced 
the government to consider negotiations with the Maoists, and in June 1999, Deuba 
was appointed by the Nepali Congress to hold informal talks with two top Maoist 
leaders, Dev Gurung and Suresh Ale Magar. If the Maoists were accused of 
duplicity—engaging in peace talks on the one hand while fighting the war on the 
other—the government was equally guilty of this charge. Talks broke down when a 
Maoist politburo member, Suresh Wagle, was killed by the police in Gorkha district. 
The Maoists responded by launching simultaneous attacks in 25 districts in 
September, and enforcing a general strike in October. In February 2000, the Maoists 
claimed they had direct influence in all but 9 districts out of 75 (2003: 26). They 
clearly had growing support, but they were also able to consolidate their position in 
the countryside due to government instability and disorder (Upreti 2009: 106). 
Whatever the exact degree of the Maoists’ weight in various districts, they were 
becoming a serious threat to the status quo in Nepali society and a serious problem for 
the Nepali Congress government. 
                                                
93 It should also be noted that the CPN (ML), which had split from CPN (UML) in 1998, supported the 
Nepali Congress in its efforts to launch Operation Kilo Sierra II, both when it was outside government 
and after it joined the government. The UML also supported the police operation whilst in opposition 
(Thapa 2003: 92). 
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5.1.2. The formation of base areas 
Following Operation Kilo Sierra II, and partly in response to it, the Maoists initiated 
the formation of base areas in the mid-western hills. The absolute isolation of rural 
areas in Nepal, where government schools or health clinics had never managed to 
reach, understandably created a degree of animosity towards the state amongst the 
poor. There was a perception that the Maoists, in contrast, were attempting to address 
the problems of the poor in concrete terms; for the Maoists, this was the objective, 
and developing a presence throughout the country was central to it. The Maoists 
classified the areas under their influence into three types: areas in which they had 
complete control were base areas; areas adjoined to base areas were guerrilla areas; 
and cities, where the Maoists could engage in publicity, make contacts and expand 
networks, were designated propaganda areas (Sharma 2004: 43). Base areas would 
supply logistics for the war, provide training grounds for Maoist cadre and be areas in 
which oppressed classes and nationalities could exercise democracy: ‘the question of 
continuous democratisation of the state power leading to the withering away of the 
state’ (Yami 2006: 140) would be resolved by the reinforcement and expansion of 
base areas. Starting from the regions where they had the strongest presence and where 
the government’s presence was limited to the district headquarters—the mid-western 
hills—the Maoists began declaring base areas in 1999, as per their fifth plan (Karki 
and Seddon 2003: 25). These were areas in which the Maoists had overpowered the 
police and administration, creating a virtual political vacuum.  
 
Base areas had the preliminary features of what the Maoists described as people’s 
power: ‘people’s co-operatives, collective labour and farming, construction of rural 
tracks, bridges, memorials for martyrs, registration, purchase and sale of land, 
people’s security, people’s culture, people’s courts and running schools and so on’ 
(2003: 240).94 The base areas were run by various jana samiti [people’s committees] 
from district to ward levels, and several ward-level committees were merged to form 
                                                
94 It should be noted that these and other achievements in the base areas are cited by leading members 
of the Maoists, particularly Yami and Kattel, and are therefore claims that may be disputed. An 
International Crisis Group (ICG) report, for example, argues that ‘whether the Maoists have ever been 
successful in creating base areas is open to differing interpretations’ (ICG 2005a: 25). Onta (2004: 147) 
points out that the lack of independent reporting by journalists visiting base areas failed to challenge 
the Maoists’ claims to various achievements under its people’s governments. However, Onta can 
hardly blame the Maoists for having ‘taken good advantage of Nepal’s press freedoms to foster their 
own cause’ (2004: 148), as every other political and even non-political entity does the same. 
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model villages, whereby women and Dalits were given special representation on the 
committees (Yami 2006: 142). Domestic violence was reduced in base areas (Kattel 
2003: 52) and the Maoists had much support for their land reform agenda from 
amongst the peasant population, forcing the Nepali Congress in particular to put land 
reform at the top of their agenda (2003: 53). The Maoists also banned the production 
and sale of alcohol, a campaign that was largely led by women, Maoist and non-
Maoist. Schools and health clinics were operational, private schools were prevented 
from charging fees in guerrilla areas (fees were completely banned in base areas) and 
new syllabuses were introduced by the party’s Education Department (Yami 2006: 
142). People’s courts facilitated a measure of access to justice for the poorest, and 
cases would be settled almost immediately (Kattel 2003: 54). A leading member of 
the party, Hisila Yami (2006: 143), stresses the importance of the mobile people’s 
courts and the need to develop the work of the Maoists’ judicial system in order to 
win the confidence of the masses. Without complete control of the base areas and the 
support of local people from those areas, Thapa (2003: 65) argues that the People’s 
War would have been a non-starter; ‘the Maoist mystique would perhaps not have 
spread so quickly’. Base areas thus served practical and ideological purposes. 
 
From 2001, base areas were supported at the national level by the establishment of the 
United Revolutionary People’s Council (URPC), considered to be the embryonic form 
of a parallel government, and which would organise national level strikes and make 
demands on the state. By 2003, nine autonomous regions had been declared based on 
nationality and region: Seti-Mahakali, Bheri-Karnali, Tharuwan, Magarat, Tamuwan, 
Tamang, Madhes, Newar and Kirat. Yami (2006: 144) argues that except for district 
headquarters and along the main highways in these areas, Nepal was under the control 
of the Maoists. The Maoists had begun to institutionalise power at the local level 
through the formation of people’s committees in the main base areas—Rolpa and 
Rukum—and adjoining areas in the autonomous regions, but also at the national level 
through the URPC. This was the ‘strategic view of base areas’ (Onesto 2005: 221) 
summed up by Dahal—that the war could not be advanced without making political 
gains at the national level and working in urban areas. Yami admits that the people’s 
committees had at times tended to rely ‘more on force than on political conviction to 
yield results, especially with regard to changing old habits and enforcing new ones’ 
(2005: 151) amongst the population. The solution was to insist that people’s 
 150 
committees—subject to regular elections and full powers of recall—would remain 
separate from party committees, to ensure greater democratic control by local people 
(2005: 144). The Maoists had also begun to develop a rudimentary public 
administration system in base areas, with a mobile postal system and the maintenance 
of accounts. Local militias would be trained as future PLA recruits, support the PLA 
in major military offensives and help defend base areas. 
 
5.2. Militarisation and peace talks 
Militarily, the turning point in the war came after the Maoists orchestrated a major 
attack on a police post in Dunai, the headquarters of the northern district of Dolpa 
along the Chinese border, in September 2000. Involving roughly 1,000 fighters, the 
Maoists attacked the police post, freed prisoners in the local jail and made off with 
Rs. 50 million in cash and jewellery (Thapa 2003: 104). The Dunai attack gave the 
Maoists confidence to carry out even larger and more co-ordinated attacks, and over 
the next few months they combined this military strategy with the setting up of 
people’s governments in the mid-west (Karki and Seddon 2003: 35). By late 2000, the 
50,000-strong police force had effectively been neutralised. The government had to 
search for alternative measures to quell the movement. The question of mobilising the 
army against the Maoists revealed the tensions between the palace and the political 
parties. The army was reluctant to be involved because of inadequate resources and 
the lack of a political mandate. The parties also had reservations. According to 
Hachhethu (2004: 69), army mobilisation was associated with King Mahendra’s coup 
in 1960, which ousted the then Nepali Congress government; the army would not be 
under civilian control; and the king had constitutional powers to block government 
decisions. In January 2001, Prime Minister Koirala obtained royal assent to create a 
paramilitary unit—the Armed Police Force (APF)—that would be better armed than 
the civilian police and trained specifically to fight the Maoists.  
 
Since 1999, the army had been allocated a special budget for road construction and 
health camps in districts under Maoist control (Sharma 2004: 45) under a plan called 
the Integrated Security Programme (Hachhethu 2004: 71). This programme was 
maintained when G.P. Koirala took over from K.P. Bhattarai as prime minister in 
March 2000, but evolved into the Integrated Development Programme, and then the 
Integrated Internal Security and Development Programme (IISDP), which Koirala had 
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discussed with King Birendra. Initially, the IISDP targeted specific districts controlled 
by the Maoists: Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Kalikot, Jajarkot, Gorkha and Pyuthan (2004: 
69). Following the Dunai attack, which killed 14 policemen (2004: 71), the 
government decided to deploy the army under the IISDP to the headquarters of 16 
districts. This would not be to engage the Maoists militarily, since there were still 
disagreements between the prime minister and the king over whether and how the 
army was to be used against the Maoists (Thapa 2003: 96), but for security duty. A 
top government official, explaining the IISDP, claimed that ‘the basic idea is to use 
the army to defend positions and create space for government, political parties and 
NGOs to go back and work to win back the people with serious development work’ 
(Bhattarai 2001). The army had always distanced itself from the incompetence and 
previous excesses of the police in an attempt to turn people away from the Maoists 
and build people’s confidence in the army and its capacity to maintain security. The 
high command of the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) and many of its officers, drawn from 
Nepal’s upper classes, was always fiercely anti-Maoist.  
 
But several Congress leaders accused the army of failing to provide adequate support 
to the APF and not co-operating with the parties in counterinsurgency efforts; the 
army had been insisting, even after the creation of the IISDP, that an all-party 
consensus giving the army a mandate was necessary before it could be mobilised. 
Hachhethu (2004: 71) comments:  
 
The army’s rigid disobedience of the government was in fact a 
manifestation of the role played by the palace. Soon after the king had 
given his consent to the IISDP, he also made various other suggestions, 
e.g. to identify the Maoist problem as terrorism or insurgency, to grant 
general amnesty to the Maoists, to mainstream the Maoists, and to reach 
an all-party consensus. These were at odds with the spirit of IISDP.  
 
After a particularly devastating attack on a police post by the Maoists in April 2001 in 
Rukum and Dailekh districts, in which 70 policemen were killed, the police officially 
appealed for help from the government. The Maoists had on occasion attacked the 
army’s barracks, but there had been no direct military confrontation. In July, the 
Maoists attacked the army again, this time in the village of Holeri in Rolpa. The army 
was sent on a police rescue operation, but refused to confront the Maoists without a 
political mandate from the government, along with clear rules of engagement. The 
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Maoists were willing to negotiate, but wanted the resignation of Prime Minister 
Koirala first, which came that very month. Koirala’s position was already undermined 
for several reasons: he was accused by opposition parties of not being able to deal 
effectively with the Maoist insurgency; his influence within the party was declining 
because of an internal conflict within the Congress; and there were corruption 
allegations against him linked to his role in leasing a commercial jet for Royal Nepal 
Airlines.95 According to Hachhethu (2004: 72), ‘The Koirala government was 
alienated from opponents within its own party, from opposition parties, from civil 
society, from the palace, and from the army’. Koirala was forced to resign on 18 July 
2001 over the Holeri incident. The Maoists had gained the advantage. Deuba took 
over as prime minister for the second time and announced a ceasefire, to which Dahal 
responded positively. The first round of talks began in August 2001, over five years 
since the start of the People’s War. 
 
With a ceasefire in place, the Maoists held open rallies across the country, including 
in Kathmandu, in which thousands participated. They had three demands: the 
formation of an interim government, elections to a Constituent Assembly to draft a 
new constitution and a republican state. Besides these, they wanted discussions with 
the government over the various longstanding treaties with India, details of arrested 
Maoists released to the public, and the rolling back of police operations. The 
government made concessions by abandoning controversial security regulations and 
by releasing Maoist detainees; the Maoists, in turn, dropped their demand for a 
republic (Hutt 2004: 10).96 But after three rounds of talks between August and 
November, when it became clear that the government and a consensus of political 
parties were not going to accept a Constituent Assembly, the Maoists called off the 
talks, declaring that there was ‘no further justification for either dialogue or the 
ceasefire’ (Thapa 2003: 121). On 23 November the Maoists staged a series of co-
ordinated attacks in 30 districts, on several police posts as well as civilian targets, and 
made off with Rs. 225 million from rural banks (Karki and Seddon 2003: 37). If the 
RNA had already been undermined by previous attacks, the Maoists dealt a further 
                                                
95 See http://cjonline.com/stories/052801/new_nepal.shtml (last accessed on 22 August 2013). 
96 The Maoists’ concession was clearly only a temporary move, arguably stemming from a position of 
relative confidence; at the time they had also suggested holding the second round of talks with the 
government in Libang, the district headquarters of Rolpa. This was widely seen as an invitation to the 
Maoists’ capital, serving to boost the Maoists and undermine the government (Thapa 2003: 65). 
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blow to the credibility of the army; for the first time, the Maoists attacked the RNA’s 
barracks in the district of Dang, killing 14 soldiers (2003: 37). Two days later, the 
Maoists attacked the army again. Estimates are that 250 people were killed in the 
three days between 23 and 26 November (2003: 37), when the government declared a 
state of emergency, only the third in Nepal’s history.97 
 
Along with the emergency on 26 November 2001, Prime Minister Deuba instituted 
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) Ordinance (TADO) 
and declared the Maoists as terrorists under this law (Hutt 2004: 11).98 By all 
accounts, this was the beginning of the escalation of the war. There was much 
speculation as to why the talks themselves had broken down, including that the 
government side in particular had been unprepared; but both internal and external 
circumstances also forced a change in the situation. The army obtained the political 
mandate it needed in November 2001, following 9/11. Within Nepal, the situation had 
also changed after 14 members of the royal family were murdered in June 2001.99 
Although the establishment could not blame the Maoists for the murders, they were 
put on the back foot by the instability it had created within what was supposed to be 
one of Nepal’s most stable institutions. It was keen to resolve ‘the Maoist problem’ 
once and for all through a combination of counterattack, still using the police, but now 
with the addition of the APF—and, crucially, the RNA—and peace negotiations.  
 
Like many governments around the world, the War on Terror allowed the government 
of Nepal to label the Maoists a terrorist group, and in so doing provided the 
government with the justification, weaponry and international backing to attempt 
quell the insurgency. It was in this context that a decision was taken to deploy the 
                                                
97 The state of emergency suspended the rights to freedom of thought and expression, assembly and 
movement, the right not to be held in preventive detention without sufficient grounds, and the rights to 
information, property, privacy and constitutional remedy (Karki and Seddon 2003: 37). 
98 Due to public outrage and street protests, the government was unable to promulgate the TADO in 
1997 when it was first drawn up; its promulgation was made easier in the post-9/11 context. In April 
2002 it was passed in parliament and became an Act, making terrorism a crime punishable with life 
imprisonment and authorising security forces to make arrests without warrants, and use force or 
firepower if confronted with resistance. 
99 The palace massacre, in which the crown prince killed the king, queen and several other members of 
the royal family, also marked another turning point in the war. King Gyanendra, the younger brother of 
the deceased King Birendra, had been away on the night of the killing spree and assumed the throne 
amidst the widely held conspiracy that he had a hand in the murders (Hutt 2005: 114). Whether or not 
the manner in which he came to power played a part in the way he ruled, Gyanendra was much more 
willing to use force against the Maoists than his brother Birendra. The post-9/11 context and the War 
on Terror clearly also served to justify the use of force. 
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RNA against the Maoists. Unable to win the war outright, the army soon became 
known for the worst human rights violations in the world (Singh et al. 2005: 2). 
Military personnel from the US Pacific Command spent several weeks with the RNA 
in order to assess how US$20 million in military aid could be spent to fight the 
insurgency. In addition, the US government was doubling its development aid to 
US$38 million for 2003 (Karki and Seddon 2003: 42). India also explicitly 
condemned the Maoists following 9/11, announcing that it would assist Nepal in its 
efforts to counter terrorism and would deploy troops along the border with Nepal 
(Hachhethu 2004: 77), while providing truckloads of military hardware, including 
INSAS rifles and surveillance equipment. India referred to the Nepali Maoists as 
terrorists even while the government of Nepal had temporarily withdrawn the label 
during the ceasefire (Muni 2012: 319). Britain also increased its military and 
development aid. The procurement of helicopter gunships from the Global Conflict 
Prevention Pool, a joint fund across British government departments, caused great 
controversy over the use of such funds that had the potential to kill innocent 
civilians.100 The British government also organised a high-level London Meeting on 
its approach to the situation in Nepal in June 2002, concluding that a ‘twin-track 
approach’ was needed that would address both security issues and governance and 
development, seen to be underlying causes of the conflict. While some British 
government officials emphasised a military response as part of an overall 
developmental response, such as Minister for International Development Clare Short, 
others—including the Foreign Office Minister Mike O’Brien who visited Kathmandu 
in October 2002 as a follow-up to the London Meeting—made it clear that the 
Maoists were terrorists.101 According to this latter, more combative view, it was 
imperative that the British government defeat terrorism and prevent Nepal from 
becoming a failed state (Karki and Seddon 2003: 45). Following the London Meeting, 
GB£7 million was provided in military assistance, including training and hardware. 
 
When King Gyanendra took absolute power in February 2005, as described in the 
next section, he cited the incompetence of the Nepali Congress government to hold 
                                                
100 The Global Conflict Prevention Pool includes funds from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
the Ministry of Defence and the Department for International Development (DFID). At least one 
member of staff from the DFID office in Kathmandu resigned over the issue of helicopter gunships. It 
was reported that 50 Maoists were killed in Rolpa on 3 May 2002 using helicopter gunships. 
101 For official dates see http://www.nepembassy.org.uk/nepal_britain_relations.php (last accessed on 
14 September 2013). 
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elections. This ultimately united the political parties in opposition to the monarchy 
and began the process of ousting the king from power.102 It also gave the Maoists’ 
anti-monarchy position considerable legitimacy, and opened up space for 
republicanism to become a serious prospect. Major donors such as the UK, and later 
the US, as well as India, decided that they could not sustain support for the king’s 
actions. Crucially, by mid-2005, the Indian government calculated that the Maoist 
‘problem’ could be solved if they were tamed, and that this could only be done by 
bringing them into the mainstream. The Indians thus brokered a Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Maoists and the mainstream parties in November 2005. 
Within six months, the 2006 people’s movement began, led by an alliance between 
the Maoists and the political parties but where civil society leaders became prominent. 
After 19 days, on 24 April, the king conceded all of the main demands the alliance 
had put forward and reinstated parliament (Vanaik 2008: 67). But for the king it was 
too late. The monarchy had suffered such a severe legitimacy crisis that was to 
ultimately rally public opinion in favour of an end to the monarchy altogether.  
 
5.3. The second people’s movement 
The impetus for the second people’s movement for democracy can be traced back to 
the royal coup of 1 February 2005—the second in Nepal’s history—staged this time 
by King Gyanendra, the second son of King Mahendra. Since the escalation of the 
war in 2001 when the army was unleashed on the Maoists, Nepal had been in a 
political and military stalemate. The insurgency had weakened the political parties 
even further, polarised debate in society and undermined the authority of the Nepali 
state. Three rounds of peace talks between the government and the Maoists had ended 
in failure. Meanwhile, the Maoists’ war in the countryside was unrelenting and they 
had made progress in establishing networks in the capital. It was in this context that 
King Gyanendra took power, as dramatically as his father had done in 1960: all 
Internet, mobile and telephone communications were cut; a state of emergency was 
declared and select journalists, politicians and NGO leaders were arrested (Heaton 
Shrestha and Adhikari 2010: 300; Routledge 2010: 1285). The king then announced 
that basic freedoms would be restored within 100 days, but that he would exercise 
                                                
102 King Gyanendra arguably began to concentrate power in his own hands as early as October 2002, 
when he suspended parliament and appointed two successive prime ministers loyal to the monarchy 
(Vanaik 2008: 64).  
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direct rule for the next three years (Hutt 2005: 112). Figures from the former 
panchayat regime were appointed to a 10-member royal cabinet, chaired by the king 
himself, and ‘music, songs and images identified with the panchayat period began to 
be aired on state television and radio’ (Shah 2008a: 14). The urban middle classes 
were split; at least one section was hoping that emergency rule would lead to decisive 
steps to end the insurgency, while another section was reeling from the shock of the 
takeover. Shortly after the coup, however, King Gyanendra exposed his lack of 
strategy: the security situation had failed to improve, the Maoists continued to defy 
the RNA, and the royal government became distracted with issues such as civil 
service reform and school textbook redesign (2008a: 14). At the same, it was 
becoming clearer that people had lost faith in the monarchy (Upreti 2009: 155). The 
political situation was becoming increasingly polarised, and as anti-king forces 
gathered strength, those in favour of the king were becoming isolated.  
 
NGOs and donors were not immune from this deepening polarisation, and responded 
immediately to the takeover and the suspension of civil liberties. Nepal’s main 
military backers—the US, UK and India—suspended military aid, and the World 
Bank deferred US$70 million in budgetary support (Routledge 2010: 1286). After an 
initial period of hesitation, major national and international NGOs openly began to 
take sides with pro-democracy forces. The royal government responded by attempting 
to pass an ordinance to prevent NGOs from exposing human rights violations 
committed by the government, which would thereby strengthen the opposition. On 10 
November, without parliamentary process, the SWC issued the Code of Conduct for 
Social Organisations, noting that the new ordinance would increase the prestige of 
NGOs by making their work more systematic and transparent. The ordinance called 
for NGOs not to engage in partisan political activities that would endanger law and 
order and the sovereignty of the country, and would give the SWC authority to 
suspend, dissolve or cancel the registration of any NGO in breach of the Code. 
Significantly, the ordinance also stated that the government would have to approve 
foreign funding to NGOs. In a context where human rights organisations were entirely 
funded by foreign donors, and where human rights workers were being intimidated, 
arrested, and even tortured, NGOs had reason for concern.103 Several prominent 
                                                
103 Interview with Mandira Sharma, Kathmandu, 21 March 2010. 
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national and international NGOs and human rights defenders issued statements 
condemning the move, arguing that the government was violating international norms 
to which it was a party, including freedom of expression and association; the 
ordinance would also curtail the ability for human rights workers and the media to 
monitor government repression. Amnesty International and the International 
Commission for Jurists, two leading INGOs working in Nepal, pointed out that codes 
of conduct are normally developed by NGOs themselves, and are entered into on a 
voluntary basis. They also highlighted the role of local NGOs in providing basic 
services in Maoist-dominated areas, which if prevented from working, would 
seriously impact the economic and social rights of people already suffering from the 
conflict.104 The NGO Federation of Nepal rejected the Code of Conduct outright, 
launching demonstrations and burning copies of it in the streets in 35 districts.105 
After sustained international condemnation, the Supreme Court suspended its 
implementation; it was later annulled. 
 
With the mood against the royal takeover turning increasingly bitter, the conditions 
were in place for the parties to form a more coherent opposition. Major parties from 
across the political spectrum came together to form the Seven Party Alliance (SPA), 
the goal of which was to reinstate parliament. Although the Maoists had certainly had 
their differences with the parties, they calculated that growing animosity towards the 
king could be exploited, turning the tripartite conflict between the king, the parties 
and the Maoists into a contest between two contending forces—the monarchists on 
one side and pro-democracy forces on the other. When the king announced that 
municipal elections would be held, the Maoists joined the SPA to actively oppose the 
elections. The opposition, now consisting of the mainstream political parties, the 
Maoists, NGOs, various elements of civil society, the media and diplomats, began to 
coalesce against the king. The balance of forces shifted decisively, however, when the 
Indian government intervened, facilitating a 12-point agreement between the SPA and 
the Maoists in November 2005 (Shah 2008a: 15), calling for an end to autocratic 
monarchy and a common understanding with the Maoists. Although India outwardly 
                                                
104 See http://www.achrweb.org/countries/nepal/HRDS0105.pdf (last accessed on 8 June 2010) and 
http://nepallaw.blogspot.co.uk/2005/11/open-letter-on-proposed-code-of.html (last accessed on 8 June 
2010). The ordinance was annulled in May 2006 after the restoration of parliament.  
105 See http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=05KATHMANDU2488 (last accessed on 9 June 
2010). 
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insisted that it did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal (Upreti 2009: 
156), the arbitration by the Indians was arguably part of a broader strategy to bring the 
Maoists into the mainstream and secure stable conditions for economic development. 
The Indian government not only sent Karan Singh, a member of the Indian parliament 
with connections to the Nepali royal family, but Sita Ram Yechury, a politburo 
member of the CPI (Marxist) with credibility amongst the left parties in Nepal, to 
mediate between the SPA and the king, and persuade the Maoists to accept multiparty 
democracy (2009: 156).106 The calculation was that if the Maoists could be persuaded 
to end the war, this would be favourable to Indian interests on at least three counts: 
first, sufficiently neutralised, the Nepali Maoists could be used as an example to be 
emulated by the Indian Maoists (Muni 2012: 327; Nayak 2007: 935; Thapliyal 2006: 
69); second, the collusion of Maoists across the border between India and Nepal 
would be greatly diminished if not cut off completely (Upreti 2009: 157), including 
the potential spillover of the conflict (Muni 2012: 325); and finally, India could do 
business with the Maoists at least as profitably as they could with the king—and 
possibly even more profitably if the Maoists were serious about strengthening 
capitalism—while at the same time being seen to back the forces of democracy. 
 
On the domestic front, the parties began to create movement committees in 
preparation for the second people’s movement, in collaboration with local 
communities and NGOs. Together with the Maoists, the parties then scheduled a joint 
4-day general strike beginning on 6 April 2006. As foreign pressure combined with 
mounting domestic pressure against the increasingly vulnerable monarch, 
demonstrators began to defy curfews and the general strike turned indefinite. On 21 
April, hundreds of thousands marched into Kathmandu chanting slogans against the 
king and the monarchy, including slogans in favour of a republic. Remarkably, army 
columns stationed along the ring road, which were meant to enforce the curfews, 
withdrew into the city as demonstrators approached (Shah 2008a: 16). The conduct of 
the army during the 2006 movement was in stark contrast with its role during the 
royal coup a year earlier, when it began to withdraw from the rural areas to the cities 
in order arrest and intimidate leaders associated with the opposition (Hutt 2005: 119). 
That evening the king announced that he would relinquish executive powers; the SPA, 
                                                
106 See also http://www.indianexpress.com/news/yechury-could-be-headed-for-nepal-too/2805/ (last 
accessed on 20 July 2012). 
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emboldened by the demonstrations, rebuffed the offer and instead threatened to bring 
two million people onto the streets on 25 April. Roka (2011: 178) claims that during 
the 19 days of the second people’s movement, over 10 million people across the 
country came to the streets, joining the struggle ‘not only for a change of government’ 
but to protest against neoliberal policies, the unequal distribution of wealth, and 
cultural, linguistic and regional discrimination.  
 
Routledge (2010: 1286) argues that through the democracy movement, the poor were 
able to make claims on the state, but in collaboration with elitist NGOs. The 2006 
revolution was an example of a context in which NGOs resisted establishment 
politics. But while they played an important role, it was a secondary role: NGOs only 
came on board with the movement once there was a clear possibility of success and 
once it became unpopular to side with the monarchy. If there was one civil society 
group that could be said to have led the 2006 people’s movement it was undoubtedly 
the Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP). The CMDP was 
launched in July 2005 following the royal coup on the basis that the political parties 
were not adequately responding to the attack on democracy and civil liberties. The 
CMDP was a relatively broad-based campaign that organised mainly in Kathmandu 
and was dominated by high-caste and middle class professionals and intellectuals, but 
unlike other groups managed to gain the visibility and reputation needed to attract and 
mobilise large numbers, including outside the capital. One reason for this is because 
of the moral authority of its leaders—Devendra Raj Panday, Shyam Shrestha, Mahesh 
Maskey, Krishna Pahadi and others, who were seen as incorruptible and not seeking 
political power—but more importantly because of its relatively radical agenda. The 
elite character of the CMDP does not appear to have been an issue until the period 
following the people’s movement, when other activists accused it of being exclusive 
(Heaton Shrestha and Adhikari 2010: 301). It called for an overhaul of the 
constitution, republicanism and full proportional representation in the CA, amongst 
other demands. The CMDP was a political movement but publicly distanced itself 
from the politics of the political parties, claiming that it was not representing anyone 
but wanting the political parties to be more representative. Significantly, when donors 
attempted to fund the group, they were rejected outright.107 Indeed, the CMDP had 
                                                
107 Interview with Devendra Raj Panday, Kathmandu, 15 January 2010. 
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captured the moral highground by refusing donor funding for the movement but also 
distancing itself from NGOs (Heaton Shrestha 2008: 9). 
 
Many of the well-funded, Kathmandu-based, established NGOs initially took 
positions that showed they were resistant to change, but were later pressured to take 
more progressive positions. In the early days of the movement, for example, when the 
CMDP organised a street protest shortly after its formation, established NGO leaders 
organised another protest on the same day nearby, unwilling to take the lead from the 
CMDP. The relationship between the CMDP and many of the larger mainstream 
NGOs, at least initially, was marked by tensions. Heaton Shrestha and Adhikari 
(2011: 46) note that during the repression following 1 February, NGOs’ response was 
‘fairly muted’. On the other hand, the newer, more activist-oriented NGOs—mainly 
staffed with young people and operating more as campaigns and networks—were 
involved in CMDP activities and the intensification of protests. The tensions between 
the more prominent NGOs and the CMDP were ultimately put aside when the vast 
majority of NGOs were pressured into participating in the movement. There were 
three main reasons compelling the NGOs to participate in the movement. First, there 
were practical constraints to working during the state of emergency, while at the same 
time the SWC—threatening to adhere to more stringent monitoring and financial 
accountability—was making it more and more difficult for NGOs and INGOs to carry 
out their activities. Second, NGOs were influenced by donor dissatisfaction with the 
king’s move, and this no doubt allowed them to take more overtly political positions 
against the king. Under normal circumstances the vast majority of NGOs would have 
remained neutral or at least refrained from advocating particular political positions, 
especially those associated with the far left.108 Finally, there was political and moral 
pressure, mainly from the Maoists and the CMDP but also from the wider public. In 
the context of the new royal dictatorship, other than a few royalists, virtually all forces 
in society were now agitating for the abolition of the monarchy.  
 
5.4. Maoist strategy and tactics 
The official political line of the Nepali Maoists was to establish New Democracy 
following Mao’s concept of developing the three instruments of revolution: the 
                                                
108 Interview with David Wood, Kathmandu, 2 May 2010. 
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revolutionary party, the people’s army and the united front. All must be developed in 
order for the revolution to succeed, but the party was considered primary because it 
would build on and facilitate the development of the other two instruments. Mass 
organisations and the ‘people’s movement’ were considered secondary (UCPN 2004: 
3). However, commitment to a national capitalist project, as opposed to an 
international, firmly anti-capitalist one, made for a broad range of rhetoric and 
activity, spanning violent insurrection to peace negotiations. A concrete political line 
from the ideological perspective of MLM, with the aim of carrying out a People’s 
War, was developed as far back as 1991, but it took several years of debate within the 
party before a coherent set of strategies and tactics could be made, and preparations 
begun to implement this line.  
 
The Maoists’ assessment was that the first five years of the People’s War was 
considered successful from a military and strategic perspective. But conditions in both 
rural and urban Nepal were beginning to change. Outside Kathmandu, the now well-
equipped RNA—unsympathetic to the Maoists’ cause despite the rank and file being 
drawn from some of the same ethnic groups as the rank and file of the Maoists—was 
a new and daunting challenge. Within Kathmandu, security had been massively 
strengthened, with curfews often in place and additional police patrols. The Maoists 
recognised that there had to be a greater focus on the capital in order to build a 
network that could then begin to assemble a popular base where state power is 
located. It was at this point, at the Maoists’ second national conference in February 
2001, that the Maoists adopted Prachanda Path—described as a new strategy to take 
the revolution forward that involved fusing the Maoist model of protracted People’s 
War with the Leninist model of general insurrection in the capital as a basis for 
overthrowing the government (Karki and Seddon 2003: 30). Prachanda Path was 
considered a development of MLM based on the specific conditions of Nepal. 
 
The strategy marked a decisive shift. First, it was acknowledged that the project of 
protracted war according to the Maoist doctrine of encircling the cities was likely to 
be defeated given the superior military capabilities of the RNA, backed by the US, 
UK and other imperialist powers. The previous position, that mass movements were 
secondary to the People’s War, was renounced and urban-based insurrection was 
upheld as a central objective, in addition to the war. Fraternal organisations were 
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created in the cities to co-ordinate strikes and demonstrations, with a view to 
organising a mass movement similar to the 1990 people’s movement (Adhikari 2010: 
232). The move towards the cities also included a public relations campaign, to 
communicate clear and reasonable demands to Kathmanduites, and use these demands 
as a basis for peace talks with the government. Second, and perhaps somewhat 
paradoxically, the Maoists decided that seeking this negotiated settlement to the war 
would allow them to realise the demands they had been making since the early 1990s: 
elections to a Constituent Assembly that would form an interim government that 
would then draw up a people’s constitution. Calling on ‘all political parties and 
people’s organisations of the country’ (UCPN 2004: 118) to participate in a national 
conference, the Maoists were now pursuing a strategy of People’s War and urban 
insurrection on the one hand, combined with peace talks on the other. That the Maoist 
leadership was not only willing to engage in a potential compromise with the 
government but to hold talks with all parties—presumably including those defending 
the monarchy—indicated the beginning of their drift rightwards. 
 
From the Maoists’ perspective engaging in peace talks was also double-edged. The 
ceasefire allowed them to regroup and strengthen their base, and they did this by 
surfacing and organising open rallies across the country, including in Kathmandu. 
When the Maoists broke off the talks and a state of emergency was imposed in 
November 2001, the government introduced a ‘surrender scheme’ to persuade 
individual Maoists to leave the movement. By the end of the year there were reports 
that 1,689 Maoists had surrendered, including 364 involved in people’s governments 
(Karki and Seddon 2003: 38). In February 2002 the Maoists launched a major attack 
on the army barracks in Mangalsen, the district capital of Accham in the west, killing 
107 security personnel (Thapa 2003: 134). One analyst had observed, ‘the heavy 
death toll of soldiers in Mangalsen has little meaning unless [the Maoists] are able to 
show their presence on the streets of Kathmandu’ (Karki and Seddon 2003: 40). 
Following the Mangalsen attack, the Maoists claimed to have reached the stage of 
strategic equilibrium or strategic stalemate, where ‘the other side is reduced to 
protecting areas that remain under its control and concentrates on protecting the urban 
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centres’ (Thapa 2003: 99).109 The talks were important not necessarily for reaching a 
settlement (although it is arguable that the Maoist leadership was already seeking an 
exit out of the war) but to begin a campaign of political mobilisation in the centre.110 
Adhikari (2010: 232) notes that the Maoists, far from looking for a ‘safe landing’ as 
some had suggested, had greater ambitions: negotiations were an instrument to create 
divisions amongst the elite and to penetrate Kathmandu by openly organising political 
events. At the same, this engagement would allow the Maoists to gauge the 
government’s relative political strength and support, and assess the response of the 
population—from workers to the middle classes—to Maoist demands.  
 
Placing equal emphasis on urban work meant that the Maoists needed reliable urban 
intellectuals and activists who could communicate their concerns to the public, help 
release jailed cadres, undertake party work and organise in the unions. The Maoists 
worked to cultivate links with urban intellectuals and created several united fronts 
sympathetic to the party. But while the strategic shift was recognition of the 
importance of mass movements—and this was its inherent strength—openness to 
negotiations, even as a tactic, shifted at least some attention away from the broader 
struggle and onto questions related to the parameters of peace talks. Instead of 
creating divisions within the establishment as envisioned, this created the conditions 
for divisions amongst the Maoist leadership over how to take the revolution forward. 
Working in urban areas, particularly around peace talks, meant that the Maoists were 
also more exposed to the work and influence of NGOs.   
 
5.4.1. Entering the mainstream  
During the April 2006 movement it seemed as if almost anything was possible: the 
Maoists had the support of the masses, the monarchy lacked authority and the army 
ultimately refused to fight. The military stalemate between the army and the Maoists 
                                                
109 Strategic stalemate followed the initial stage of strategic defence, involving mobile warfare and the 
creation of united fronts. Strategic stalemate is followed by the final stage of strategic offensive, where 
‘guerrilla tactics assume a supplementary role to the main thrust of mobile and positional warfare’ 
(Thapa 2003: 99).  
110 The talks themselves created debate and divisions within the party (Pattanaik 2002: 119), mainly 
over fears at cadre level that the party would compromise (ICG 2003: 1). Possibly to assuage fears, 
Ram Bahadur Thapa (aka Badal), head of military operations and a member of the Maoists’ negotiating 
team, told thousands of supporters that the Maoists would return to the jungle if the peace talks—and 
by implication the Maoists’ demands—were not taken seriously by the government. See 
http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=03KATHMANDU624 (last accessed on 4 April 2013). 
 164 
forced the army to calculate that a political solution was unavoidable. But without a 
plan for seizing power and going beyond the parliamentary road, the Maoists’ alliance 
with the mainstream parties became a way for the ruling elite to demobilise the 
revolution. The consolidation of the alliance took the form of the CPA, signed in 
November 2006 between the Maoists and the SPA.111 The CPA, like the 12-point 
agreement before it, was prepared in Delhi and facilitated by the Indian government. 
Although it spelled the end of the monarchy, it also marked the official end of the 
People’s War. The most devastating aspect of this process was the Maoists’ 
agreement to dismantle their parallel infrastructure outside Kathmandu: as part of the 
conditions for entering government the Maoists began to return property to landlords 
confiscated during the war and dismantle people’s courts and people’s committees; 
they also agreed for PLA fighters to be confined to cantonments under UN 
supervision. These were a few amongst the many ‘temporary’ compromises on the 
road to a new democratic republic, arguably a reversal of the gains made over the past 
ten years, but of which the Maoists seriously underestimated the consequences. 
 
There was fierce debate within the party as to whether the Maoists should exchange 
participation in a Constituent Assembly for an end to the war, and it was at the time of 
the CPA that divisions amongst the leadership intensified. Dahal and Bhattarai argued 
that the entry into peaceful, competitive politics was justified as a ‘sub-stage’ towards 
the Maoists’ goal of establishing a new democratic republic (Bhattarai 2005: 1513). 
But leading members of the party, calling themselves the revolutionary faction, under 
the leadership of Mohan Baidya (aka Kiran), claimed that the peace process was 
becoming a strategy rather than a tactic.112 Baidya argued that the entire peace process 
had to be viewed as a tactic, and the more the Maoists became embedded in the peace 
process over time, the more they would ‘become corrupted by the privileges of power 
and lose their revolutionary edge’ (Adhikari 2010: 238). The Baidya faction within 
the party also contended that it was impossible to maintain the old alliance with the 
parliamentary parties, not least because these parties would never accept the 
promulgation of a constitution that would work in the interests of the majority. The 
idea of a ‘consensus-based constitution’ the Maoists were arguing for would only 
reflect an elite compromise. In the post-monarchy political landscape in Nepal, 
                                                
111 The Comprehensive Peace Accord is also variously called the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
112 Interview with Indra Mohan Sigdel, London, 5 December 2011.  
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Baidya proposed that the Maoists focus their struggles against the reformist 
parliamentary parties; this meant strengthening urban organisation with a view to 
capturing state power (2010: 238). This view acquired substantial support within the 
party, and since 2008 in particular, the Baidya faction had been organising in direct 
opposition to Dahal and Bhattarai. Taking a considerable number of cadres and 
central committee members with them, they formally split with the UCPN in June 
2012, forming the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist).113 The CPN’s first congress 
was held in January 2013 and revealed the lack of a distinct political line. But the new 
leadership has few choices; neither going back to waging a People’s War, which 
would be unpopular, nor working within the existing system, are options. Pursuing the 
strategy of urban insurrection would also require fighting the security forces; without 
first developing a mass base and lacking financial resources to develop a military 
wing, there is every prospect of defeat. Adhikari (2013: 29) notes that in such a 
context, the CPN may be persuaded to merge with the UCPN in the future. While 
tactics are crucial, a radical strategic breakthrough would have required a 
reconsideration of the Maoists’ fundamental theory.  
 
5.4.2. The Maoists’ conception of semi-feudalism 
One of the central objective constraints the Maoists refer to in their analysis of the 
political economy of Nepal is its semi-feudal nature. For the Maoists, this is the 
principal factor that has given rise to poverty and inequality. The argument is that as 
long as feudal elements remain, Nepal is not ready for a transition to socialism, nor 
able to move beyond bourgeois democratic demands. This in turn has direct 
implications for how political and social change is sought. Bhattarai (2003a: 137) 
cites three main reasons supporting the Maoists’ analysis of Nepal as semi-feudal. 
The first is the existence of semi-feudal relations in the agricultural sector, which 
forms the base of the Nepali economy, and which therefore determines the nature of 
the class structure. Bhattarai argues that because ‘tenants are forced to till the 
landlord’s land under arrangements that provide for bare subsistence needs rather than 
securing capitalistic profit’ (2003a: 137), the principal mode of surplus extraction is 
semi-feudal. Second, wage labour in agriculture is limited, and has not expanded the 
reproduction of capital in the agricultural sector. The decline in traditional industry is 
                                                
113 Estimates are that the new party took approximately 30 per cent of the central committee and a third 
of the Maoists’ CA members, including a large number of cadres (Adhikari 2013: 27).  
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partly a reflection of the underdevelopment of the forces of production, particularly in 
the last 50 years, and a low level of industrialisation in general, which has stunted the 
development of a working class in Nepal. The proportion of the total labour force 
engaged in industry is low, as is the share of industry as a proportion of GNP (2003a: 
142). Industries established in the 1960s have either been closed down because they 
cannot compete with foreign imports, or sold off at knockdown prices. This has also 
led to the lack of an internal market. Third, although owner/cultivators are 
numerically in the majority, they are tied to local landlords, usurers and feudal 
landowners and are therefore not independent (2003a: 137). Private usury reinforces 
semi-feudal exploitation through interest payments and other labour-service 
payments, which is still how the vast majority of Nepalis obtain credit in rural areas. 
 
The level of Nepal’s industrial development, and the resulting debate over identifying 
the dominant mode of production in Nepal, has been obscured in two ways. First, 
because Nepal is a predominantly an agricultural country—76 per cent of households 
earn a living from farming (Nepal. Central Bureau of Statistics 2011: 9)—there is a 
tendency to characterise it as a form of feudalism. To equate the dominant category of 
production with the dominant mode of production, however, leads to the reductionist 
analysis that a large peasantry—that is of course at least partly shaped by vestiges of 
feudal relations—must equal a feudal economy. Second, there is a tendency to capture 
the economic structure of the country in an isolated and static picture. Economic 
development is a process, not a particular moment, and it is a process, particularly in 
the last few decades, that has been played out in an international dimension. Nor can 
the question of the dominant economic relations solely be understood through 
economic analysis. To understand a country’s economic dynamic it is important to 
grasp the economic role being played by the elites, and to determine which sectors of 
the economy they are linked to. In addition to identifying petty commodity production 
and semi-feudal forms of production, Seddon (2001: 50-55) notes that as early as the 
1970s there was the development of a widespread agricultural processing industry, 
particularly of rice and oil in the Terai. While identifying the tendency of Nepali 
capital to concentrate in the hotel, construction, motor transport and commerce 
sectors, Seddon notes that the development of heavy industry was the direct result of 
foreign aid or Indian capital (2001: 55). Industrial production accounted for 10 per 
 167 
cent of GDP at this time. Mikesell (1999: 186) also points to the early development of 
capitalist production in Nepal, as early as the 1950s:  
 
Key elements of the dominance of landed property were eclipsed. The 
combination of agriculture and industry was broken as factory-produced 
cloths, shoes, cigarettes, etc., displaced village-produced ones. 
Consumption and production in the village became another step in the 
circulation of industrial commodities. 
 
The Maoists’ analysis also neglects the characteristic combined nature of development 
in poor countries. Across the developing world, the most primitive economic forms 
are combined with the most modern. Understanding Nepal’s economic development 
in regional and international terms is crucial. Mikesell (1999: 186) stresses the 
importance of foreign intervention in the development of Nepali capitalism, which has 
taken the form of ‘assertion of monopoly control by ruling families in alliance with 
transnational interests—a position analogous to that of the Birlas, Tatas, and other 
large houses of post-Independence India’. He concludes that ‘development’ in Nepal 
has meant the increasing assertion of transnational corporate control over society and 
the state (1999: 186). Another reason why Nepal’s economy can only be understood 
in regional and international terms is the role of remittances: 56 per cent of 
households receive remittances, up from 23 per cent in 1995/96 (Nepal. Central 
Bureau of Statistics 2011: 9). The Maoists would not disagree with the fact that the 
ruling elite in Kathmandu share the same class interests as those of the elite in 
imperialist countries, not with those of the poorest Nepalis. While it is true that Nepal 
is predominantly an agricultural country, and possesses low levels of agricultural 
technology in many areas, there are large and growing sections of the economy which 
are driven by capital accumulation, and capitalists have control of labour, production, 
trade and finances in the most dynamic and fastest growing sectors of the economy. 
The key figures in this process tend to have links with the wider regional economy.114   
 
The government pursues neoliberal development models in line with World Bank and 
IMF prescriptions, and has done since 1986, backed up by national laws. FDI has 
                                                
114 Binod Chaudhary, who in 2013 became Nepal’s first billionaire, perfectly illustrates the nature of 
the dominant section of Nepal’s contemporary elite. He has business interests in banking, food, cement, 
real estate, hotels, power and electronics. Chaudhary also owns Nabil Bank, one of Nepal’s largest 
banks, but has made most of his wealth abroad. See http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-
03-16/south-asia/37766800_1_noodle-kathmandu-indian-economy (last accessed on 16 March 2013). 
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been encouraged in Nepal since at least the 1950s, and the Maoists themselves have 
continued this process whilst in government. At the same time, both the industrial 
sector in Nepal and wage labour in agriculture are growing.115 To underestimate the 
significance of capitalist relations in Nepal has potentially damaging consequences for 
those who seek social change. Mikesell (1999: 187) writes: 
 
If the present problems of Nepal are interpreted in terms of a persistence 
of feudalism, the problem of change is merely one of disposal of the feudal 
classes and the capture of state power by a more progressive emerging 
national bourgeoisie. But when the problem becomes understood in terms 
of the transnational class relations which have subordinated Nepalese 
society and interests to their own, then the solution becomes of another 
order entirely. 
 
Semi-feudal elements within the Nepali economy remain, but the overall dynamic is 
one in which an alliance between foreign capital and sections of the elite dominates 
the direction of development, determining Nepal’s social, political and economic 
trajectory and its dominant social relations.  
 
5.4.3. Fallacies of semi-feudalism in Nepal 
There are three further problems with the Maoists’ analysis of Nepal as semi-feudal. 
The first is the theoretical distinction made between national capitalism and 
bureaucratic capitalism. According to the Maoists, bureaucratic or comprador 
capitalism is founded on the interests of imperialism and, in alliance with feudalism, 
prevents the development of national capitalism. The latter, which is understood as 
necessary for the development of Nepal along a path towards socialism, is prevented 
from flourishing, first because of the threat of US imperialism in general (and Indian 
expansionism in particular) and, second, because feudal relations dominate capitalist 
relations. Yet the Maoists never make clear what distinguishes one set of capitalists 
from another in concrete terms. In reality, capitalist development in Nepal is taking 
place through a powerful alliance between international capital and the dominant 
sections of the Nepali ruling class, and this nexus tends to draw all capitalist 
enterprise into its orbit. The Maoists sustain this essentially fictitious distinction 
between national and bureaucratic capitalism in order to justify the view that there is a 
                                                
115 At a national level, 37 per cent of household income is non-agricultural; this figure is 47 per cent in 
urban areas (Nepal. Central Bureau of Statistics 2011: 42). 
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capitalist path to development in Nepal that can be made to work for the poor if the 
Maoists are in control. The Maoists’ abandonment of revolutionary struggle—and 
their conduct in government since—exposes the contradictions in their theoretical 
system. If the end of the monarchy was not the end of feudalism, as they claim, then it 
is unclear why they have chosen to side with a peace process that has brokered the 
end of a revolutionary process.116 Once again, the Maoists’ answer is that only 
national capitalism can break the alliance between imperialism and feudal remnants, 
and that a Maoist government would encourage this process. But the Maoists cannot 
in practice untangle the tight relations between Nepali and foreign capital. Nor can 
they avoid the harsh reality that in a global system, foreign investment is a 
prerequisite for capitalist development. For all the talk about the dangers of 
imperialism, and particularly Indian imperialism, whilst the Maoists have been in 
government they have made close links with Indian capitalists through numerous 
trade deals and an active policy of encouraging FDI from India and beyond.117  
 
The second problem is a consequence of the first: the strategy of forming alliances 
with the national bourgeoisie. Because the main threat is posed as external, the main 
axis of social conflict is between reactionary forces on the one hand—those that serve 
the interests of imperialism—and ostensibly progressive forces i.e. those that are 
patriotic and nationalist. This makes for a contradictory position towards the 
bourgeoisie. This is at least partially recognised on a theoretical level: the character of 
the national bourgeoisie is described in the Maoists’ theoretical documents as ‘at one 
                                                
116 According to Prachanda Path, feudalism in Nepal was reinforced by a Hindu monarchy that 
sanctioned inequality under the caste system practiced across Nepal. But once again the justification for 
sustaining the analysis of Nepal as semi-feudal seems less to do with objective factors than subjective 
ones. The Maoists themselves have been instrumental in the process of abolishing the monarchy, which 
will have at least undermined the caste system as it is practiced in Nepal. The growing unpopularity of 
the monarchy that began with the royal massacre in 2001, also gave substance to the increasingly 
widespread belief that the monarchy had never brought tangible benefits to the vast majority. In that 
sense, it is also hard to see how successive kings in Nepal suppressed the development of capitalist 
relations of production, being some of the most powerful businessmen in the country. 
117 When Baburam Bhattarai visited Delhi shortly after he became prime minister in August 2011, he 
requested a US$1bn long-term loan. See http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/nepal-to-seek-1-
billion-soft-loan-from-india-baburam-bhattarai/article2551799.ece (last accessed on 7 February 2013). 
He also signed the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) with India in 
October 2011. The objective was to increase foreign investment by guaranteeing the right of foreign 
investors to be compensated in case profits are lost due to war, emergencies, insurrection or riots, 
which may be interpreted to include labour strikes. The BIPPA has drawn criticism from a range of 
political leaders, including from within the UCPN. See 
http://www.myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=49485 (last accessed on 
6 February 2013). 
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end dreaming of amassing the wealth by exploiting the workers’ but is at the same 
time a victim ‘run over by the monopolist comprador and bureaucratic capitalists’ 
(UCPN 2004: 17). The Maoists conclude that the national bourgeoisie is a ‘vacillating 
ally of the revolution’ (2004: 17). But it is an ally nonetheless. Similarly, the notion of 
class collaboration is warned against: ‘real defence, application and development of 
MLM is not possible without undergoing strong ideological struggle against right 
revisionism that backs class collaboration, reformism and national capitulation’ 
(UCPN 2010: 3). Yet the Maoists’ record since the CPA has been precisely one of 
such cross-class alliances and collaboration with national capitalists.  
 
A third problem with the Maoists’ strategy is the question of leadership. On the one 
hand, the Maoists assert that ‘MLM has taught us and we have clearly understood that 
it is not possible to lead revolution [sic] to a decisive victory without the leadership of 
a militant and disciplined communist party, vanguard of the proletariat, based on the 
unity of ideology and resolve’ (UCPN 2010: 7). The Maoists undeniably recognise 
the proletariat as ‘the most revolutionary class of the society’ [sic] (UCPN 2004: 16). 
Further, they argue that ‘this class has the historical responsibility of identifying and 
giving leadership to other allied classes’ (2004: 16). But at the same time, they claim 
that the revolution is essentially a peasant revolution: ‘it is absolutely necessary for 
the success of the revolution to concentrate force in rural areas... to develop class 
consciousness among the peasants and to train them in the field of class struggle 
against the feudal land ownership and comprador and bureaucratic capitalism’ (UCPN 
2004: 1). Elsewhere the Maoists claim that the People’s War ‘can be developed only 
by relying on the masses and principally on the peasants’ (2004: 20). This 
contradiction stems from an analysis that sees the working class in Nepal as 
underdeveloped and not conscious enough to lead a socialist revolution. 
 
Following the royal coup, Bhattarai (2005: 1511) argued that ‘the principal struggle is 
among the feudal, the bourgeois and the proletarian classes’, calling it a triangular 
class contention in which a traditional, dominant feudal class is allied with the 
comprador and bureaucratic bourgeoisie. But there is no evidence of an independent 
class of landlords, who, owning nothing but land and taking a share of the harvest, 
would rise up independently of the capitalist class if feudal relations were threatened. 
Once again, this is not to suggest that feudal relations are absent in Nepal, but it is 
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capitalist accumulation that preoccupies the elite. Sharma (1992: 271) writes that the 
specific policies of the Ranas led to the emergence of a landowning class, the top of 
which was dominated by the Rana and Shah aristocracies, and at its base the high-
caste Bahun, Chhetri and Newar families, who occupied positions in the military. But 
this class was not an independent landowning class. Sharma highlights the point: 
 
This class, however, cannot be regarded as an independent class since it 
arose primarily as a result of the state granting it the right to own certain 
land. It was not by virtue of being a landowning class that they controlled 
the state apparatus, but because they controlled the state apparatus, they 
continued their existence as a landowning class. In fact, there had been 
plenty of instances when due to political reasons, these lands were 
confiscated by the state. Thus, in order to retain the land they had to 
continually support the central authority. (Sharma 1992: 271) 
 
The consolidation of neoliberalism in Nepal was determined in part by liberalisation 
processes in India beginning in 1990, in addition to pressures from the World Bank 
and IMF. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Nepali economy is highly dependent on 
India, and no analysis of Nepal is complete without considering the role and influence 
of India. On a political level, India has been a regional imperialist power since 
independence, and has attempted to prevent the ascendance of the Nepali Maoists 
because this has lent legitimacy to the Indian Maoists. Failing to prevent the Maoists’ 
influence, they chose to pacify them, and succeeded in facilitating their entry into the 
mainstream. As indicated earlier, this has had two major benefits for India: the Nepali 
Maoists have served as an example to the Indian Maoists and extremist groups the 
world over, that is, that the building of a socialist society is utopian; and, secondly, 
India has been able to increase investment in Nepal, further reinforcing Nepal’s 
economic dependence.  
 
5.5. The ideological offensive against the Maoists 
Since the early 1990s, when the Maoists had begun to garner support amongst 
increasingly wider sections of the population, they began to pose a threat to the 
stability of the state, and in particular the Nepali Congress government. The purpose 
of Operations Romeo and Kilo Sierra II, in which Nepali Congress cadre ‘played the 
role of local guides to help police hunt for their prey’ (Kattel 2003: 58), was to crush 
the movement by sheer physical force. Not being able to distinguish between Maoists 
and ordinary villagers, this included the killing of those who did not consider 
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themselves Maoists, but who were nevertheless sympathetic to the aims of the 
movement. Predictably, this had the effect of strengthening the Maoists’ cause, as 
family members and others sought revenge against the brutality of the police (Karki 
and Seddon 2003: 23; Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2003). But even for those whose 
family members were not targeted, presented with the choice of siding with the 
government, which was defined in terms of its absence in the rural areas, and the 
Maoists, with whom local people were at least familiar, most people sided with the 
Maoists. Upreti (2009: 108) notes that ‘The way Maoists were receiving support from 
the rural youth and women was alarming’. The project of containing the Maoists, 
therefore, could not be confined to physical force, but needed to be extended to 
countering the Maoists’ ideology. In part this was the thinking behind the army’s 
‘hearts and minds’ campaign, instigated by the Nepali Congress, alongside military 
force. The first major intervention by the army to counter the Maoists’ influence 
focused on development under the IISDP. On a practical level the government was 
always competing with the Maoists’ attempts at constructing a parallel administration, 
including in terms of delivering development. For much of the international 
community, particularly the US and UK, strengthening the role of NGOs in mediation 
and conflict resolution was important, though Muni (2012: 325) notes that India was 
not comfortable with this because it undermined Indian hegemony in the region. 
 
Although the establishment parties initially took the position that crushing the 
insurgency militarily was the most effective way of defending the state, they 
ultimately vacillated between a military solution on the one hand and negotiating with 
the Maoists on the other, given the Maoists’ considerable influence. But at least one 
factor that led to the Maoists’ ultimate capitulation to the mainstream was precisely 
the fact that they misunderstood the potential of the genuine mass support they 
possessed. It is worth noting that the Maoists won double the number of seats in the 
2008 CA elections as the Nepali Congress, which had enjoyed hegemony in the 
Nepali political landscape for more than 50 years. The Maoists had also managed to 
overturn the traditional support the UML enjoyed in much of the countryside, and 
which they had cultivated for years. The Maoists proved the existence of this support 
through bourgeois elections no less, and all the key political players in Nepal were 
astonished by the Maoists’ widespread following, including Indian intelligence, which 
had concluded that the Maoists had little popular support (Muni 2012: 328). The 
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Nepali Congress was not the only force to lead the ideological attack against the 
Maoists. Kattel (2003: 67) notes that as early as September 2001, political resistance 
to the Maoists began to develop at the grassroots, and several Maoist Resistance 
Committees were set up, though it was unclear how popular they were and to what 
extent they were established by political forces external to the area. In October 2001 
the UML had announced it was launching a nationwide ‘ideological campaign’ 
against the ultra-leftist tendencies of the Maoists, in order to prevent them from 
undermining the communist movement in general (2003: 68). This was at a time when 
the Maoists were pressuring elected representatives, many of whom were UML 
supporters, to resign from their posts and support the people’s governments. 
Successive governments had attempted to use all the forces and institutions at their 
disposal to contain the Maoists, and NGOs also became firmly embedded in the 
ideological offensive against the Maoists. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, this 
offensive found concrete expression in an anti-Maoist alliance that came together at a 
particularly crucial moment: the 2010 general strike. 
 
5.6. Maoist policy towards NGOs 
The Maoists’ policy towards NGOs, adopted as part of the Common Minimum Policy 
and Programme of the URPC at its first national convention in 2001, was that 
‘imperialist financial penetration and internal sabotage on the pretext of NGOs / 
INGOs shall be ended’.118 This policy clearly reflects the demand in the 40-point 
document issued in 1996 stating that the work of NGOs and INGOs, equivalent to 
‘bribing by imperialists and expansionists’ (Karki and Seddon 2003: 184), should be 
stopped. In addition, various party documents refer to the role of NGOs:  
 
Under the strategy of preventing revolution in a country like ours the 
networks of NGOs and INGOs have been spread in order to engage some 
educated middle class people, to prevent them from falling below the 
middle class and to entrap the people in the petty reformist mirage [sic]. 
(UCPN 2004: 17) 
 
The practice during the war was thus to ban or at least oversee NGO activity in areas 
under their control. This applied particularly to the Maoists’ base areas but 
theoretically to the country as a whole. However, the policy was only ever enforced in 
                                                
118 See http://www.bannedthought.net/Nepal/UCPNM-Docs/2001/CommonMinimumPolicy-0109.pdf 
(last accessed on 30 March 2013). 
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a partial and unsystematic manner. Shneiderman and Turin (2004: 101) note that 
some organisations were forced to leave based on the Maoists’ perception of 
corruption amongst NGOs, but others were allowed to remain; the merits of particular 
NGOs were evaluated on a case-by-case basis. According to Frieden (2012: 103), aid 
agencies that engaged in activities that took place outside district headquarters had to 
accept or at least tolerate the Maoists by ceding part of their salaries to the frequent 
requests for donations, but they were able to operate and move freely during all 
phases of the conflict. Frieden reasons that this was because firstly, the Maoists’ use 
of violence was predictable and targeted; secondly, that the Maoists wanted 
international recognition; and thirdly, that the government wanted development 
agencies to work in areas under Maoist control because it provided the appearance of 
state presence (2012: 103). On the other hand, the security forces suspected 
development agencies of providing resources and prestige to the Maoists through the 
execution of development projects, with the police force often demanding bribes to 
allow agencies to continue working. Responding to these pressures from both the 
Maoists and the security forces, the major donor agencies developed the Basic 
Operating Guidelines (BOGs), a set of internationally recognised principles for 
development work and humanitarian assistance. The BOGs encompassed 14 
principles clarifying the position of donors and their partners with respect to the war, 
including that violence or threats to development workers would not be tolerated; that 
aid could not be used for military or political purposes; and that unhindered access 
was essential, amongst other principles.119 From the perspective of donors, the BOGs 
were a strategy to keep operational space open and ensure the security of staff, and 
based on accepted international norms of best practice in development. The BOGs 
were signed in October 2003 by all Western bilateral aid agencies, including the UN 
and INGOs. USAID declined to be part of the BOGs because of legal provisions 
forbidding US citizens from engaging in relations with the Maoists, given that in 
April 2003 they had been placed on the US terrorist list. The BOGs remain in place 
today and, according to donors, remain highly relevant as an ‘expression of impartial 
commitment to poverty alleviation and to transparency’ (2012: 112), as well as the 
security and independence of aid workers. 
 
                                                
119 The BOGs can be found on the UN’s Nepal Information Platform. See 
http://un.org.np/thematicareas/bogs (last accessed on 2 August 2013). 
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The Maoists’ hostility towards NGOs, not only as ‘foreign imperialistic spy agencies’ 
but merely providing jobs ‘to the relatives of Nepali Congress, the UML and other 
influential people’ (Kattel 2003: 66), has been a defining characteristic of Maoist 
policy since the beginning of the war. But since much of the population relies so 
heavily on NGO projects, it was always extremely important for both the Maoist 
leadership and cadre to analyse the role of NGOs and at the same time present a 
coherent alternative to what were widely perceived as the failures of NGOs. However, 
the pressure of the international support for the BOGs, and for NGOs in general, 
would have influenced the trajectory of the Maoists’ position towards NGOs. This 
position shifted from a relatively hard, ultra-left position during the war—that NGOs 
are essentially agents of imperialism and, as such, need to be abolished—to a position 
scarcely distinguishable from the other parties in the post-conflict context. Towards 
the end of the war, in 2005 according to one source, the Maoists began to make the 
distinction between ‘hardware’ and ‘software’ programmes, mimicking a similar 
distinction made by NGOs themselves.120 Hardware programmes included building 
roads, infrastructure and other tangible projects that had the potential to directly 
benefit people, whereas software programmes could include work around social 
exclusion, youth projects and even human rights work. Members of the people’s 
government told one interviewee, who has conducted extensive research in the base 
areas, that they could accept hardware projects for Rapti Zone but had to refuse 
human rights NGOs, missionaries or any other ‘ideological’ projects.121 Shneiderman 
and Turin (2004: 100-01) also observe that the Maoists were averse to ‘forms of 
social action, which they feared might interfere with their plan for social revolution’. 
In 2005, the Maoists called a meeting of NGO activists in Dang district with the aim 
of getting them involved in the Maoists’ own projects, in order to focus resources on a 
particular district capital in the Rapti Zone that the Maoists wanted to develop. The 
meeting was called to explain the Maoists’ own plans, and only NGO activists were 
invited. This was perhaps the beginning of the Maoists’ systematic engagement with 
NGOs, but the process of rapprochement had already begun several years earlier.122 
According to an NGO worker in Rukum:  
 
                                                
120 Interview with Kiyoko Ogura, Kathmandu, 25 March 2010. 
121 Interview with Kiyoko Ogura, Kathmandu, 25 March 2010. 
122 According to the interviewee, the meeting was not public and took place discreetly; as such, the 
details of the meeting were ambiguous. 
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The Maoists have a negative view of NGOs in general. But for a time they 
were favouring human rights NGOs over development NGOs, even 
towards the end of the war; they felt that human rights NGOs had the 
potential to expose the human rights violations of the army, whereas 
development NGOs needed to be monitored. This was during the war. 
Now they allow all kinds of NGOs because they have to be positive with 
NGOs, they are doing good work, they can’t deny them. The difference 
between peace and war is what accounts for the Maoists’ policy shift.123  
 
There are two main reasons why the Maoists accelerated their engagement with 
NGOs at that point in the war. The first was essentially pragmatic. If money and 
resources continued to pour into Nepal during the war, at least some of which was 
targeted at base areas in the Rapti Zone, the Maoists wanted access to these resources. 
In Rolpa district alone, according to NGO Federation records, there were 167 NGOs 
registered, approximately one NGO for every 1,200 people.124 This was not 
coincidental. The simple fact that a large amount of aid was targeted in the base areas 
made maintaining a hard line on NGOs difficult. The temptation was to engage with 
NGOs to try and control their activities. This reflected an acceptance of the need to 
deal with NGOs as part of the political and economic landscape, but also the 
beginnings of a longer term approach, similar to the one adopted by the UML in the 
early 1990s, based on the notion that NGOs could be used to divert funding and 
support in order to further the aims of the party. Second, there was a more general 
softening of the Maoists’ position towards NGOs during the peace talks, which was 
part of an emerging tendency to try and draw NGOs into the struggle for democratic 
change. For example, the Maoists began to make public statements in the media 
calling on NGOs to press the government for dialogue and to investigate human rights 
abuse cases. The Maoist leadership had begun to see NGOs as potential allies in 
exposing the human rights abuses of the army. This helped increase the legitimacy of 
NGOs in the peace process. It also enabled a number of civil society intellectuals to 
become mediators between the king, the Maoists, and the political parties.125 All of a 
sudden NGOs began to play a peace-brokering role, and donors began to promote the 
role of NGOs and civil society in the peace process. 
                                                
123 Interview with Jeevan Khadka, Rukum, 17 March 2010. 
124 Interview with Shobha Ram Dangi, Rolpa, 1 March 2010. 
125 Again, although the CMDP distanced itself from NGOs, as a civil society group it arguably played 
the most prominent role in unofficial negotiations between the king, the Maoists and the parties. Padma 
Ratna Tuladhar and Daman Nath Dhungana, who were the official mediators to formal peace talks 
between the government and the Maoists, were also in close contact with the CMDP. 
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Ultimately, in the post-conflict context, these factors combined to facilitate a wider 
acceptance amongst the Maoists of the role of NGOs not just in securing human rights 
and brokering an acceptable peace agreement, but also that they had a potentially 
useful role in development and democracy. For example, in Rolpa and Rukum during 
the war, NGOs had to seek permission from the Maoists in order to work in their base 
areas, whereas post-2006 NGOs could work with absolute freedom.126 This is not to 
suggest that NGOs have no role in these fields, but that the Maoists’ embrace of these 
roles reflected a deeper ideological shift. Another political factor served to ease the 
rapprochement between the Maoists and the NGOs. Indeed, one of the reasons for 
distrust of certain NGOs during the war was not related to the principle of anti-
imperialism. Some human rights NGOs in areas under Maoist control were dominated 
by UML activists, and operated at least partially with the aim of extending UML 
politics into base areas.127 One interviewee explained: 
 
They [Maoists] know that through NGOs, the UML is doing politics—that 
is why they don’t want to allow them. I don’t think this is related to 
ideology. They don’t want competition against their organisation. They 
are very much afraid if they permit NGO activity freely, then INSEC, 
CWIN etc.—these UML NGOs—if they are allowed in their areas, they 
will work as party workers. This is the main reason. There isn’t a deeper 
ideological reason.128 
 
This question became less and less important as the war developed and as the UML’s 
influence was dramatically eroded during the People’s War. Fear of the UML’s 
influence became less of a factor in shaping Maoist strategy. Increased engagement 
with NGOs was also strongly reinforced by the experience of the last months of the 
People’s War, particularly during the period of the victory over the king in 2006. 
During these months, NGOs began to side openly with the pro-democracy movement 
under the leadership of the broad-based CMDP, confirming in the minds of at least 
                                                
126 Interview with Kiyoko Ogura, Kathmandu, 25 March 2010. According to Ogura, the Maoists were 
freely inviting NGOs to Rolpa in the post-conflict context. She commented, ‘When I went to Rolpa last 
year I met Merlin [a US-based INGO]; the Maoists have already opened branches of Merlin in many 
VDCs. I think one of the main branches is in Thawang. [In previous years] the Maoists stopped Merlin 
to enter in Rolpa’ [sic]. She believed that the party leadership may not have known the details of the 
negotiations between the local commanders and Merlin, but that negotiations had taken place for them 
to be able to work so extensively in the area. 
127 Rural Reconstruction Nepal was one of the few national NGOs allowed to work in Rolpa, in order 
to build a small hydropower plant facilitating 24-hour electricity. But this access, according to Ogura, 
must have been the result of negotiations between the head of RRN and top Maoist leaders. 
128 Interview with Kiyoko Ogura, Kathmandu, 25 March 2010. It is arguable that the Maoists’ refusal 
to allow the UML into base areas at certain points is, however, precisely on ideological grounds. 
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sections of the Maoist leadership that in the right circumstances NGOs could be 
leveraged to play a vital, progressive role.     
 
The Maoists’ position on NGOs therefore shifted from one that viewed all NGOs as 
detrimental to the interests of Nepal’s poor, to a pragmatic one that not only accepted 
but also facilitated the work of NGOs. While this position confounded the Maoists, it 
was one that allowed NGOs a great deal of freedom and the basis on which to 
establish their models of development as the common sense of progressive politics. 
Most obviously, the growing acceptance of, and convergence with the NGOs, 
influenced the way the Maoist leadership approached and conducted themselves 
during the negotiations in 2003. The discourses of ‘peace’, ‘conflict resolution’ and 
‘development’ dominated the negotiations, displacing earlier Maoist notions of 
economic demands, restructuring and social justice. Maoist leaders often asked civil 
society leaders for their advice on the way forward for the party, including leaders of 
the CMDP.129 The slogans adopted by NGOs, donors and the mainstream parties 
around the ‘politics of consensus’ entered the vocabulary of the Maoists and heavily 
influenced their thinking. 
 
Having accepted a key role for NGOs in the social and economic spheres—and 
subsequently in the political sphere whilst in opposition—once in government the 
Maoists were unlikely to revert to an anti-NGO position. Again, the Maoists’ position 
on NGOs whilst in government became scarcely distinguishable from the other 
mainstream parties. The exact mechanisms through which this policy transformation 
took place were complex. The process was unquestionably underway as early as 2003 
when Maoist leaders—still officially underground—publicly and privately met heads 
of national and international NGOs in Kathmandu, where they had gathered for talks 
with the government.130 They also held press conferences and mass meetings, and 
established a liaison office in Kathmandu (Hutt 2004: 15) to facilitate the publicity 
                                                
129 This is evidenced by the fact that following the general strike of 2010, Prachanda apologised to the 
people of Kathmandu for the inconvenience they had been caused. See also 
http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/news-archive/2-political/6003-intellectuals-advise-
maoists-to-work-for-consensus.html (last accessed on 20 May 2012). The general strike is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6. 
130 As the representative of an international NGO in Nepal, this author also met Baburam Bhattarai 
during the 2003 peace talks.   
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drive.131 The absence of a record of open debate within the party over the question of 
NGOs, however, confirms the impression that there was not a considered 
reorientation of the Maoists’ approach to NGOs, but rather a fragmented evolution. 
The same interviewee commented that the Maoist leadership was not thinking about 
NGOs, and had not even worked out a concrete line on NGOs in the post-conflict 
context. She further noted that ultimately, whether or not an NGO was allowed to 
work in an area controlled by the Maoists depended on the personality of the NGO 
worker, the specific activities of the NGO, and the local context, for example, whether 
the local population perceived project activities as useful. In that sense, the Maoists’ 
approach was very much pragmatic: if they believed that they would benefit from the 
presence of a particular NGO, they would accept it. In the post-conflict context they 
were no longer even making the distinction between ‘hardware’ and ‘software’.132  
 
The evidence suggests that the Maoists drifted into an engagement with NGOs rather 
than making a concerted policy turn. Although the conscious attitude of the Maoists 
towards NGOs evolved over time, this was seemingly a post-festum response to 
changing practice and circumstances rather than a carefully developed and 
implemented reorientation. There were strong pressures on the Maoists, ranging from 
economic to practical and strategic, and the consequences of this increased 
engagement were serious, leading as they did to the adoption and internalisation of 
NGO discourse, and arguably certain theoretical concepts of the NGOs. But the very 
fact that such a policy transformation on a question as central as the attitude to NGOs 
was largely driven by circumstance and pragmatic considerations raises questions 
about the coherence of the Maoists’ theory in the first place. It suggests that early 
hostility towards NGOs had been based on a largely rhetorical and underdeveloped 
argument: NGOs were agents of imperialism with no redeeming features, only crude 
vessels for propagating the interests of foreign donors.133 In reality, the role of NGOs 
has been much more contradictory, and the Maoists’ one-sided argument was never 
going to provide an adequate guide for what would necessarily involve a complex 
                                                
131 It was at this time that the government had agreed—temporarily as it turned out—to remove the 
terrorist tag from the Maoists, except for Prachanda (Hutt 2004: 15). 
132 Interview with Kiyoko Ogura, Kathmandu, 25 March 2010. 
133 One publication handed to this author during fieldwork was of a translated copy of an article on 
NGOs by Petras (1999). Although this was an important article, the Maoists’ publication lacked any 
additional theoretical insights or practical application of the ideas in the context of Nepal. 
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strategy. This had a particular effect on the Maoist rank and file and their ability to 
deal with the proliferating presence of NGOs in base areas: 
 
I’m sure the donors are funding the Maoists. I don’t know how they [the 
Maoists] will compromise. NGOs don’t have much room for negotiation; 
it’s mainly a donor agenda. If the Maoists really do have a long-term 
strategy on the issue of NGOs, it seems a risky game. To get your cadre 
into the NGOs has a depoliticising effect. But what’s the strategy if they 
have to compromise and, in addition, they lose the party?134 
 
This was a reflection of a wider issue, namely, a broader series of theoretical 
convergences between the Maoists and the NGOs, which disarmed the Maoists at all 
levels when dealing with the question of how to approach the NGOs. These issues 
came to a head during the 2010 general strike, and they explain the perplexity and 
periodic despair expressed by many Maoist activists when they considered the 
relationship between the party and NGOs. 
 
                                                
134 Interview with Kiyoko Ogura, Kathmandu, 25 March 2010. 
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VI. Of revolutionaries and reformists 
 
The mass general strike of 2010 illustrates the complex relationship between NGOs 
and the Left and their respective approaches to social change. When it appeared as if 
the Maoists were reasserting and reconsolidating their support on the streets, the 
NGOs and their associated allies mobilised to challenge this effort with their own 
project, which effectively re-established elite hegemony. This chapter describes the 
background to the general strike and, based on personal participation and observation 
of the strike, mainstream media reports and interviews, describes the withdrawal and 
demobilisation of the strike and its significance. It then outlines a theoretical 
framework for understanding the parallel approaches of the left parties and the NGOs 
through an analysis of the theory of stages. It shows how the Maoists’ view of social 
change—that of a revolution in stages over an indefinite period of time—correlates 
with the NGOs’ vision of social change as a gradual, evolutionary process unfolding 
over decades or even centuries. Through this convergence, the NGOs were able to 
tame the Maoists’ militancy and ultimately incorporate them into a form of politics 
that was manageable for the establishment. The limitations of this evolutionist 
approach of the Maoists, which the UML also shares, have made themselves felt 
clearly in Nepal at the current political conjuncture, where polarisation is no longer 
based on class but on ethnicity, posing grave threats to the gains made through the 
mass struggles over the past two decades. 
 
6.1. The general strike and the politics of consensus 
The 2010 general strike called by the Maoists was perhaps the greatest political crisis 
for the ruling elite since the people’s movement of 2006. The Maoists had declared 
that the general strike would begin after a mass rally planned for May Day. They had 
been preparing for the general strike for several months, providing basic military and 
political training for tens of thousands of young cadres in several districts. These 
cadres would then be sent to the capital for the rally on 1 May, and would enforce the 
strike that would begin on 2 May. The Maoist leadership claimed that the strike would 
be indefinite, and would be part of a ‘decisive war’ (Dahal 2010) against the 
government over the looming constitutional crisis. The immediate demand was that 
Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal resign in order to let the Maoists—the most 
popular party in the country coming out of the CA elections—lead government, 
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thereby allowing the constitution-making process to move forward. Following the 
elections, the CA had set itself the task of writing the constitution within two years, 
with a deadline of 28 May 2010. As the months rolled on, it was becoming clearer 
that the CA was never going to meet its deadline, and that different parties were 
delaying the drafting for different reasons: the Nepali Congress and the UML refused 
to agree to the Maoists’ demand of integrating the bulk of the PLA into the Nepal 
Army; the Maoists were accused of delaying the constitution-drafting process to 
ensure their CA members continued to have access to the relatively generous 
stipends.135 The mainstream media reported the Maoists’ preparations with a mixture 
of fear and uncertainty, and donor agencies issued press statements expressing 
concern over the effects the strike would have on the economy and on tourism. They 
urged the Maoists to avoid confrontation, show flexibility and ensure the protests 
would be peaceful; they also suggested that the Maoists try to resolve matters at the 
negotiating table instead of on the streets (The Kathmandu Post 2010: 3). In the days 
running up to the strike, 10 political parties from across the political spectrum met to 
make it clear they would be open to discussing the inclusion of the Maoists in a 
consensus government if the Maoists were to compromise on the issue of army 
integration, renounce violence and disband the military structure of the YCL 
(Republica 2010b: 7). The parties also accused the Maoists of violating the principles 
of the CPA by conducting military training for their cadres.136 
 
While it was clear from the CA elections in 2008 that the Maoists had a base of 
support unlike any other party, the Maoists also faced a dilemma. Proving the strength 
of their support to the other parties was important, but they also had to prove 
themselves to the millions that constituted their base. For this, they not only had to 
distinguish themselves from the other parties, but make progress on promises. These 
promises included ensuring the constitution was drafted on time, but also that it could 
be used to effect material changes for the vast majority. The dilemma was thus 
twofold. First, entering the mainstream had meant that those who voted for them were 
not only from poor and working-class backgrounds but also included sections of the 
                                                
135 Many of the Maoist CA members came from poorer backgrounds than their counterparts, and have 
benefited from receiving the stipends. In general, donors have funded these stipends.  
136 Dahal denied that Maoist cadres had received military training, dismissing allegations as 
propaganda and clarifying that the cadres were trained in how to manage the massive demonstrations. 
He claimed that there was no intention to pursue violent methods but that if the government resorted to 
violent tactics first, the Maoists would retaliate (Republica 2010a). 
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middle classes and business people; promises spanning such a range of interests were 
always going to be difficult to uphold, and the Maoists constantly had to balance these 
different—and in many cases opposing—interests.137 Second, there was an 
increasingly vast gulf between the promises made by the Maoists to the rank and file 
of the party and the poorest supporters, and what they were prepared to deliver. In the 
context of a potential constitutional crisis and growing impatience amongst the 
Maoists’ mass of supporters, who were watching their leaders become enmeshed in 
the fold of mainstream party politics, the Maoists planned the strike. What they were 
aiming to achieve was not altogether clear: they had told hundreds of thousands of 
cadres and supporters that the indefinite strike in Kathmandu would be the final battle 
to ‘capture state power’ (Republica 2010a) and that it would be an historic third 
people’s movement—after 1990 and 2006; but what they wanted was to lead a 
coalition government. They had told supporters that they wanted a ‘people’s 
constitution’, but they themselves had doubts about whether a coalition government 
would be able to produce one. Moreover, there were differences of opinion within the 
leadership over whether to go ahead with the strike. Bhattarai had argued from the 
outset that the strike would ‘lead the party nowhere’ (Basnet 2010) and was pushing 
for the withdrawal of the strike, while Dahal had sided with the so-called hardline 
factions within the party, mainly Baidya and his supporters, to go through with it in 
order to keep up the pressure on Madhav Kumar Nepal to resign. What the Maoists 
would do if the prime minister refused to resign remained a mystery. 
 
6.1.1. The May Day rally and beyond 
The rally on 1 May was a massive show of strength for the Maoists, and would have 
clearly undermined the morale of the other mainstream parties. Even though the 
general strike was scheduled for the following day, an atmosphere pervaded the city 
that was similar to that of a strike day—most shops were closed and traffic was 
minimal due to the sheer numbers of people in the centre of the city, the majority of 
whom appeared to be participating in the rally. Many were bystanders, while others 
                                                
137 Analysing the reasons for the Maoists’ widespread support, ICG (2008: 14) notes that voters had 
developed a strong distaste for the mainstream parties. If the UML was ‘wiped out’ in its stronghold of 
Kathmandu and the Nepali Congress suffered a ‘humiliating defeat’ then it can be assumed that 
erstwhile UML and Congress supporters were now voting for the Maoists. This new section of Maoist 
voters would have undoubtedly encompassed a range of political opinions but, according to the ICG, 
were willing to recognise the Maoists’ long years of struggle and sacrifice for political change.  
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steered clear of the rally altogether. The rally itself was peaceful, festive and 
expectant. Estimates vary, but most sources concur that several hundred thousand 
cadres and supporters participated in the rally in Kathmandu.138 It had been well 
planned and executed almost flawlessly. In an interview in the streets the following 
day, a central committee member of the UCPN had the following assessment: 
 
May Day was a beautiful day in Nepali politics. It was a huge 
demonstration, maybe more than 300,000 people on the streets in 
Kathmandu. There were over a million on the streets across the country. 
Although it wasn’t as big as we had wanted and there were some 
shortcomings on our side, it was peaceful and disciplined. And those 
cadre and sympathisers who have come to Kathmandu are committed to 
staying until we get a people’s constitution.139 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Mass rally in Kathmandu. Hundreds of thousands of supporters attend the Maoists’ mass 
rally in Tundikhel, central Kathmandu, 1 May 2010. Source: The author 
 
The Maoist leader also claimed that he saw no contradiction between fighting in the 
streets and fighting in parliament, and that the general strike would continue until the 
                                                
138 From this author’s own observations and attendance at the rally, the figure of 300,000 in Kathmandu 
seems plausible. Mainstream media reported another 100,000 in different parts of the country. See also 
http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2010/raju120510.html (last accessed on 10 May 2010) for another 
eyewitness report. 
139 Interview with Swanaam Saathi, Kathmandu, 2 May 2010. 
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prime minister resigned. The strike the next day began on an equally strong footing, 
and demonstrated the strength, discipline and determination of the Maoist movement. 
Raju (2010), an observer throughout the strike, noted two distinct features of the 
strike: first, that the Maoists were superbly organised with clear chains of command 
and impressive discipline and, second, that they were also bound together by a unity 
of purpose driven by high levels of political awareness. There were demonstrations 
throughout the day, including torch rallies, political meetings at major crossroads, 
cultural programmes involving singing and dancing in the streets, and human chains 
formed around the ring road. The YCL was heavily involved in logistics and 
organised a series of rallies and demonstrations. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Peaceful and expectant demonstrators. The Maoists’ Young Communist League and 
supporters join the rally and demonstrations, 1 May 2010. Source: The author 
 
For the UML government, which did nothing for the duration of the strike, the Maoist 
mobilisation was a serious loss of legitimacy. The government was unable to mobilise 
either the police or the APF because the rallies, meetings and demonstrations were 
largely peaceful, and the Maoists made much effort to ensure they stayed this way. 
Instead the security forces became reduced to being passive bystanders, and the 
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government mobilised the business federations, popular, liberal anti-Maoist figures, 
and NGOs. They organised a concerted campaign to oppose the strike. On the sixth 
day, the Maoists succumbed to this pressure. 
  
6.1.2. NGOs and “people power” 
NGOs were generally unsupportive of the Maoists’ mobilisation. They considered it a 
threat to the peace process because it had the potential to create a confrontation that 
could once again deepen the polarisation in Nepali society. Their public position 
emphasised their fear that the rally would lead to violence. This was not only a 
misreading of the Maoists’ intentions but was effectively a nod to the government that 
they were prepared to play a monitoring role akin to the police, without arms. Human 
rights and legal observers were conducting street patrols, with the aim of bearing 
witness to violence caused by the Maoists’ rally and strike. It is not inconceivable that 
violence could have broken out, but it was only when NGOs began to mobilise, 
supported by the parties and their youth wings, some of whom were armed, that the 
possibility of clashes became real.  
 
 
Figure 6.3: Observing on the fringes. Human rights observers in their distinctive blue vests, along 
with the APF, gather at the fringes of a mass street meeting, 5 May 2010. Source: The author  
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A coalition of anti-Maoist groups—consisting of NGOs, chambers of commerce, 
entrepreneurs, intellectuals, professionals, popular national figures such as comedians 
and others described as ‘civil society activists’—organised a peace rally in 
Kathmandu Durbar Square, the site of the former royal palace in the old part of town. 
The number of participants exceeded expectations; several media accounts held that 
the rally was 25,000-strong. The rally then ended with a spontaneous demonstration 
down major streets of the city, disorienting the Maoist mobilisation and ultimately 
bringing the strike to an end. Faced with a serious social crisis, the NGOs decidedly 
became part of the ruling alliance. While the ruling elite managed to reconsolidate its 
hegemony, the Maoist leadership was finding ways to pacify its cadres. If during the 
war the aims of this anti-Maoist alliance were for stopping the war and ending the 
violence, during the general strike they aimed to suppress the Maoists’ level of 
support by replacing any potential for emancipatory politics with a vacuous politics of 
‘peace and conflict resolution’, which was presented as non-political but was 
effectively supporting the status quo. Through a combination of NGO mobilisation 
and the limitations of the Maoists’ politics, the state was able to re-establish control. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Not quite confronting power. Days following the withdrawal of the strike, Maoists and 
supporters confront security forces on the road to parliament, 22 May 2010. Source: The author  
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6.1.3. Withdrawing the strike 
The general strike is an example of how NGOs played a conservative role in 
preventing the movement from developing. At least two related factors ensured the 
success of the NGOs’ mobilisation. The first was an ambiguity in the Maoists’ 
theoretical framework, and the second was the fact that the Maoists had no riposte to 
the demands of the NGOs, who were calling for peace and conflict resolution through 
further negotiations. This is because the Maoists shared many of the NGOs’ 
assumptions about the crisis. There was also a difference between 2006 and 2010: in 
2006 the Maoists were able to mobilise a vastly broader movement. Although the 
Maoists managed to attract huge numbers, the strike was called, built and enforced by 
the Maoists themselves—there was less of a concerted attempt to appeal to the masses 
and to work with a wider movement of support. There were two reasons for this: first, 
there was widespread scepticism from the general public about the Maoists’ motives 
and, secondly, from the perspective of Maoist cadre, when the leadership was not 
willing to take the movement as far as possible i.e. some form of ‘taking power’, the 
whole movement was lost. Indeed it is arguable that because the Maoists had no plan 
to take the movement beyond the general strike, the end of the strike was inevitable. 
Ultimately, instead of using the constitution as an instrument with which to address 
social and economic discrimination, and recognising also that a bourgeois constitution 
would be a blunt instrument to realise these objectives, the constitution became an end 
in itself for the Maoists. Like the Nepali Congress and the UML, the Maoists 
propagated a myth that once the constitution was written, the masses would be 
assured change. It was following the withdrawal of the strike that the Maoists were 
becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish from the other parties, and they could 
firmly be said to be part of the mainstream, whereby the mainstream was a reflection 
of the ideas of the dominant ruling order. 
 
6.2. Social change in stages 
If one of the central and explicit aims of donor governments that began working in 
Nepal in the 1950s was to stem the growing tide of communism, the development of 
the NGO industry from the late 1980s can be seen as a continuation of that aim, but in 
a more subtle manner. Despite this, the popular appeal of communist ideas has been 
growing since the 1950s, and far from waning during the panchayat and in the post-
1990 context, the communist parties continued to organise and recruit. This fact has 
 189 
led the Maoists to insist that donors and NGOs had failed in their attempts to prevent 
the communist movement from growing in Nepal. While this claim is demonstrably 
true, it arguably overlooks a central dynamic of the situation: NGOs failed to limit the 
growth of the radical left but they have played an important part in a process which 
has seen the Maoists move from an openly revolutionary strategy with broad social 
and economic aims, to one in which this strategy has been limited to constitutional 
change, and its methods re-routed into purely political and conventional parliamentary 
channels. This constitutes an important achievement for those with an interest in the 
maintenance of basic power structures in Nepal. It was a process replete with 
contradictions. At the height of mass popular mobilisation in 2006, the Maoists made 
their biggest steps towards integration into the mainstream political and legal 
framework. As described in Chapter 5, the Maoists were involved in lengthy and 
serious negotiations with the Nepali Congress government and other parties in 2001 
and 2003. These negotiations came to nothing because not enough was on offer for 
the Maoists. But the ruling class was also split by the failure of these negotiations. 
Those sympathetic to the king wanted to continue the war and pursue a policy of open 
repression; this culminated in the period of autocratic rule on 1 February 2005 in 
which all parties were banned. Other sections of the establishment were looking for a 
way to demobilise the Maoists through concessions and incorporation. The king’s 
coup was a provocation to the liberal wing of the establishment, but it also provided 
them with an opportunity to work with the Maoists in a common struggle. In the 
process of this struggle, the king was forced to abdicate, but at the same time, the 
Maoists’ ambitions were successfully tempered.  
 
6.2.1. Deconstructing the peace process 
The concrete outcome of the war was not only the end of the monarchy but the 
establishment of the CPA, which committed the Maoists to a peace process, facilitated 
by India on the political front, and organised by the UN in practical terms. NGOs 
played a central role in this process. Monitoring, normalisation and reconciliation 
duties for NGOs were written into the CPA. Perhaps equally importantly, the CPA 
itself was constructed in the language and according to the values and worldview of 
NGOs, and decidedly not in terms of the original aims and ambitions of the Maoists’ 
revolutionary ideals. The inner logic of this outcome was the prospect for important 
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and necessary constitutional changes, but which nevertheless preserved the status quo 
(Giri 2008: 295). The CPA states that: 
 
Both sides agree to solve problems created in the above context on the 
basis of mutual agreement and to take responsibility at the individual and 
collective manner in the task of creating appropriate [sic] environment for 
normalising relations and reconciliation and ensure implementation with 
the help of all political parties, civil society and local organisations. 
 
The limited discussion of economic or social questions in the CPA is vague, 
aspirational and, with the exception of measures to redistribute the wealth of the royal 
family, never strays from the discourse of market-based approaches. Point 3.12 
suggests, for example, forming ‘a common development concept for economic and 
social transformation and justice as well as to quickly make the country developed 
and economically prosperous’ (UN 2006). Point 3.13 suggests following ‘a policy of 
massive increase in employment and income generation opportunities by increasing 
investment in industries, trade and export promotion etc. while ensuring the 
professional rights of the labourers’ [sic] (UN 2006). The CPA also affirms the right 
to private property and the importance of ‘giving continuity to production by not 
disturbing the industrial climate in the country’ (UN 2006). Interestingly, the most 
forthright economic and social measures of the CPA are those that address elements 
of feudalism within the country. Point 3.6 commits ‘to gradually implement by 
deciding through mutual agreement a minimum common programme for the 
economic and social transformation to end all forms of feudalism’ (UN 2006). The 
gradualist approach and the need for consensus are noteworthy. But as argued in 
Chapter 3, widespread feudal arrangements are marginal in the Nepali economic 
landscape. In this sense even the letter of the CPA tends to intensify dominant 
economic forms. The cursory and general nature of the economic measures outlined 
in the CPA points to the fact that economic questions are not the most pressing. The 
bulk of the document is concerned with the technicalities of the peace process and, by 
implication, the integration of a revolutionary organisation into a political process that 
allows the central economic and social features of Nepali society to remain intact. The 
long road travelled from the People’s War to parliamentary legitimacy finds clear 
expression in the Maoists’ own rhetoric when they claim that ‘the main form of 
struggle will be from within the government, to make the new constitution’ (Mikesell 
and Des Chene 2008: 12).  
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At key moments NGOs played an important role in this process. During the People’s 
War, the spread of NGOs in the base areas generated levels of popular reliance on 
NGO-provided services, which influenced the attitudes of the Maoist rank and file. 
This began the erosion of the relatively hardline policy towards NGOs that had 
dominated the Maoists’ thinking until then. NGOs also played a key role during early 
attempts to find a basis for ending the People’s War, and NGO approaches began to 
frame the war in terms of ‘conflict resolution’. In 2006 the NGOs joined the pro-
democracy movement, although they maintained a distance from the CMDP because 
of its stance against donors (Heaton Shrestha 2009: 9). The involvement of NGOs 
reflected the fact that the overwhelming majority of the establishment and 
international community of donors had turned against the king. Initially, NGOs 
tended to organise independently of the CMDP, but as the year wore on, they became 
more integrated into the wider movement. The Maoists and the NGOs thus found 
themselves struggling alongside each other in the campaign for democracy. At the 
same time, however, in both conscious and unconscious ways, NGOs were attempting 
to limit the struggle: they framed it as a campaign to return to the political framework 
before the royal takeover of February 2005, and they saw this as the means to end the 
war. Ending the war was one of the NGOs’ key priorities throughout, and despite 
somewhat tentative involvement in the struggle for democracy, at least initially, 
conflict resolution and the legal aspects of the process remained central concerns.  
 
At least some of these outcomes were not accidental results of NGO policy, but were 
structured into NGO theory and practice. The propagation of the idea that the conflict 
in Nepal was the essential obstacle to development—as opposed to the product of and 
attempt to redress inequality—is central to NGO ideology. Neutrality and 
disengagement from the struggle thus became important ‘developmental’ virtues. One 
lengthy report submitted to USAID by Save the Children entitled Strengthening the 
NGO Sector in Nepal to Mitigate the Impact of the Maoist Conflict praises a Save the 
Children US training programme claiming, amongst other things, that it ‘educated 
[local organisations] on how to deal with the conflict situation in Nepal, which has 
specifically curtailed the mobilisation of communities for most development 
programmes (except to fulfil the Maoist’s own agenda)’ (Save the Children 2008: 18). 
It goes on to describe how ‘participants found that the training taught them to be 
transparent and remain neutral during the period of conflict’ (2008: 18). Similarly, in 
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a report outlining Care Nepal’s response to the conflict, Care has attempted to ensure 
that staff and partners ‘observe humanitarian principles in its project interventions’ 
(Seddon and Hussein 2002: 38) by not supporting one party to the conflict at the cost 
of the other. The BOGs, adopted by donors, had analogous aims. 
 
In 2010 the relationship changed once more when, under myriad pressures, the 
Maoists called the general strike, which at least at times appeared to have relatively 
far-reaching aims, threatening to go far beyond the terms that had been set by the 
CPA and raise fundamental social and economic questions. Faced with this situation, 
NGOs became central to an alliance in opposition to the Maoists, and which 
mobilised to contain the movement. Their success was partly a product of the fact that 
the Maoists had failed to build a broad movement for social and economic change 
after the ceasefire. This in turn was a product of the fact that the Maoists had already 
accepted a political framework that foregrounded the democratic question and 
uncritically incorporated much NGO-inspired discourse. In the absence of a 
revolutionary project, NGOs were able to hegemonise layers of the middle class, and 
even sections of the urban poor, in a movement that successfully presented the crisis 
as one of conflict avoidance and social peace. Faced with a counter movement on the 
streets involving many of its erstwhile voters claiming the high ground of democratic 
process and social responsibility—values that the Maoists had recently signed up to—
the Maoists’ initiative crumbled. The 2010 general strike was the last time the Maoists 
raised economic and social questions in a concerted and class-based way. Since then, 
they have been involved in a complex constitutional struggle that has been primarily 
focused on political questions. Despite the Maoists’ original hostility to NGOs, the 
latter have continued to play a central role in Nepali society at all levels, and they 
have continued to have a profound influence on the Maoists’ political project. Having 
begun from a revolutionary perspective, one in which popular agency was central, the 
Maoists have moved closer to the NGO approach to social change on entering 
parliamentary politics. This has involved conceptualising the potential for major 
social change through direct human agency as limited to the political field, and 
conceiving economic policy as essentially a collection of technical measures whose 
main aim is the nurturing of free enterprise.  
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The left parties in Nepal have traditionally argued that socialism is only possible in 
the distant future, a position based on the theory of stages, which has long been 
dominant on the Left in the developing world. An analysis of the stagist theory and its 
consequences is crucial for understanding the character and potential for socialist 
revolution in the context of developing economies with large peasantries. That the 
Maoists explicitly adopted the theory warrants its analysis with particular reference to 
Nepal. Indeed the Maoists’ use of the theory as the basis for the People’s War has 
been explicit, and they have repeatedly argued that Nepal cannot move forward 
without the development of productive forces under capitalism. This theoretical 
approach has, however, opened itself up the possibility of a conceptual convergence 
with NGOs. While references to the level of productive forces are not common in the 
NGO literature, in practice NGOs do not challenge the neoliberal doctrine that 
development essentially equals economic growth. Many NGOs of course have a 
welfarist role, distributing basic necessities to particularly vulnerable populations. 
Even this ‘non-state’ welfare function assumes a non-political approach to the 
solution of economic problems. The majority of NGOs, however, are engaged in 
attempts to encourage the production of community self-sufficiency, local 
development and so forth, all approaches that effectively take for granted the primacy 
of the free market. While NGOs are driven by the lack of economic development 
under neoliberalism, they have ultimately attempted to make the market work. 
Without questioning the basis of the global economy at a more fundamental level, 
NGOs adopt a similar evolutionist, gradualist method: the rejection of fundamental 
transformation in favour of an increasingly professionalised and essentially technical 
approach to the problems of poverty, inequality and underdevelopment (Kamat 
2003b: 90; Lister 2003: 178). This, in the final analysis, is the essence of NGOs.  
 
6.2.2. The theory of stages 
The stagist approach to history and social change originated in the evolutionist 
approach of the Second International, an organisation of socialist and labour parties 
formed in 1889 following the dissolution of the First International, in which Karl 
Marx participated. Löwy (1980: 3) has described the stagist perspective as ‘the 
supposition of an unvarying succession of historical (economic and/or socio-political) 
stages’, whereby proletarian revolution—the aim of which is socialism as opposed to 
bourgeois democracy—could only be the final outcome of a process of 
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industrialisation. The concept of stages, first developed in a systematic way in the 
writings of Georgi Plekhanov, presupposes that a socialist revolution in a given 
country is determined mainly by its economic potential. But, Löwy asks, ‘if the 
exhaustion of potential for economic development in some abstract sense is the 
overarching structural precondition of socialism, what country could meet this 
criterion even today?’ (1980: 6). In other words, the limits of a particular country’s 
ability to develop are impossible to predict in advance, and can only be judged in 
retrospect. The growth of productive forces, according to the stagist perspective, 
becomes the defining criterion for the potential for social and political 
development.140 Drawing on Löwy (1980: 49), three related features constitute the 
essence of the stagist theory. The first is economism, which Löwy describes as ‘the 
tendency to reduce, in a non-mediated and one-sided fashion, all social, political and 
ideological contradictions to the “economic infrastructure”’. In the preface to Marx’s 
A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, the economic infrastructure of 
society is described as constituting the totality of the relations of production, which 
are themselves based on the level of productive forces. The economic infrastructure is 
‘the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure, and to which 
correspond definite forms of consciousness’ (1970: ii). This position, which was no 
more than an analytical starting point, has repeatedly been interpreted as a complete 
theory. In fact, both Marx and Engels insisted that the economic infrastructure—what 
was also referred to as the ‘base’ of society—interacts with the superstructure in a 
dialectical manner, such that each sphere influences the other.  
 
The prevailing economism of the Second International and later the rigid ‘dialectical 
materialism’ developed in Russia under Stalin had raised important questions about 
the role of economic and technological development in Marx’s theory of history as 
compared to human agency, including the role of ideology, class consciousness and 
political action. Over-privileging the economic structure of society as determining 
social life in a mechanical way not only separates economic from political struggles 
                                                
140 The concept of productive forces refers to the combination of the means of production (tools, 
machinery and factories, in addition to land and raw materials etc.) and human labour power 
(Bottomore et al. 1983: 178). Marx writes that ‘at a certain stage of development, the material 
productive forces come into conflict with the existing relations of production…’ (1970: 21), describing 
the essential conflict between capital and labour under the capitalist system, how the capitalist class 
becomes a block to the further development of productive forces, but also how the conflict between 
capital and labour points to the objective possibility for social revolution. 
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but leads to ‘economism’. Rudas (quoted in Lukács 1996: 66-7), one of the pioneers 
of dialectical materialism, is typical in ascribing immutable, natural powers to 
economic forces: ‘[T]oday’s society is subjected to certain laws, which prescribe the 
future direction of society just as necessarily as the direction of the stone that has been 
thrown is prescribed by the laws of gravity’. Critiquing the concept of economism and 
its practical application, Gramsci (1957: 160) writes of ‘the iron conviction that there 
exist objective laws for historical development of the same character as natural laws, 
with, in addition, the belief in a fatalistic finalism of a similar character to religious 
belief’. The conscious, subjective element of social life and the role of political 
struggle are effectively denied. In a polemic against economism, Gramsci argues that 
‘An appropriate political initiative is always necessary to free the economic drive 
from the tethers of traditional policies, to change, that is, the political direction of 
certain forces which must be absorbed in order to realise a new, homogenous, 
economico-political historical bloc, without internal contradictions…’ (1957: 160-1). 
Accounting for this political initiative is crucial, since it overcomes the constant 
separation of economics and politics under capitalism (Wood 1981). In a world of 
uneven development, in which some regions have advanced capitalist economies, and 
others lag behind, such an approach tends to lead to a stage-bound theory of social 
change in underdeveloped regions. If the economy—the level of industrialisation, the 
numerical weight of the working class, its capacity for production and so on—is the 
sole factor determining the potential for socialist revolution, then in some parts of the 
world the next step is unavoidably seen as the development of productive forces under 
a capitalist framework.  
 
The second key feature informing the stages theory is a narrow nationalism, and the 
corresponding tendency to underemphasise an internationalist perspective. Once an 
economistic approach to social change has been accepted, the adoption of a nationalist 
framework in an underdeveloped country almost inevitably leads to the conclusion 
that the key task is the development of national economic capacity. This in turn tends 
to lead to the privileging of national co-operation between classes and at best the 
postponement of the demands of subaltern classes, particularly those of the working 
class. As a consequence, socialist measures are unavoidably held off until the future. 
A critical approach argues that the central problem of a nationalist framework is that it 
fails to judge economic development in the context of the totality of the capitalist 
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system. In fact, the development of modes of production and the corresponding social 
forms on an international level have an impact on every part of the world (Lukács 
1977: 45). If an economy is judged in its regional or international context as opposed 
to in isolation, a very different picture can emerge. First, whereas some 
underdeveloped countries can plausibly be described as ‘pre-capitalist’ if viewed 
separately, in reality the accelerating integration of the world economy means that 
enclaves of capitalist industry within underdeveloped areas have a disproportionate 
economic importance. Second, the balance of class forces takes on a different aspect 
if judged regionally. As indicated in Chapter 3, Nepal’s economy should be seen as 
part of a complex of economic relations that extend across the subcontinent and its 
working class and peasantry can be seen as part of regional networks that include the 
massive urban centres of India.   
 
A consequence of the first two features is the third feature of stagism, what is 
described as a ‘pre-dialectical’ (Löwy 1980: 31) or undialectical approach and its 
overemphasis on objective conditions, ‘leaving no room for the revolutionary practice 
of the proletariat and its creative intervention in the political process’ (1980: 33). The 
prevailing argument on the Russian left after the revolution in 1905 was that the 
objective conditions of Russia’s economic development would determine the level of 
class consciousness amongst the proletariat i.e. the subjective conditions. In other 
words, the objective would determine the subjective, and the economy would be the 
condition of consciousness; ‘here, in two phrases, is the quintessence of the 
materialist gospel of the Second International’ (1980: 35). This undialectical approach 
precluded the immediate and complete emancipation of the working class in many 
underdeveloped countries by assigning a specific weight to each class within the 
nation in a mechanical, a priori manner without reference to wider economic links 
(1980: 35). This approach also tends to underplay the importance of wider historical 
developments. If a mechanical and nationally focused theory of economic stages 
downplays the possibility and potential of workers leading struggle at a regional level, 
it also often leads to the romanticisation of the role of at least sections of the domestic 
capitalist classes. As argued in Chapter 5, the Maoists in Nepal make a distinction 
between ‘comprador’ and ‘national’ capitalists, assigning a progressive role to the 
latter. For many Marxists, strong limits emerged as early as the mid-19th century to 
the ability or willingness of national bourgeoisies to carry through democratic change. 
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The argument runs that the emergence of mass popular challenges to bourgeois rule 
effectively ruled out radical action on the part of the bourgeoisie as they became 
concerned about unleashing uncontrollable revolutionary processes.  
 
The stagist approach also distinguishes between the tasks of the democratic revolution 
and those of the socialist revolution as if these were completely disconnected projects, 
militating against applying the category of the totality towards understanding the 
capitalist system.141 Rather, as Selwyn (2011: 425) argues, a dialectical approach, 
which is explicit in Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution, strives to account for 
‘(1) the evolving world system, (2) the timing of backward economies’ catch-up 
attempts and (3) how domestic social structures interact with international forces to 
influence a country’s development trajectory’. According to Löwy (1980: 12), Marx 
had intuited this approach in the Communist Manifesto: ‘rather than two distinct 
historical stages, the bourgeois and proletarian revolutions might in fact constitute 
only two moments of the same uninterrupted revolutionary process’.142 Rejection of 
the stages theory, however, is not to deny the notion of revolution as a process—with 
different stages—but rather, specifically the stagism as conceived during the Second 
International. In fact ‘history moves dialectically—not unilinearly—through 
innumerable combinations, fusions, discontinuities, ruptures and sudden, qualitative 
leaps’ (1980: 27). As Davidson (2012: 227) argues, such a dialectical theory of 
permanent revolution became the dominant position of the Bolshevik party and the 
Communist International from early 1917. This internationalist and dialectal analysis 
of revolution and development was largely abandoned by the communist movement 
after the emergence of Stalinism in the 1920s. For a series of complex and interrelated 
reasons, Stalin led an ideological campaign to separate contemporary revolution into a 
series of stages: ‘the first stage is the revolution of an all-national united front… the 
second stage is the bourgeois democratic revolution… the third stage is the socialist 
revolution’ (quoted in Davidson 2012: 256). As a result of his immense authority in 
                                                
141 The philosophical disciple of Plekhanov, Lenin initially defended this approach without fully 
recognising its limitations. Although he had asserted the need for an ‘uninterrupted revolution’ (Löwy 
2010: 36) with reference to the democratic and socialist revolutions, it was not until April 1917 when 
Lenin wrote his famous April Theses that he argued that political demands had to be combined with 
economic demands.  
142 Although Marx and Engels had never developed a comprehensive theory of revolution in 
underdeveloped countries, they ‘had admitted the objective possibility of a rupture in the succession of 
historical tasks’ (Löwy 2010: 8) with a dialectical articulation. 
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the international communist movement, he had exercised an enormous influence over 
the interpretation of revolutionary theory—an influence that lingers today.  
 
6.2.3. The Maoists and stagism 
The Nepali Maoists exhibited a version all of these approaches—economism, 
nationalism and the lack of a view of the totality. They used the question of the level 
of productive forces to argue that Nepal is neither ready for socialism, nor to carry out 
a socialist revolution. Instead, productive forces must be expanded through capitalist 
development. In an interview with the Financial Times, shortly before the CA 
elections, chief theoretician of the party, Baburam Bhattarai, argued: 
 
Our immediate agenda is not to build socialism but to build a strong 
economic foundation, which will pave the way towards transition to 
socialism in the future… Our main intention right now is to abolish all 
remnants of feudalism and build the way for having a developed, 
industrial, capitalistic economy in the country. That means there will be 
full scope for the private sector and nothing will be nationalised or 
socialised.143 
 
At its most extreme, this led the Maoists to conclusions they once argued against, 
including encouraging World Bank and IMF reforms and the work of NGOs in Nepal. 
The ultimate logic of this played itself out in the most dramatic way, forcing the 
Maoists to take positions in complete opposition to their rhetoric. Bhattarai stressed 
that the private sector would play a very important role in Nepal’s development and 
that the Maoist government would facilitate this role by creating a conducive 
environment for investment; all national and international investors interested in 
Nepal’s economic development were welcome. The ultimate consequence was that 
revolutionary potential was reduced to economic potential, and economic 
development was separated from political demands and social realities, constantly 
leading away from confrontation and towards accommodation.  
 
The Maoists’ conception of the national bourgeoisie is of a class that has the potential 
to fight progressive battles against the international or comprador bourgeoisie. As 
such it is a potential ally to confront international capital. As indicated, a distinction is 
                                                
143 See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2df5a098-0b96-11dd-9840-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2FOtSGWOa 
(last accessed on 15 August 2012). 
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made between national capital, which is productive, increases national investment and 
utilises national labour and resources, and comprador or bureaucratic capital, which is 
parasitic and wasteful. While the Maoists recognise that national industrialists may 
also make profits on the international market, they argue that this ‘dual character’ can 
be transformed. What they neglected to account for is that both serve to strengthen the 
capitalist system. The Maoists argue that when Nepal became economically 
dependent on Britain in the early 19th century and later India, the consequence was 
that it obstructed the development of national capital. For national capital to be 
developed, workers must work with the national capitalist class in the interests of 
capitalism. This led Bhattarai to argue: 
 
Both the management and workers have a common interest now, for the 
development of the economy. They both fought against feudalism, 
autocracy and monarchy. To create a vibrant industrial economy is now 
in the interest of both the management and the workers… There were 
some disputes, especially regarding the minimum wage issue... So what I 
appeal to the management is that they should provide the minimum wage. 
The workers shouldn’t resort to… strikes.144  
 
At one level, the Maoists appeared to be bringing the subjective and the objective 
together. For the Maoists, the objective conditions for revolution in Nepal already 
existed: the desperate socio-economic conditions of the vast majority, worsened by 
‘burgeoning bureaucratic capitalism’ (Dahal 2003: 200), and a deeply reactionary 
ruling elite at the top of a caste system, in which the subjugation and exploitation of 
the vast majority is enshrined. The mountainous and inaccessible terrain in Nepal, 
with thick forests and few roads, also made it particularly suitable to armed struggle, 
and these conditions determined at least to some extent the kind of revolution the 
Maoists thought was possible. It was the physical terrain combined with 
overwhelming poverty and underdevelopment that encouraged revolutionaries in 
Nepal to look to the conditions and experiences of their northern neighbours for 
inspiration. Much of China was rural, with a mass impoverished peasantry, 
concentrated land ownership, a relatively small working class and a semi-colonial 
existence. Maoist leaders had been brought up with pictorial magazines of the 
Cultural Revolution disseminated across Nepal by the Chinese government, and these 
                                                
144 See http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2009/01/12/interview/other-parties-fear-if-the-
budget-is-implemented-the-maoists-will-benefit/174930.html (last accessed on 4 May 2012). 
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images were of a progressive, egalitarian society.145 What was lacking in Nepal, 
according to the Nepali Maoists, was leadership; in other words, ‘the conscious 
subjective efforts of a vanguard party of the proletariat’ (2003: 201). It was on this 
basis that the Maoists formed a new party and launched the People’s War. 
 
In a sense, the Maoists’ politics were marked by a strong subjectivism and the sheer 
anger that had developed in society that led them repeatedly to denounce capitalism. 
All the same, their formal theoretical positions, while often contradictory, tended to 
be shaped by the stagism that dominated the Left internationally in general and 
Maoist movements in particular. The theory won out over more radical impulses. The 
Maoist leadership repeatedly claimed ‘the historical necessity of passing through the 
sub-stage of democratic republic in the specificities of Nepal’ (Bhattarai 2005: 1513). 
Emphasis on the level of productive forces, putting the aspirations of the nation—in 
terms of economic development, independence from India and so on—before the fight 
against the capitalist system, the Maoists’ insisted on the need for a series of stages 
before the development of socialism, citing the ostensibly unique conditions of Nepal: 
 
Since we belong to a communist party, our maximum goals are socialism 
and communism. Those are the maximum goals of all those accepting 
Marxism, Leninism and Maoism as philosophical and ideological 
assumptions. Given the international power balance and the overall 
economic, political and social realities of the country, we can’t attain 
those goals at the moment. We must accept this ground reality. We have 
mentioned democratic republic and Constituent Assembly, with the 
understanding that we should be flexible given the balance in the class 
struggle and international situation.146 
 
6.2.4. NGOs and stagist assumptions 
The underlying assumptions about development held by NGOs dovetail in many 
respects with the conclusions that the Maoists draw from the theory of stages.  
The Maoists’ emphasis on capitalist economic development as a pre-requisite for 
social emancipation leads them to a separation of the economic and the political. This 
separation is mirrored in the NGO approach. One of the clearest examples of this 
separation is the distinction made between generations of rights—the first generation 
being civil and political rights and the second generation economic and social rights, 
                                                
145 Interview with Indra Mohan Sigdel, London, 5 December 2011. 
146 See http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2006/02/07/editorial/we-want-to-stop-
bloodshed-prachanda/64859.html (last accessed on 5 May 2012). 
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embodied in distinct UN conventions. This separation is a product of the 
understanding that support for economic and social rights is more difficult for states 
than civil and political rights because economic rights have the potential to contradict 
neoliberal reforms that challenge the provision of goods by the market (Nelson and 
Dorsey 2003: 2022). This partly reflects the fragmented approach to development that 
NGOs have taken as they have become more professionalised. The separation of the 
political and the economic, and the fragmented approach to development that NGOs 
have taken in Nepal particularly, is also partly a consequence of the 
professionalisation of the NGO sector since the 1990s. Heaton Shrestha (2006b: 195) 
argues that there were several reasons for needing to professionalise. NGOs felt they 
had to distance themselves from the corruption and largely self-serving interests of the 
government, in which promotions and access to services were based on nepotism and 
the notion of aphno manchhe [one’s own people].147 This was particularly important 
given that the SSNCC had developed a reputation for corruption. At the same time, it 
was important to establish a measure of credibility with the public, in order that the 
past failures of development could be addressed by NGOs in the new context of 
neoliberal development. It also reflected the pressure from donors who were, from the 
1990s, channelling much of their aid through NGOs. Donor governments wanted to 
be sure that the organisations they were dealing with reflected their own emphasis on 
the ‘depoliticisation’ of development while upholding notions of ‘human rights’. 
 
Human rights and development work have been traditionally seen as separate 
domains, and although rights-based approaches, which emerged in the mid-1990s, 
appeared to challenge this separation, in fact they did so only at the level of rhetoric 
(Uvin 2002: 6). There remains a strong division of labour within the NGO sector. 
                                                
147 This term was popularised in the 1990s in development circles in Nepal following a controversial 
publication by Bista (1991), which argued that the characteristics that defined modern Nepali culture—
high-caste, Hindu culture in particular—were fatalism, hierarchy, dependency and a lack of agency—
and that this culture was becoming more pervasive throughout Nepal. Aphno manchhe was described as 
‘a critical Nepali institution’ (1991: 98) privileging those in one’s inner circle, regardless of merit or 
capacity, for the sake of belonging and security. This was clearly a problematic thesis, for it failed to 
account for the dynamic social and political changes brought about by the 1990 movement for 
democracy, and could not have explained the subsequent emergence of the Maoists. These movements 
acutely demonstrated the existence of agency amongst the population, and cut against the notion that 
fatalism defines Nepali society. While it is true that multiparty democracy resulted in greater levels of 
corruption, and the People’s War ultimately ended in a Bahun-led compromise, it is arguable that these 
were the consequences of an elite drive towards liberalisation and the increasing inequality that this 
generated (see Chapter 3), and internal and external pressures on the Maoists to end the war (see 
Chapter 5), in order for liberalisation to continue.  
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Most human rights organisations continue to focus on civil and political rights, and 
most development organisations continue to work on health, education and so forth. 
More significantly, the use of the language of human rights, focusing on the status of 
the individual, can lead development organisations even further away than they 
already were from any interrogation of economic structures. According to Uvin 
(2002: 10) the consequence has been ‘draping oneself in the mantle of human rights to 
cover the fat belly of the development community while avoiding challenging the 
status quo too much, cross-examining oneself, or questioning the international 
system’. Thus while the shift from needs-based approaches to rights-based approaches 
was an attempt by NGOs to strengthen the commitment of states to human rights 
(Nelson and Dorsey 2003: 2013), including economic and social rights, economic 
liberalisation as the basis for development was in practice not questioned (Tsikata 
2004: 131). The World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), for 
example, which continue to promote the paradigm that neoliberal growth policies are 
synonymous with development, are universally accepted by NGOs, and NGOs often 
agree to participate in consultations of the PRSPs on behalf of the poor. The 
neoliberal economic paradigm is accepted as an objective framework that does not 
require more than technical improvements. The project of development under existing 
conditions, however flawed, is regarded as better than no development at all. The role 
of NGOs is not to question it, but to make it work as best they can. 
 
A national framework also tends to be taken for granted in the work of NGOs. While 
the Maoists assume that national capitalists will bring economic growth, there is an 
assumption amongst NGOs that the international community has Nepal’s best 
interests at heart. Despite the rhetoric of internationalism and international advocacy, 
the concrete work of NGOs takes place at the national level, and even much of the 
advocacy at international level is for specific countries, as if the development of each 
nation was not bound up with every other nation. Finally, the emphasis on human 
rights, and the downplaying of the political aspects of economic development, has 
advanced the notion that NGOs have to remain neutral over political issues. In Nepal, 
the question of civil war was avoided by NGOs for the first several years; later, NGOs 
were actively engaged in trying to end it. Following the war, NGOs have encouraged 
the prioritisation of ethnic over class questions. 
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6.3. From armed struggle to ethnic politics  
For a time, the Nepali Maoists represented hope in the face of bleak social prospects. 
Ultimately, however, adherence to the theoretical tenets of Maoism—combined with a 
number of pressures, including from NGOs—helped facilitate the shift away from 
revolutionary politics to cultural politics, and weakened the Left. The Maoists’ 
evolution was characterised by the transition from armed struggle to ethnic politics, 
while UML cadres went from being revolutionaries to ardent human rights activists. 
These transformations involved the rejection of violence, but also an analysis of 
society that is not sufficiently industrialist; under current conditions, the working class 
cannot be the agent of history. In both cases, Maoism could not provide a coherent 
alternative with which to challenge liberal humanitarianism. But NGOs and donors 
also had a role in shaping these transformations at key moments. Throughout the 
panchayat, NGOs and donors were deterred from funding disadvantaged nationalities 
(Bhattachan 2000: 77), but they also considered funding ethnic organisations to be 
encouraging subversion; in order to avoid such prospects they argued that a 
development strategy centred on indigenous nationalities would violate ‘the internal 
political affairs of the country’ (2000: 78). However, beginning in the late 1990s and 
as a result of the launch of the People’s War, they have funded ethnic organisations in 
order to create an alternative to class struggle. The focus on identity-based federalism 
as a basis for restructuring the state—effectively replacing class demands—is 
currently the Maoists’ main political project, but which itself has been undermined 
because of the mainstream parties’ inability to agree the constitution. All parties, 
including the Maoists, have been calling for national consensus around major 
constitutional issues. Without agreement over the question of federalism, the 
constitutional process has been unable to move forward. Federalism now represents 
one of the main ideological divisions in Nepali society, and various janajati 
[indigenous] leaders view the constitutional process as an opportunity to enshrine the 
rights they have historically been denied. Indeed, the janajati movement could work 
to challenge existing social relations; that the Bahun-Chhetri-dominated political 
parties—mainly the Nepali Congress and the UML—refused to accept identity-based 
federalism is evidence of the threat that increased power for ethnic minorities poses to 
this elite. However, an ethnic movement that is detached from a wider class project 
also has the potential to fragment along ethnic lines, consolidating a janajati elite 
amongst individual ethnic groups and escalating into ethnic tensions. While the 
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Maoists’ foregrounding of ethnicity was important, they failed to distinguish a 
hierarchy between class demands and more specific demands around self-
determination, which has stoked ethnic differences instead of defusing them.   
 
6.3.1. Federalism and the ethnic agenda 
Since their triumph in the CA elections in 2008, the Maoists’ trajectory has essentially 
been one of accommodation. Whereas once the Maoists’ agenda was pulling 
mainstream politics to the left, and divisions in society cut along class lines, today the 
central divisions are along ethnic lines. The Maoists were not, of course, the first to 
challenge inequalities between ethnic groups, which have been entrenched in Nepali 
society since its unification. Various nationalities governed themselves before Prithvi 
Narayan Shah, with his imperialist ambitions, sought to unify them (2000: 75). Ethnic 
discrimination was consolidated under the Muluki Ain of 1854—Nepal’s first attempt 
to codify social conditions—mainly by referring to Hindu legal texts and Mughal 
legislation. While the Muluki Ain integrated different social groups within Hindu caste 
hierarchy, it subsumed ethnic groups in a subordinate position within this hierarchy 
(Malagodi 2013: 79). Only from the 1950s did this discrimination give rise to the 
formation of ethnic organisations, whose focus was nevertheless limited to cultural 
and linguistic rights (Bhattachan 2000: 76). In the late 1970s, when the first signs of 
opposition to the system were being felt, democracy activists began to question ethnic 
exclusion from a political perspective. Following the 1980 referendum there was 
increased space for ethnic mobilisation, in part because of fewer restrictions on 
political activity, but also because the government wanted to enlist ethnic minorities 
in support of the regime (Whelpton 2005: 183), increasingly weakened by democracy 
activists. As differences between rhetoric and reality grew sharper under the 
panchayat regime, ethnicity began to acquire a political dimension (Gellner 2007: 
1825). New ethnic associations were formed pressing for language rights and 
promoting awareness about ethnic discrimination and historic injustices.  
 
When the issue of political representation was brought to the fore during the 1990 
people’s movement, the struggle for ethnic rights expanded significantly. Major 
political parties began to raise the issue of the historic discrimination of indigenous 
nationalities. National and international NGOs began to recognise ethnic rights as 
central to development efforts. Ethnic leaders—as heads of NGOs and parties but also 
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as academics and intellectuals—have also attempted to reflect grievances among 
ethnic groups, both in terms of discrimination on the basis of culture and language but 
also jobs and access to goods and services. As Gellner (2007: 1823) observes, ‘if the 
panchayat era was one of nation-building, the post-1990 democratic change marked 
the beginning of ethnicity-building’. The new constitution provided the legal 
framework through which different ethnic groups could claim existence, defining the 
nation as multiethnic, multilingual and democratic (Pfaff-Czarnecka 1999: 41). At the 
same time, however, the 1990 Constitution upheld Nepal as a Hindu kingdom and 
Nepali as the main language, making it impossible for the aspiration of a multiethnic, 
multilingual Nepal to be realised. Ethnic federalism became an issue because of the 
failures to implement the 1990 Constitution; decentralisation in particular, enshrined 
in the Local Self-Governance Act 1999, which would provide Nepal’s ethnic 
minorities with greater access to resources at local level, was never implemented in 
practice.148 The following statistics are taken from the Central Bureau of Statistics and 
although trends should be treated with prudence, they demonstrate levels of exclusion 
and inequality amongst ethnic groups and by caste. Table 6.1 shows the incidence of 
poverty by caste and ethnic group between 1995-96 and 2003-04, while Table 6.2 
shows per capita income in rural and urban areas. Table 6.3 shows the representation 
of different caste and ethnic groups in parliament between 1959 and 1999. 
 
 Poverty Headcount Rate 
Caste and Ethnic Group 1995-96 2003-04 Change 
Bahun/Chhetri 34.1 18.4 -46 
Tarai Middle Caste 28.7 21.3 -26 
Dalit 57.8 45.5 -21 
Newar 19.3 14.0 -28 
Hill Janajati 48.7 44.0 -10 
Tarai Janajati 53.4 35.4 -34 
Muslim 43.7 41.3 -6 
Table 6.1: Poverty amongst caste and ethnic groups. Source: Adapted from Lawoti (2010: 74) 
 
 
 Average Per Capita Income (Rs.) for 2003-04 
Caste and Ethnic Group Income Urban Rural 
Bahun/Chhetri 18,400 33,731 15,674 
Tarai Middle Caste 11,300 12,736 11,212 
Dalit 10,000 19,381 9,026 
Newar 26,100 36,600 14,660 
                                                
148 Interview with Seira Tamang, Kathmandu, 24 March 2010. 
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Hill Janajati 13,500 26,448 11,987 
Tarai Janajati 12,700 14,106 12,719 
Muslim 10,200 11,563 10,126 
Nepal 15,000 28,957 12,534 
Table 6.2: Average per capita income. Source: Adapted from Lawoti (2010: 89) 
 
 
1959 1967 1978 1986 1991 1999 Caste and 
Ethnic Group No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Bahun 30 28 30 24 27 21 23 21 77 38 77 38 
Chhetri 34 31 47 38 46 36 43 38 39 19 44 22 
Newar 4 3.7 15 12 10 7.9 7 6.3 14 6.8 14 6.8 
Janajati (except 
Newar) 
21 19 21 17 28 22 29 26 48 23 35 17 
Tarai High and 
Middle Caste 
18 17 11 8.8 11 11 10 8.9 21 10 27 13 
Muslim 2 1.8 0 0 1 0.8 0 0 5 2.8 2 0.9 
Dalit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 109 100 125 100 127 100 112 100 205 100 205 100 
Table 6.3: Representation in parliament. Source: Adapted from Lawoti (2010: 91) 
 
A number of ethnic organisations were established with the explicit purpose of 
implementing those rights as defined in the constitution. The Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) was formed in 1991 as a national pressure group, 
and currently comprises 48 indigenous organisations across the country advocating 
rights to self-determination and autonomy. These organisations, together with NEFIN, 
were provided further legitimacy when the government endorsed the UN’s 
International Year of the World’s Indigenous People in 1993 and the subsequent 
International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People in 1995; in 2007 Nepal signed 
up to International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 169, which aims to 
guarantee equal treatment for indigenous people, and in some cases preferential 
rights. The second people’s movement for democracy in 2006 reinforced the janajati 
movement, not only because of the massive participation of ethnic groups but also 
because it laid the foundation for the Constituent Assembly, which declared Nepal a 
secular republic. Removing the Hindu monarch as a symbol of national unity was a 
momentous step forward in weakening centuries of cultural and linguistic domination. 
But following the 2006 movement and the entry of the Maoists into the mainstream, 
Nepal has witnessed a ‘surge of ethnic conflict’ (Hangen 2007: vii). The mass protests 
in the Terai organised by Madhesi parties in early 2007, although they quickly turned 
violent and raised tensions between Madhesis and hill migrants, were successful in 
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pushing for guarantees for federalism—guarantees that neither the Maoists nor other 
political parties can backtrack on. To what extent autonomous provinces will take on 
an ethnic character has yet to be worked out. 
 
The ostensible fear amongst Bahun-Chhetri groups was that they would be unable to 
find a place to live within ethnic-based provinces. According to one interviewee, it 
was never the intention of the ethnic groups to create fear, but nor have they ever 
made efforts to clearly dispel this fear.149 Ethnic leaders have not considered the 
details of current proposals put forward by the constitutional drafting committee and 
have failed to come up with viable alternative solutions to the problems and fears 
raised by Bahun-Chhetri groups. The choices being presented are either a so-called 
romantic ethnic federalism, whereby ethnic federalism is seen as the panacea for the 
historic discrimination of ethnic groups, or no federalism at all, which is what Bahun-
Chhetri groups would like to see.150 One proposal put forward by the constitutional 
drafting committee was that the dominant ethnic group from a particular region would 
be recognised as such by the name of the province; another proposal stipulated that 
the head of the province would be reserved for the dominant ethnic minority for the 
first two years. But even these privileges, proposed in the initial stages of drafting, are 
slowly being eliminated or qualified. For example, ethnic names are to be combined 
with names based on geography, such as rivers or mountains. The current draft of the 
constitution, however, does include important provisions for decentralisation and 
increased power for ethnic minorities. The reality is that Nepal is a nation of 
minorities, and no ethnic group within any given province would form a majority. 
However, the extent to which ethnic leaders represent the interests and desires of 
ethnic groups, and in particular the poor within these groups, is debatable. Leaders 
have been emotive in their defence of ethnic interests, and this highly emotional 
environment combined with a lack of clarity about the details of how federalism 
would work, could fuel ethnic tensions in the future. Understandably, because ethnic 
federalism has been linked to the possibility of concrete provisions for 
decentralisation and the prospects for increased access to goods and services, in 
addition to political and cultural rights, ethnic groups support it.  
 
                                                
149 Interview with Seira Tamang, Kathmandu, 24 March 2010. 
150 Interview with Seira Tamang, Kathmandu, 24 March 2010. 
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6.3.2. The Maoists’ historic compromise 
The Maoists’ basic theoretical position on the national question was outlined in the 
mid-1990s, although Baburam Bhattarai had written about the national question as far 
back as the early 1980s (Bhattarai 1990: 33). The Maoists’ defence of ethnic interests 
in particular, along with questions of class, were recognised as ‘inevitable 
components of the democratic revolution’ (Yami 2006: 128). Given Nepal’s ethnic 
diversity, addressing the national question was crucial, and the Maoists attempted to 
address the historical exclusion of ethnic groups more concretely than any other party 
(Tamang 2006: 272). That ethnic groups were forming associations and raising 
demands for inclusion before the Maoists also indicates that the Maoists were 
responding to the felt concerns of ethnic minorities. The Maoists argued that Nepal 
suffers from essentially two forms of national oppression: the first is the semi-colonial 
domination of Nepal by India, manifested in unequal treaties such as the 1950 India-
Nepal Treaty; Indian interference in Nepal’s political affairs; Indian control of the 
vast majority of trade and industry in Nepal, including the exploitation of its water 
and other resources; and the promotion of Hindu nationalism in Nepal (Yami 2006: 
132-33). Other imperialist powers such as Britain, through the recruitment of 
Gurkhas, and the US, through its domination of the World Bank and IMF, exert 
‘neocolonial’ domination over Nepal. The second form of oppression, they argued, is 
internal; that is, the subjection of weaker nationalities by the dominant nationality. In 
the case of the Nepal, the janajatis or those who speak Tibeto-Burman languages, are 
oppressed by the ruling Khas nationality, whose language, dress and religion, until 
recently enjoyed state patronage. The Maoists’ attempted to briefly classify the 
relative disadvantage of different indigenous groups, from advanced group to 
endangered group, but maintained that ‘the question of Indian expansionism is 
practically the most important aspect’ (2006: 135) of the national question in Nepal. 
They also warned that imperialist countries have sought to divide the nationalities 
movement and portray it as communal and sectarian.  
 
Revolutionaries, the Maoists argued, must take up the national question seriously 
while at the same time avoiding the two extreme positions, one of assigning absolute 
primacy to the national question without a class perspective, and its opposite, which is 
dismissing the national question as a ‘bourgeois obsession’ (2006: 128). Although the 
basis of the People’s War was ostensibly class struggle, it was deepening poverty, 
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rising unemployment and the growing gap between rich and poor that were cited as 
reasons for taking up arms in the immediate. In practice, however, the Maoists put 
class struggle and the national question on the same level; when the People’s War was 
brought to an end, they were relegated to taking the former ‘extreme’ position: 
foregrounding questions of ethnicity while abandoning a class perspective. The 
Maoists continue to claim they have not abandoned class demands, but even a cursory 
look at Nepali politics reveals that the Maoists are mired in the ‘bourgeois’ tasks of 
constitution-making and peacebuilding, while the socio-economic conditions of the 
vast majority remain the same.151  
 
This is not to argue that raising the ethnic question was irrelevant, or that 
incorporating historically oppressed indigenous peoples and Dalits as collaborators in 
the revolutionary struggle was not a momentous step forward. Early in the People’s 
War the Maoists formed an ethnic wing, the All Nepal Nationalities Organisation, led 
by Suresh Ale Magar, a leading activist who was also the founding general secretary 
of NEFIN. They also established separate national liberation front organisations—all 
affiliated to the party—including fronts for Magars, Gurungs, Tharus, Tamangs and 
other ethnic groups, as well as Dalit and Madhesi organisations. Then in 2003 they 
declared nine autonomous regions across the country based on nationality, and 
promoted ethnic leaders in areas under Maoist control. The Maoists also campaigned 
for ethnicity-based federalism during the 2008 elections. The argument was that since 
there would be no single ethnic majority in any given autonomous state, all ethnic 
minorities within each of these states would be guaranteed their rights. 
Unquestionably, the defence of ethnic minorities and the establishment of various 
liberation fronts brought the Maoists some important political benefits: increased 
support from excluded groups and more votes. But playing ‘the ethnic card’ (Gellner 
2007: 1827) was neither entirely accurate nor entirely opportunistic, as has been 
suggested (Lawoti 2003), because this implies that ethnic activists joined the Maoists 
independently of ideological conviction—that they could not possibly develop a 
revolutionary consciousness that is broader than identity politics by virtue of their 
ethnic background. In fact, the creation of ethnic fronts was useful for furthering the 
                                                
151 See news.oneindia/in/2011/01/15/maoistsnot-abandoning-path-of-revolutionbhattarai-aid0126.html 
(last accessed on 21 January 2013). 
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revolution and creating a new consciousness among oppressed groups. The problem is 
what they have become: ethnic fronts without a revolutionary project. 
 
To what extent have the Maoists facilitated a shift from class struggle to identity 
politics, what specific structural constraints have they faced and what are the 
consequences of this shift? Whether such a shift has taken place can be judged by 
assessing the Maoists’ political trajectory in practice: they suspended the People’s 
War through a negotiated settlement facilitated by India in 2006, and were until 
recently at the helm of a coalition government with mainstream parties who have a 
considerable record of neglecting the aspirations of the majority. After signing the 
CPA, which officially ended the war, Dahal declared that ‘ethnic issues are the real 
issues to be addressed at the moment’ (cited in Hangen 2007: 47). If, according to the 
Maoists’ analysis, the socialist project is impossible in the present, then the only 
alternative is the postponement of class demands to an unknown point in the future, 
and the replacement of those demands with an alternative politics around which the 
Maoists can rally support. What the Maoists currently preside over is a firmly 
capitalist project, with identity-based federalism as the starting point for restructuring 
the state.152 Yet the details of how competing ethnic demands will be 
accommodated—and the potential for ethnic conflict averted as tensions rise—appear 
to be lacking. For this the Maoists have been criticised from both the Left and the 
Right. Broadly speaking, the Maoists, various ethnic and indigenous peoples’ 
organisations, including NEFIN and its member organisations, and the Madhesis, all 
favour some form of identity-based federalism. There are also more marginal Bahun 
and Chhetri groups that have mobilised on the basis of ethnicity and culture, wanting 
to secure a place for themselves in the new federal structure. Those against ethnic 
federalism include the Nepali Congress and the UML, and various smaller communist 
parties. Each side of the ethnic federalism divide also has various intellectuals, 
academics, journalists and other prominent spokespeople in support. Upper-caste 
Bahuns and Chhetris in general blame the Maoists for encouraging the potential for 
state fragmentation and undermining national unity; one view is that ethnic rights 
                                                
152 At times the Maoists stress that nationality rather than ethnicity would determine state restructuring, 
but these concepts are often used interchangeably and are both closely related to indigeneity. In 
deciding whether to apply preferential rights for indigenous groups as stipulated in ILO Convention 
169, for example, the use of the term nationality will not appease those who stand to lose out. 
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threaten upper-caste cultural domination.153 Others point to the very real possibility 
that ethnic mobilisation—without a mechanism for how ethnic rights are to be 
implemented in practice for all, including the poorest—has the potential to lead to a 
reinforcement of the power of traditional elites, but now with a dangerous ethnic 
dimension (Sharma 2012: 48; Gellner 2011; Ghai 2011: 326).154 Unless concrete 
economic benefits can be secured for all Nepalis regardless of ethnic background, 
then raised expectations for ethnic rights will only promote ethnic division. 
Addressing economic exclusion—and in particular access to resources, jobs and 
services—is difficult in the context of deprivation, but requires challenging elite 
authority across all ethnic backgrounds, not creating the conditions for competition 
for resources on an ethnic basis. 
 
The shift from class struggle to identity politics can also be assessed through a 
consideration of the Maoists’ theoretical premises regarding the national question. In 
an influential 1996 document entitled ‘Nationality Question in Nepal’, which was 
reprinted in 2006, they noted the following: 
 
In the present era of imperialism as the weak national bourgeoisie of the 
oppressed countries cannot bring about democratic revolutions or lead 
national liberation movements on their own, the proletariat should lead 
both the democratic revolution and the national liberation movement in 
the oppressed countries. It is thus obvious that the national question is 
inseparably interlinked with the class question and would be 
simultaneously solved only through the New Democratic Revolution. This 
theoretical clarity is essential before we delve into the national question 
in Nepal or elsewhere. (Yami 2006: 130) 
 
In beginning to analyse the complex relations between class and ethnicity, the Maoists 
made an important distinction between questions of class and questions of national 
liberation. Quoting Lenin, Bhattarai later reiterated the Maoists’ position: ‘In the same 
way as mankind can arrive at the abolition of classes only through a transition period 
of the dictatorship of the oppressed class, it can arrive at the inevitable integration of 
nations only through a transition period of the complete emancipation of all oppressed 
                                                
153 For example, Chhetri Samaj Nepal, an organisation set up in 1997 to advance the identity and 
interests of Chhetris, has grown significantly since 2009 and has recently organised street protests 
demanding that Chhetris be declared an indigenous group. 
154 See also an interview with David Seddon at 
http://nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=19569#.UjdHtNLNl8E (last accessed on 3 February 2013). 
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nations, i.e. their freedom to secede’ (cited in Bhattarai 2004). Lenin (1914) also 
wrote that the self-determination of nations could not mean anything other than 
political self-determination, that is, the right to secede and form a separate state. He 
argued that the right to secede is the most democratic approach to the national 
question because it recognised the need for nationalities oppressed by the tsarist 
monarchy to break from this oppression. Based on this understanding, Bhattarai 
(2004) further argued, ‘we should firmly grasp that the best way to solve the national 
question is to implement the right to self-determination of oppressed nationalities 
under the leadership of the proletariat according to the concrete time, place and 
conditions’. The Maoists had made significant advances not only by defending the 
struggle for self-determination amongst ethnic groups, but recognising that these 
struggles could destabilise prevailing social relations. Indeed, ethnic groups who have 
faced discrimination in Nepal for centuries have recently been making powerful 
demands on Nepal’s constitution-writing process. Under the banner of the Indigenous 
Nationalities Joint Struggle Committee, they also mobilised a 3-day nationwide 
general strike in May 2012, demanding identity-based federalism as the basis for the 
new constitution. In November, former UML vice-chairman Ashok Rai announced 
the formation of the Federal Socialist Party, which recognises identity-based 
federalism as a legitimate aim but is not solely an ethnic party. The following month, 
janajati leaders mainly associated with the Nepali Congress formed the Social 
Democratic Pluri-National Party, aimed at uniting indigenous peoples, Dalits, 
Muslims, Madhesis and other oppressed groups under a social democratic agenda. As 
Tamang (2006: 271) has argued, the role of the Maoists in the emergence and 
maintenance of this movement cannot be underestimated. 
 
What the Maoists had not appreciated was that the national question needed to be 
raised precisely in order to defuse it: as Lenin saw it, the struggle for socialism had to 
be pursued in unity with workers and the oppressed of all nations. The Maoists 
interpreted the national question in Leninist terms to mean the formation of separate 
organisational forms along ethnic lines, rather than ensuring that ethnic demands are 
articulated through a wider class project. Without the primacy of a class perspective, 
national liberation taken to its logical conclusion means nothing other than secession, 
which ultimately loses the focus on class unity across nationalities. Moreover, the 
Maoists had not elucidated how the New Democratic Revolution, being a sub-stage 
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towards socialism, would succeed in simultaneously solving both class and national 
questions. The ethnic movement—aided by NGOs and donor funding in an 
international context where indigenous rights have been valorised by the neoliberal 
state—now has a political trajectory that is largely independent, and perhaps even 
contrary to, class struggle. The Maoists were left open to this subversion because they 
put the ethnic struggle on the same level as the class struggle. As Lenin (1913) 
argued, the focus on autonomy distracts attention away from the task of democratising 
the state, which itself alone can ensure peace between nationalities. He concluded 
that, ‘workers who place political unity with “their own” bourgeoisie above complete 
unity with the proletariat of all nations, are acting against their own interests, against 
the interests of socialism and against the interests of democracy’. In addition to 
supporting the right to self-determination in principle then, it was necessary to 
conduct an implacable struggle against the bourgeoisie when it sanctioned or 
defended national oppression. This precludes making alliances with the national 
bourgeoisie in order to fight against an external oppressor, since there would always 
be a tendency on the part of the bourgeoisie to turn against the workers, including 
those of the oppressed nationalities. But this is precisely what has happened in Nepal: 
the Maoists entered into a coalition government with the national capitalists, which 
also happen to be dominated by Bahun-Chhetri groups, and have since been unable to 
address either questions of class or ethnicity. Thus the Maoists, having embraced the 
neoliberal line in the hope of growing Nepal’s working class, have played into the 
hands of donors, because of their own abandonment of a wider class project. Having 
facilitated the emergence of an ethnic movement that places ethnic demands at the 
same level as class demands, they may have also unleashed ethnic tensions that have 
the potential to escalate in the future. 
 
6.3.3. Replacing class demands 
It has been argued that one outcome of the end of the People’s War has been the 
Maoists’ replacement of what was essentially a class struggle—at least initially—with 
an emphasis at national level on identity. There are three related problems with 
replacing class demands with ethnic politics. First, it discounts economic 
differentiation within ethnic communities and facilitates the continued domination of 
ethnic elites within a particular group, who have markedly different levels of cultural 
and intellectual development and whose ambitions and demands are therefore in 
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potential contradiction to those of the poorest. Second, it risks inflating ethnic 
divisions instead of defusing them. Identity-based federal restructuring in particular 
has the potential to become an explosive issue and diverts attention away from the 
inability of a consensus-based constitution to deal adequately with the ethnic question. 
Finally, it strengthens the capacity for NGOs and powerful Western donors, who 
already exercise extraordinary influence in Nepal, to dictate the terms of the peace 
process and the trajectory of development for Nepal. How ethnic rights are realised in 
practice—whether through autonomous governments under a new constitution or 
through an entirely new political framework that accentuates economic inclusion in 
addition to ethnic inclusion—is the key question.  
 
As outlined in Chapter 5, from the beginning of the People’s War, those in favour of 
the status quo attempted to demobilise the movement. The mainstream political 
parties, ethnic and religious elites, and foreign powers, including India and major 
donors, have all in different ways opposed the Maoists. But it is not because they 
feared the inclusion or exclusion of ethnic minorities; the real concern was the threat 
that the poor would pose to the economic and political dominance of the ruling order 
itself. Ironically, this threat was ultimately a problem for the Maoists themselves. This 
is why they preferred to suspend the People’s War and thereby postpone class 
demands: Nepal is not ready for fundamental economic transformation because it has 
yet to reach the capitalist stage of development. To pursue the path of capitalist 
development, the Maoists agitated to lead government. In August 2011, Baburam 
Bhattarai became prime minister with the help of the United Democratic Madhesi 
Front (UDMF). Although the Madhesis broke with the Maoists and created the 
UDMF after the signing of the CPA in 2006, they formed a coalition government with 
the Maoists in 2011. This was not on the basis of the Maoists’ class demands or 
revolutionary credentials but on their agreement over redefining the Terai as a single 
autonomous unit called Madhes, and securing positions for Madhesi leaders in 
government.155 The historic marginalisation of the Madhesis, as with all other ethnic 
groups, needs to be addressed. But in the absence of a wider project of transformation 
along class lines, the prioritising of ethnic policies can lead to social fragmentation 
through the diversion of discontent into ethnic channels. Even if fragmentation is 
                                                
155 The formation of a single Madhes state is opposed by the Tharus who inhabit the western Terai, and 
who have warned of reprisals if the land they inhabit is not declared autonomous.  
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avoided, there is no guarantee in these circumstances that the most oppressed will 
benefit. But if ethnic groups are differentiated by class, and ethnic autonomy enables 
upward mobility for a section of the group, then the economic minority within the 
ethnic minority risks further exclusion and discrimination. The elites within a 
particular ethnic group, whose interests vacillate between those of the ruling elite and 
those of their ethnic community, risk being strengthened if class demands are 
abandoned. For those ethnic groups in which there is relatively less economic 
differentiation, the demand for ethnic rights has the potential to challenge the class 
structure of Nepali society, and as such is likely to be sidelined by a government that 
is committed to maintaining that structure in the pursuit of capitalist development. 
 
The Maoists also want to avoid increased violence between ethnic groups. But their 
foregrounding of federalism on the basis of identity, or even nationality, ignores the 
fact that a constitution drawn up in collaboration with the mainstream parties will not 
be a ‘people’s constitution’, as the Maoists were hoping, but a compromise between 
opposing social forces. Such a constitution would be unable to realise ethnic rights 
because these rights ultimately involve economic questions. It is widely accepted that 
janajati votes have always gone to those representatives who are in the best position 
to fulfil basic economic demands: access to jobs and better health, education and other 
services (Housden 2010; Boquérat 2006). Ethnic minorities have undoubtedly been on 
the sharp end of the liberalisation policies of the 1980s and 90s, and which have 
resulted in rising income inequality (Wagle 2010: 573). Thus while the focus on 
ethnic inclusion gained the Maoists initial popular support during the war, those in 
favour of ethnic federalism constitute a minority; this is because of its association 
with the potential for ethnic violence, particularly after clashes between Madhesis and 
hill migrants surfaced in the Terai following the end of the war.156 The Maoists’ 
inability to defuse the ethnic question is partly to do with the fact that they are not 
leading a revolutionary government, with democratic institutions at the local level that 
could make decisions on the redistribution of resources. But the Maoists’ illusion that 
the ethnic question can be addressed by making a series of constitutional 
                                                
156 A poll conducted of over 4,000 respondents by Himalmedia in May 2011 showed that 76 per cent of 
the population opposes ethnic federalism. See 
http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue/2012/04/4/Nation/18228 (last accessed on 23 February 2013). 
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amendments—or other technical interventions through the state—under what is 
effectively an unchanged political framework, may also be their undoing.  
 
This is not dissimilar to the approach that NGOs have taken to addressing ethnic 
inclusion, and this is the final problem for the Maoists: the influence of external 
powers, against which the Maoists fought since the beginning of the war. NGOs and 
donors in Nepal began to express an interest in funding ethnic inclusion projects 
because of the new development paradigm around social inclusion in the late 1990s 
(Hangen 2007: 42). They argued that inclusion would promote political stability. But 
as Hangen suggests, this also promoted the idea that social problems can be resolved 
by technical solutions rather than politics (2007: 42). For donors—and by extension 
NGOs—political stability meant avoiding the question of class and the economic 
system that produces it, and facilitating an engagement with ethnic organisations that 
allowed protest, but not an outright challenge to the state. Hangen identifies the 
problem from a donor perspective: if ethnic organisations ‘cannot be responsive to 
ethnic political demands, indigenous nationalities may seek to challenge the state in 
more revolutionary ways, creating further conflicts’ (2007: 42). Thus the funding of 
ethnic organisations was crucial, and donors have been funding a range of different 
ethnic organisations and initiatives as part of their investment in the peace process. 
NEFIN in particular has been one of the main recipients of this funding.  
 
Over the past decade NEFIN has become a key player in Nepali politics and, together 
with the Maoists, has managed to put indigenous rights issues high on the national 
political agenda. Although NEFIN refers to itself as independent and non-partisan, it 
has effectively adopted the Maoists’ position on state restructuring based on 
nationality, language and cultural identity, and has argued for autonomous provinces 
and rights to self-determination. It supports secularism and the creation of ethnic-
based fronts and organisations. However, it also seeks to work with a range of NGOs 
and donors to obtain funding and international support for its activities. NEFIN has 
co-operated on several projects with donors, including with the European 
Commission, the ILO, DFID and the World Bank, and has partnered with several 
NGOs, including Care, ActionAid and others. Its ability to partner with international 
organisations gives it a legitimacy that has been useful in raising its profile. But as 
NEFIN increases its political engagement, its obligations to donors—specifically to 
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be non-political—are compromised. In 2004 NEFIN acquired a multi-year multi-
million pound grant from DFID. There had been debates within the janajati 
movement as to whether the involvement of donors would risk diluting demands, but 
when economic resources are at stake, ethnic elites in particular have responded to 
donor projects. As Bhattachan (2000: 79) has suggested, nationalities would work 
with NGOs if they supported them in realising demands for ethnic autonomy and 
literacy programmes in mother tongues. Financial resources are essential for ethnic 
groups to realise their aspirations, but organisations like NEFIN face dilemmas over 
the extent to which donors use ethnic marginalisation to suppress further 
politicisation, particularly over economic inclusion.157 This is not simply a question of 
‘strengthening livelihoods’ or implementing a series of microcredit programmes 
through NGOs; economic inclusion taken to its logical end poses a fundamental 
challenge to donor interests and agendas. It is clear that DFID’s notion of janajati 
empowerment does not involve allowing NEFIN or any other partner to make 
demands in which political confrontation is the outcome, and yet this is the only 
logical outcome of janajati empowerment.  
 
It was the Maoists who had proved that challenging the state is precisely what has the 
potential to bring about fundamental social change. The Maoists also exposed the 
attempt by NGOs and donors to pacify those in opposition, using funding as the 
principal mechanism. The Maoists rightly raised ethnic demands as part of the 
People’s War, and aspects of the proposed federal structure undeniably offer 
opportunities to address entrenched patterns of ethnic discrimination. But by 
abandoning class demands without providing an alternative pole around which to 
organise political consciousness and collective resistance, the Maoists only risk 
encouraging ethnic divisions. Moreover, by appealing to the state for ethnic rights 
through constitutional means, this strengthens the neoliberal state and the NGOs that 
work alongside it, instead of popularising a critique of the state and its role in 
perpetuating socio-economic inequality.   
 
                                                
157 In May 2011, DFID discontinued funding to NEFIN for its Janajati Empowerment Project, citing its 
involvement in organising bandhs [strikes]. NEFIN organised two bandhs in 2011 demanding inclusion 
in and promulgation of the constitution within the deadline. See http://www.ekantipur.com/the-
kathmandu-post/2011/05/11/top-story/supporting-bandas-costs-nefin-dear/221581.html (last accessed 
on 25 February 2013). However, a brief look at the Enabling State Programme website, which manages 
the project, shows that funding is set to continue until the end of 2013. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 
The Maoists’ transition from fighting a People’s War to engaging in a peace process 
has been one of the most momentous events in Nepali history. It also has been 
described as one of ‘the most remarkable developments in the history of efforts to 
resolve communist rebellions’ (Muni 2012: 313). The move from armed struggle to 
mainstream party is not unique to Nepal, but the question remains as to whether this 
phenomenon—the evolution from revolutionary politics to NGO politics—was 
inevitable. The preceding chapters have attempted to show how this shift took place, 
the limited but nevertheless important role of NGOs in that process and what its 
consequences were in the context of Nepal. One of the main contentions has been that 
NGOs played an important—and at least partly conscious—role at a number of 
different levels in ensuring that the Maoists opted for a peace process backed by 
regional and global imperialist powers, against whom they had fought throughout the 
previous decade. The other central claim concerns the theoretical positions of Maoism 
itself. Although the Maoists managed to reorient the country towards a radical 
departure from the status quo—a secular, federal republic that replaced a conservative 
Hindu monarchy—and gain immense popularity as communists, they were 
predisposed towards a partially NGO-brokered ‘peace process’ that would leave much 
of the Nepali elite in place because of their conviction that a new, more equitable 
society was impossible at the present stage of historical development.158 Participation 
in the peace process has had profound consequences: the Maoists have accepted the 
main tenets of capitalist development, entrenched themselves into the mainstream of 
politics in Nepal, and distanced themselves from strategies involving popular struggle. 
Moreover, the adoption of a parliamentary perspective alone has meant the 
abandonment of the struggle to transform wider structures in Nepali society and with 
it, the acceptance of a framework of consensual, neoliberal policies. In the process, it 
has meant accepting—and even embracing—the involvement of the US and India in 
Nepal’s internal political affairs. NGOs facilitated the Maoists’ transition at crucial 
moments. The impact of the revolutionary upheavals of 2006 in Nepal, and to some 
                                                
158 One Economic Times article put it bluntly, quoting Narayan Kaji Shrestha, vice chairman of the 
UCPN and deputy prime minister, as saying that the Maoists had ‘come to the conclusion that it was 
not possible to achieve socialism via the model of new democracy in the current global political 
context’ and that since ‘the society has preferred capitalism the party has decided to change its 
ideological course’. See http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-02-
01/news/36684621_1_socialism-nepal-maoists-ucpn-maoist (last accessed on 30 August 2013). 
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extent the general strike of 2010—the possibilities that were opened up, including the 
hopes and expectations that were dashed—will be felt for many decades to come. 
 
7.1. The promise of democracy 
In her critical analysis of democratic Nepal, Brown concludes that the 1990 
movement was an uneasy compromise, without a ‘clear break from the past’ (1996: 
211) of the panchayat era. Instead, the power and authority of Nepal’s traditional 
elites had been reinforced, because inequality was now sanctioned through the ballot 
box. Brown argues, however, that unlike the panchayat regime, it is the ‘government 
elected by the people that must bear responsibility for economic stagnation, poverty 
and inequality’ (1996: 211). Her conclusion is pessimistic: that democratic Nepal 
differs only superficially from the panchayat era. Of course there is truth in this, but it 
is also true that the post-1990 democratic political order had brought forth the 
possibility of fundamental change unlike under the panchayat system. Even if the 
middle classes in the urban centres led the democracy movement, as Brown points 
out, this does not diminish its significance and its impact on the formation of political 
consciousness across Nepal. Although Brown was writing a decade before the second 
people’s movement, clearly the first people’s movement in 1990 was in the minds of 
those who came out onto the streets in 2006. The second democracy movement was 
also much broader than the urban middle classes. The fact that much has been said 
about ‘raised expectations’ amongst the vast majority was an important step forward 
in the process of social change in Nepal. The situation contained so much potential, 
and yet at the height of the second peoples’ movement, when the Maoists had 
cultivated a great deal of support, they took the decision to abandon the People’s War 
and engage in a peace process facilitated by India, backed by the imperialist powers. 
Since then, the Maoists have been drawn into consensus-based politics wholesale. 
They have debated the finer points of what will be a bourgeois constitution; they have 
signed massive trade deals with India that are at best controversial and at worst 
deepen Nepal’s economic dependence and exploitation; they have given up the PLA 
and their urban-based fighting force the YCL, and in the process created a great 
degree of disillusionment amongst thousands of young cadre; they have continued 
plans to privatise industry that previous governments had prepared; and, crucially, 
they have co-resided over a state restructuring process that puts ethnic claims above 
all else. Whereas once divisions in Nepali society cut across class lines, today the 
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main debate is about identity and access to resources for specific ethnic groups. 
Whatever potential the Maoists’ project once held, it is impossible to claim now, as 
they still do, that the Maoists are still on the road to revolution.159  
 
But the question is how had Nepal ended up moving from what was essentially a class 
project, where the Maoists’ aim was to transform relations of production and bring an 
end to exploitation—albeit with a focus on ethnic discrimination, which was 
necessary given Nepal’s ethnic diversity and inequality—to a situation where ethnic 
identity has become the defining feature of Nepali politics? Any process of social 
change brings forth a battle between opposing social forces. What has remained 
constant throughout Nepal’s political history before and after 1990 was the 
combination of ideological and physical force exerted by the establishment to 
suppress change. In his review of Brown’s study, Muni (1996) argues that the most 
critical question was the ‘truncated and incomplete nature of democratic revolutions’ 
and continuity with the past, despite having achieved formal democracy.  
 
7.2. NGOs and the Left in Nepal 
Despite the growth and influence of the Left in Nepal over the past several decades, 
NGOs—with a much shorter history—were able to flourish. Imperialism as a force is 
ever-present in developing countries, either in subtle forms—where NGOs have 
arguably become the public relations face of imperialism (Davis 2007: 76; Hearn 
2007: 1098)—or in overt forms, such as military bases. In the case of Nepal, it was 
Indian intervention that brokered the peace deal that facilitated the entry of the 
Maoists into the mainstream. But as described throughout this work, NGOs were key 
players in the anti-Maoist alliance that was mobilising for peace and reconciliation 
and for an end to mass-based resistance. The NGOs’ presence on the ground, 
particularly in Maoist base areas, meant that they had a certain legitimacy amongst the 
Maoist rank and file, whatever the formal positions of the UCPN, and this 
undermined alternative notions of collective organisation. At a national level, NGOs 
were also central to framing the peace process in such a way as to have the best 
chance of drawing the Maoists in, both through raising the issues of the eradication of 
feudal relations and related inequality, and eliding the concepts of democracy and 
                                                
159 See http://news.oneindia.in/2011/01/15/maoistsnot-abandoning-path-of-revolutionbhattarai-
aid0126.html (last accessed on 30 August 2013). 
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peacebuilding. This role shows that in practice, when NGOs take funding from 
imperialist powers they also tend to pursue the agendas of the imperialist powers, and 
these often coincide with domestic ruling elites. In this sense, the role of NGOs during 
this period of social and political conflict bears out the reading of Gramsci that reveals 
the interrelatedness of civil and political society (Thomas 2009: 182). Civil society 
appears to be apolitical, but the structures of civil society, precisely by giving the 
impression of being ‘inevitable’ or ‘organic’ and by draining politics out of everyday 
life, are inclined to reinforce the dominance of those forces that control, or exercise 
hegemony over, political society and the state.  
 
Although the purpose of this research has not been to focus on the specific 
contributions of NGOs, the intention is not to deny or dismiss these contributions at 
various levels. Rather, it is to highlight the complexity, tensions and contradictions 
within the NGO sector in Nepal, and to point to the problem of the ideological 
influences on NGOs, despite, or in addition to, the material nature of donor funding. 
Heaton Shrestha and Adhikari (2011: 48) point to one particular example of an NGO 
that they argue defied the norm: in the post-2006 period, this anonymous NGO began 
hosting discussions around secularism and CA elections, which questioned the 
political proposals of both the king and the mainstream parties, and suggested that the 
Maoists’ agenda might be viable for Nepal—‘an unexpectedly bold act for an NGO’. 
This NGO also refused donor funding for human rights monitoring and operated more 
like a movement-oriented organisation than a ‘typical NGO’: there were no fixed 
office hours or programmes, there were a plethora of volunteers who felt they were 
working for ‘the movement’ and there was only a loose management structure. In 
what they describe as a process of ‘de-NGOisation’, Heaton Shrestha and Adhikari 
document the ways in which this particular NGO negotiated its agency, building 
credibility with the public and volunteers, first by being conscious of the reputation of 
many Kathmandu-based NGOs and, second, by eschewing donor funding.160 There 
are other examples that are less well documented, in which certain aspects of the work 
of NGOs have had positive impacts: human rights monitoring and documentation 
during and after the war have been essential in developing a measure of government 
                                                
160 It should be noted that this was not a blanket rejection of funding. For some projects, donor funding 
was accepted, but with the insistence on non-interference in programmes and campaigns (Heaton 
Shrestha and Adhikari 2011: 51). 
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accountability; infrastructure projects such as roads and communications have been 
immensely beneficial for communities in remote rural areas; and select reports of 
NGOs investigating and analysing material conditions in Nepal have been crucial in 
developing a greater understanding about how to address particular problems.   
 
Such examples do exist, and from this it is clear that NGOs can and often do play a 
supporting role—though not a leading role—in wider processes of social change 
under certain conditions. In an online interview, Arjun Karki, former president of the 
NGO Federation of Nepal and leading advocate of NGOs, highlights this potential 
supporting role. The purpose of the NGO Federation—bringing together over 4,500 
NGOs in the country—is to act as both partner to government and pressure group 
against government, when ‘it comes up with anti-poor and anti-people’ 
programmes.161 Karki acknowledges the tarnished image of Kathmandu-based NGOs 
but focuses instead on the problem of reconciliation and peacebuilding at the local 
level, and the general lack of the rule of law that has flourished since the beginning of 
the People’s War. These are concerns shared by the many donors funding NGO 
projects. However, given the vastly more constrained facilities and connections to 
funding in the districts and, crucially, the class background of the NGO workers 
themselves, the work of NGOs at the local level is often of a different order. One 
NGO worker in Rukum commented:  
 
We have heard criticisms about NGOs in Kathmandu. One thing you can 
see is that NGOs in rural areas are not the same as the ones in 
Kathmandu. … We do a lot of volunteer work for the NGO movement 
here. There is some criticism at the local level too, but there is a huge 
difference between district level salaries and Kathmandu salaries. … We 
need to improve NGOs in terms of transparency but we need NGOs, they 
are a vital part of society.162 
 
In Humla, there are 111 registered NGOs but only a handful of them are active, 
according to a representative of the NGO Federation in Humla. This interviewee takes 
a slightly more critical and more nuanced view of NGOs, recognising their role and 
                                                
161 See http://www.arjunkarki.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=84:the-
credibility-and-management-of-ngos-in-nepal-dunhams-interview-with-dr-arjun-kumar-
karki&catid=3:interviews&Itemid=5 (last accessed on 19 September 2013). 
162 Interview with Jeevan Khadka, Rukum, 17 March 2010. 
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limitations, but also confirming the role of NGOs in the transition from armed 
struggle to peace process:  
 
NGOs have played a big role in Nepal’s transition but political parties 
play the decisive role. NGOs can raise social awareness, and they have 
been doing this. … NGOs are teaching about rights and people are 
conscious about rights. The problem is they haven’t been able to provide 
[adequate material goods]. … Human rights are fine and good but at the 
end of the day people need rice. On the other hand there is no dynamism 
in politics and people have no trust in any of the politicians. … These are 
some of the problems we face.163 
 
Another NGO worker in Humla similarly identifies the problem of the lack of 
accountability but focuses criticism on power politics at national and international 
levels, drawing a distinction between NGOs and donor agencies and refraining from 
criticising NGOs directly:  
 
It’s politics that is the problem. For example, there is no analysis about 
where the local budget is going. There is no needs-based analysis by 
Kathmandu-based donors. They have no idea, and yet they make the 
decisions. Since 10-15 years there have been numerous public reports 
about the Hilsa-Simikot road but the road is still unfinished. … It is true 
that there have been important changes. In education, many people have 
now passed SLC and even a degree. Communications have also improved; 
you have telephones now and mobile phones, and the road has almost 
reached. NGOs are working for all these issues. The main problem is 
political. The Nepal government’s policy is to work according to the 
policy of the donors, not its own.164 
  
There is a role for NGOs, both in Nepal and at a global level. But NGOs have been 
and continue to be influenced by the conservatism of the state. This co-option has 
involved a complex interplay of material and ideological interventions at various 
levels and in myriad forms. In Nepal, there was an additional co-option—that of the 
Left—and it was similarly enabled by the related weaknesses of the theory and 
practice of the left parties themselves, and in particular the Maoists. NGO engagement 
at local levels was facilitated by the Maoists’ abandonment of local political 
institutions that could take the gains of the revolution forward: the Maoists had 
dismantled the people’s governments and the people’s courts in the rural areas and 
                                                
163 Interview with Kamal Bohara, Humla, 7 April 2010. 
164 Interview with Nanda Bahadur Rokaya, Humla, 5 April 2010.  
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effectively allowed NGOs, as seen in the base areas of Rolpa and Rukum, to take their 
place. Once they allowed this to happen, NGOs set about the task of constructing a 
return to market-based institutions. Even the Nepali Congress and the UML have been 
surprised at the pace with which the Maoists have embraced not only the moral and 
financial corruption that has entailed being in government, but neoliberal reforms.165 
Ultimately, it ceased to be the Maoists who were shaping the movement and the 
method of resistance, but the imperialist powers and the middle classes. The popular 
aspiration the Maoists expressed for a more humane, democratic, equitable and just 
society have been contained for the time being by a successful counter-hegemonic 
struggle and the contradictions in the Maoists’ own theory. But the successful 
struggles they led for political change continue to raise questions about social justice 
in the present. The challenge of producing a theory and practice of development that 
genuinely benefits the masses of Nepal remains present at every turn. 
                                                
165 Interview with Shyam Shrestha, Kathmandu, 17 January 2010. 
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Appendix 2: List of interviewees 
 
Kathmandu 
1. Aditya Adhikari, journalist 
2. Bishnu Pukar Shrestha, Chairperson, Campaign for Human Rights and Social 
Transformation (CAHURAST) 
3. Chaitanya Mishra, Professor, Tribhuvan University 
4. Chaitanya Subba, former advisor to NEFIN 
5. Chij Kumar Shrestha, Chairperson, Association of International NGOs in 
Nepal (AIN) 
6. David Wood, Consultant, UNDP and former Head of Office, DFID Nepal 
7. Deepak Bhattarai, Chairperson, Collective Campaign for Peace (COCAP) 
8. Devendra Raj Panday, civil society activist and former minister 
9. Dipendra Jha, Chairperson, Democratic Freedom and Human Rights Institute 
(DFHRI) 
10. Ganashyam Bhusal, Central Committee Member, UML 
11. Kiyoko Ogura, writer and journalist 
12. Krishna Bahadur Mahara, CA member, UCPN (M) 
13. Mandira Sharma, Executive Director, Advocacy Forum 
14. Netra Timisina, Chairperson, NGO Federation 
15. Padma Ratna Tuladhar, former minister and mediator 
16. Pampha Bhusal, CA member, UCPN (M) 
17. Pradip Nepal, Central Committee Member, UML 
18. Ram Kumari Jhankri, student leader, UML 
19. Renu Rajbhandari, Chairperson, Women’s Rehabilitation Centre (WOREC) 
20. Santosh Budda Magar, CA member, UCPN (M) 
21. Seira Tamang, Chairperson, Martin Chautari 
22. Sharada Jnawali, Conflict Advisor, Asian Development Bank 
23. Shyam Shrestha, civil society activist 
24. Subodh Pyakurel, Chairperson, Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) 
25. Swanaam Saathi, Politburo Member, UCPN (M) 
 
Humla 
1. Divas Devkota, Project Co-ordinator, Development Project Service Centre 
(DEPROSC) 
2. Kamal Bohara, District Representative, NGO Federation 
3. Karna Bahadur Rokaya, Project Co-ordinator, Nepal Institute of Development 
Studies (NIDS) 
4. Karnajit Bhudathoki “Sushil”, CA member, UCPN (M) 
5. Nanda Bahadur Rokaya, District Co-ordinator, Karnali Integrated and Rural 
Development Research Centre (KIRDARC)  
6. Ramesh Aidi, District Representative, Informal Sector Service Centre 
(INSEC) 
7. Sher Bahadur Magar, Project Co-ordinator, Rural Integrated Development 
Service (RIDS) 
 
Ilam  
1. Bhesh Raj Acharya, civil society activist and Nepali Congress member 
2. Jasa Bahadur Lungeli, Campus Chief, Mahendra Ratna Multiple Campus 
3. Kiran Sunwar, District Chairperson, NEFIN 
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4. Mohan Lal Balmiki, Dalit rights activist 
5. Mohan Singh Thebe, Chairperson, Human Rights Forum 
6. Rudra Baral, Programme Co-ordinator, Sahara Nepal 
7. “Raman”, Eastern Region In-charge, UCPN (M) 
 
Jhapa 
1. Dharma Gautam, journalist 
2. Keshab Bhattarai, journalist 
3. Mahendra Giri, Programme Co-ordinator, Sahara Nepal 
4. Pankaj Bhurtel, Project Co-ordinator, Development Project Service Centre 
(DEPROSC) 
5. Prakash Pariyar, District Representative, Collective Campaign for Peace 
(COCAP) 
6. Ram Prasad Dhungana, Chairperson, Nepal Community Development Centre 
(NCDC) 
7. Rudra Sitaula, President, NGO Federation 
 
Mugu 
1. Amit Baral, District Co-ordinator, Rural Community Development Centre 
(RCDC) 
2. Deepak Raut, Project Co-ordinator, Human Rights and Environmental 
Development Centre (HRENDC) 
3. Gagan Bahadur Shahi, District Representative, NGO Federation 
4. Lagna Singh Sejuwal, Project Co-ordinator, Chhaya Chetra Community 
Development Centre (CCDC) 
5. Mangal Shahi “Pratik”, District In-charge, UCPN (M) 
6. Prakash Bahadur Thapa, District Co-ordinator, Karnali Integrated and Rural 
Development Research Centre (KIRDARC) 
7. Santosh Kumar Malla, District Chairperson, Campaign for Human Rights and 
Social Transformation (CAHURAST) 
 
Rolpa 
1. Ganashyam Acharya, Chairperson, Human Rights Awareness Centre 
(HURAC) 
2. Jit Bikram Malla, civil society activist and Nepali Congress member 
3. Juna Budda, General Secretary, Rural Development and Social Awareness 
Society (RUDAS) 
4. Maitrai Sharma, Project Officer, Development Project Service Centre 
(DEPROSC) 
5. Man Bahadur Budha Magar “Bikalpa”, District In-charge, UCPN (M) 
6. Prakash Kumar Giri, District Co-ordinator, Community Development and 
Research Centre (CDRC) 
7. Saraswati Acharya, President and Meena Gharti, Secretary, Himalayan 
Grassroots Women’s Natural Resource Management Association, Nepal 
(HIMAWANTI) 
8. Shobha Ram Dangi, District Representative, NGO Federation 
 
Rukum 
1. Jeevan Khadka, District Representative, Informal Sector Service Centre 
(INSEC) 
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2. Krishna Gautam, journalist 
3. “Mahesh”, Sub In-Charge, UCPN (M) 
4. Nara Bahadur Nepali, Chairperson, Rukumeli Bikas Samaj Kendra 
5. Pramesh Shrestha, District Co-ordinator, Child Workers in Nepal (CWIN) 
6. Prem Oli, Training Officer, Human Rights Protection Legal Service Centre 
(HRPLSC) 
7. Purna Bishwakarma, Chairperson, Oppressed Community Development 
Centre (OCDC) 
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